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Abstract
In September 1997, Fordham Law School’s Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (”Lawyers Committee”) undertook a
two-year project to study Turkey’s State Security Court system and to evaluate it against international fair trial standards. This special report is an amalgamation of their findings.

SPECIAL REPORT
JUSTICE ON TRIAL: STATE SECURITY
COURTS, POLICE IMPUNITY, AND THE
INTIMIDATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
DEFENDERS IN TURKEY
Report of the Joseph R. Crowley Program/Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights: Joint 1998 Mission to Turkey.*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Turkey's human rights record has emerged
as a critical issue in its relations with its allies in Europe and
North America. The Turkish government has been criticized for
serious violations of human rights ranging from restrictions on
* The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights/Crowley Program Joint Delegation
to Turkey benefitted from the contributions, support, and advice of many individuals
and organizations. First, we are indebted to the scores of lawyers, prosecutors, judges,
and other informed individuals who have met and consulted with the delegation during
our visit and the drafting of this report. Second, several Turkish human rights
organizations and professional associations have been helpful to us in our work. These
include the Human Rights Foundation, the Human Rights Association, the
Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (Mazlum Der), and
the Contemporary Lawyers Association. The bar associations of Istanbul and Diyarbakir
have been particularly helpful to our work, serving as co-hosts of the joint delegation
and providing much advice and hospitality at other times. The bar associations of
Adana, Ankara, Adiyaman, Batman, Izmir, and Malatya, and the Union of Turkish Bar
Associations have also assisted us. The wisdom and counsel of lawyers Senal Sarihan
and Sezgin Tanrikulu have been particularly valuable to the joint delegation and to the
Lawyers Committee in its work over the past few years. We are grateful to all of the
above. None of the above individuals or organizations bears any responsibility for the
views and opinions expressed here.
The Turkish government has been unfailingly cooperative and helpful in
facilitating our access to officials and in providing comments on our work, some of
which are reflected in this report. We have particularly appreciated the comments of
Prof. Dr. Hikmet Sami Turk, now Minister of Justice, and the helpfulness of Dr. Serif
Unal, Director General for International Cooperation at the Ministry of Justice and
Namik Tan, Counsellor at the Embassy of Turkey to the United States in Washington,
D.C.
The Directors of the Crowley program would like especially to thank Dean John
Feerick and the Fordham Law School alumni for supporting the work of the Crowley
program; Robert Quinn, the 1998-1999 Crowley fellow, who invested countless hours
preparing this report for publication; and Michael Posner, Executive Director of the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, for his willingness to collaborate on this project.
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speech and association to the use of torture.' To its credit, the
government has expressed a commitment to improving its
human rights record, despite difficult domestic problems including violent confrontation with the Kurdish Workers Party
("PKK") in ,southeastern Turkey.2 Reflecting this commitment,
Turkey has ratified a number of important human rights treaties
including the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention" or "Convention") and the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention Against Torture").'
Notwithstanding the government's expressed commitment
to ending abuses and its international obligations to do so, serious human rights violations persist. Although this report documents a number of these violations directly, it focuses on obsta1. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, TURKEY COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998, (1999) [hereinafter 1998 STATE DEP'T REPORT] (see also reports for earlier years); HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION CENTERS REPORT (1996)
[hereinafter 1996 HRFT REPORT] (see also reports for earlier years); Committee on
International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Torture in Turkey: The Legal System's Response, 45 RECORD 6 (1990); Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, An Update
of the 1990 Report of the City Bar Association on the Turkish Legal System's Response to the
Problem of Torture in Turkey, 51 RECORD 468 (1996); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI,
BROKEN PROMISES: TORTURE AND KILLINGS CONTINUE IN TURKEY 16-47 (1992) [hereinafFOUNDATION OF TURKEY,

ter

HUMAN

RIGHTS

WATCH/HELSINKI,

BROKEN

PROMISES];

PHYSICIANS

FOR HUMAN

RIGHTS, TORTURE IN TURKEY AND ITS UNWILLING ACCOMPLICES: THE SCOPE OF STATE PERSECUTION AND THE COERCION OF PHYSICIANS (1996) [hereinafter PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, TORTURE IN TURKEY];

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI,

TORTURE AND MIS-

TREATMENT DURING PRETRIAL DETENTION BY ANTI-TERROR POLICE Vol. 9, no. 4 (1997)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS'WATCH/HELSINKI, TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT]; United
Nations, Report of the Committee Against Torture, G.A. Res. 44, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,

Supp. No. 44A, U.N. Doc. A/48/44/Add.1 (1994) [hereinafter U.N. Torture Report];
Council of Europe, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment-or Punishment, 1996 Public Statement on Turkey, Dec. 6, 1996,
Ref.: CPT/Inf (96) 34 [EN] (visited Apr. 14, 1999) <http://www.cpt.coe.fr/en/other/
stat9612.htm> (on file with the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal) [hereinafter 1996
Council of Europe Statement].
2. This region has been the scene of armed conflict since 1984. The conflict has

been characterized by serious human rights violations, including attacks on civilians, by
both security forces and members of the Kurdish Workers Party ("PKK").
3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]; U.N.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 93d plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1995) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].

1999]

JOINT MISSION TO TURKEY

2131

cles within the Turkish legal system to the improvement of Turkey's human rights record more generally. These obstacles
include the existence of specialized political courts, police impunity for human rights violations, and the harassment of lawyers
and human rights advocates who seek to hold the state accountable for these violations.
Turkey's State Security Courts (or "SSCs") comprise a system of special courts operating throughout Turkey, the jurisdiction of which is limited to political offenses and serious criminal
offenses deemed threatening to the State. A number of features
of the State Security Court system raise questions regarding the
availability of a fair trial to defendants tried within the system.
For example, the participation of a military judge on every State
Security Court panel undermines the independence of the
courts, particularly given the -nature of the court's jurisdiction
and the role of the military in enforcing Turkey's strict Anti-Terror Law. In addition, the SSCs are governed by special procedures that afford fewer protections for defendants than do procedures in Turkey's ordinary criminal courts. In particular, suspects accused of political crimes within the jurisdiction of SSCs
are subject to extended periods of incommunicado detention
during which they may be tortured. Though the systematic use
of torture is well-documented, police responsible for such acts
are rarely held accountable. Finally, lawyers representing defendants in the State Security Courts are often subject to intimidation and harassment, sometimes undermining the effectiveness of their defense.
In September 1997, Fordham Law School's Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights4 and the Lawyers
4. The Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights ("Program" or
"Crowley Program") at Fordham University School of Law promotes teaching, scholarship, and advocacy in international human rights law. Principal elements of the Program include an annual fact-finding mission to an area of the world with significant
human rights concerns, a student outreach project involving students in course work,
research and human rights internships, both domestically and abroad, and a speaker
series, bringing many of the world's foremost experts in the field onto campus, stimulating dialogue and promoting scholarship. The Crowley Program approaches its work
in these areas in light of Fordham Law School's commitment to public service, its widely
recognized strength in the field of international law, and its close proximity to the
world's leading centers for human rights advocacy. For more information about the
Crowley Program, visit its website at <http://www.fordham.edu/law/centers/crowley/
home.htm>.
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Committee for Human Rights5 ("Lawyers Committee") undertook a two-year project to study Turkey's State Security Court system and to evaluate it against international fair trial standards.
The project included extensive study of Turkish law and procedure, including a review of previous reports by the Lawyers Committee and other international and Turkish non-governmental
organizations, and information provided by the Turkish government, among other sources. In May and June 1998, an eleven
person delegation 6 spent two weeks visiting ten cities in Turkey.7
During the mission, delegation members interviewed lawyers,
prosecutors, judges, government officials, and torture victims
and observed hearings in both State Security Courts and ordinary penal courts.8 This report documents our investigation,
summarizes our findings, and sets out our recommendations to
the Turkish government.9
The report is divided into three major parts. Part I addresses the right to a fair trial in the State Security Courts. Following an overview of the State Security Court system, this Part
analyzes problems with the independence of the SSCs, particularly the participation of a military judge, and then proceeds
chronologically through the trial process. It addresses the role
of the prosecutor in securing a fair trial, with particular focus on
the prosecutor's relationship with the police and with defense
5. Since 1978, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights ("Lawyers Committee")
has worked to protect and promote fundamental human rights. Its work is impartial,
holding all governments accountable to the standards affirmed in the International Bill
of Human Rights. Its programs focus on building the legal institutions and structures
that will guarantee human rights in the long term. Strengthening independent human
rights advocacy at the local level is a key feature of the Lawyers Committee's work. For
more information about the Lawyers Committee, visit their website at <http://
www.lchr.org>.
6. The members of the delegation from the Crowley Program were Professors
Tracy Higgins and Martin Flaherty (Co-Directors, Crowley Program), Michael Sweeney
(Crowley Program Fellow), Marko Maglich, Ayako Nagano, Kysseline Jean-Mary, Joan
Xia, Nnennaya Okezie, and Dyanna Pepitone (Crowley Program Scholars). The representatives of the Lawyers Committee were Neil Hicks and Tigran Eldred. The delegation benefitted from the help of seven very able interpreters: Muge Kinacioglu, Ayliz
Baskin, Aykut Kazanci, Tolga Ozalun, Dilek Kurban, Ayse Artun, and Pinar Erdogdu.
7. The cities were Adana, Ankara, Adiyaman, Batman, Diyarbakir, Istanbul, Izmir,
Manisa, Mardin, and Urfa.
8. A detailed itinerary listing the mission interviews is attached in Appendix One.
9. A version of this report entitled Obstacles to Reform: Exceptional Courts, Police Impunity and Persecution of Human Rights Defenders in Turkey is available from the Crowley
Program in International Human Rights and the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights.
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attorneys. It then describes in some detail the right to counsel
and obstacles to effective representation by defense counsel in
State Security Courts. Finally, this Part addresses the use of coercive interrogation procedures by the anti-terror police and the
use of coerced testimony in SSC proceedings.
Part II elaborates on the problem of coercive investigation
techniques by documenting the existence of a climate of impunity for police who engage in torture and other serious violations
of human rights. Part II begins by noting that torture of individuals held in detention continues to be one of the most serious
human rights problems in Turkey. It then reviews jurisdictional
hurdles to prosecution of police for torture, the most important
of which is a much-criticized law requiring bureaucratic review
and approval to prosecute any civil servant accused of a crime.
Part II also addresses other obstacles including reluctance on the
part of prosecutors to pursue these cases, understaffing of prosecutors' offices, police interference with the collection of evidence such as forensic evidence of torture, and a reluctance on
the part of the court to convict and impose appropriate
sentences.
Part III addresses the separate but related problem of the
harassment and intimidation of lawyers and human rights advocates. This Part begins by examining the harassment and unfair
prosecution of lawyers, a problem that further compromises the
fairness of proceedings in State Security Courts by undermining
the effectiveness of counsel in such proceedings. It then addresses the regulation and intimidation of human rights advocates, particularly the use of the Anti-Terror Law to restrict their
freedom of speech and association. Because much of the work
of defense lawyers and human rights advocates is deemed threatening to the Turkish state, these individuals may become defendants themselves in the SSC system, thereby facing detention
and the possibility of torture, conviction, and imprisonment.
This report concludes with a list of recommendations to the
Turkish government for addressing the problems and improving
its human rights record.
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I. THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL IN TURKEY'S STATE
SECURITY COURTS
A. Introduction
The right to a fair trial is fundamental to a broad set of
human rights in that a properly functioning justice system protects individuals from the unlawful and arbitrary denial of basic
rights and freedoms.1 0 In light of its importance, international
standards defining the right to a fair trial require states to safeguard the fairness of procedures beginning from the moment of
arrest and detention through trial and the final stages of the judicial process. Hence, the right to a fair trial implicates a wide
range of personnel and procedures connected with the criminal
justice system. This Part examines the right to fair trial in Turkey's State Security Courts as measured against Turkey's obligations under international law.
SSCs are a part of a system of special courts in Turkey
designed to adjudicate political and serious criminal cases
deemed threatening to the security of the state. SSCs have existed since 1973, when the legislature created them in accordance with then-governing 1962 Turkish Constitution.1 ' In 1976,
the Constitutional Court annulled the law creating the SSCs,
ending the SSC jurisdiction for a time. The SSC system was restored in the 1982 Turkish Constitution, itself the result of a military takeover of the civilian government. 1 2 The current Turkish
Constitution specifically provides for SSCs, describing them as
special courts "established to deal with offences against ,the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the free
democratic order, or against the Republic whose characteristics
are defined in the Constitution, and offences directly involving
3
the internal and external security of the State."'
Currently, there are eight SSCs in Turkey, some with multi10. For a full discussion of the right to fair trial in international law, focusing in
particular on the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), see LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WHAT IS A FAIR TRIAL?: A BASIC GUIDE TO LEGAL STANDARDS AND PRACTICE (Oct. 1995).

11. See Law No. 1773 (1973) (Turk.) passed in accordance with Article 136 of the
1962 Turkish Constitution.
12. The State Security Courts (or "SSCs") have been controversial in Turkey
throughout their existence. The Turkish National Bar Association opposed their establishment and continues to support their abolition.
13. TuRK. CONST. art. 143 (1982).
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pie chambers. 4 Each SSC is comprised of a president, two full
members, two substitutes, and a prosecutor. The president, one
full member, and one substitute must be civilians. The other full
member is a military judge. 5 SSCs differ from regular courts in
a variety of ways; these differences regard the number of judges,
the use of special judges, the use of special prosecutors, the use
of special procedures, and reliance on a special investigative arm
of the security forces.
The structure and scope of activity of the SSCs raise serious
questions in light of Turkey's obligation under international law
to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. This right, however,
depends not only on the conduct of the trial but also on the
totality of the criminal justice system. 16 The fairness of the SSC
trials therefore can only be assessed by taking into consideration
every stage of the process from initial detention, through investigation, to the eventual court proceedings.1 7 In assessing the
right to fair trial in the SSCs, this Part considers several of the
component elements of that right at each of these stages.
After reviewing Turkey's obligations under international
law, this Part addresses the role of judicial independence in the
SSC system, especially the structural foundation of the SSCs in
the Turkish Constitution and the procedures for appointing
both military and non-military judges to the SSCs. This Part next
considers the prosecutor's role in collecting and presenting evi14. SSCs are located in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Diyarbakir, Adana, Konya, Trabzon, and Van.
: 15. TuRK. CONST. art. 143; Law No. 2845 on the Creation and Rules of Procedure
of the State Security Courts §§ 3, 5 (Turk.) (translated in Incal v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R.
judgment of June 9, 1998, 78 Reports ofJudgments and Decisions 1547, 1558, 28 (1998IV)).
16. For example, in the ICCPR, to which Turkey is not a state party, but which may
be regarded as the primary international instrument in this area, General Comment
No. 13 identifies issues regarding the appointment ofjudges and the independence of
the judiciary as falling within the coverage of Article 14 of the covenant. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
176-77, 6 I.L.M. 368, 372-73 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Compilation of General Comments & Recommendations Adopted by the Humans Rights Treaty Bodies, Hum. Rts. Committee, 21st Session, 1984, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 14 (1994) [hereinafter General
Comment 13] (dealing principally with fair trial questions).
17. As will be discussed below, such an approach has been followed by the European Court of Human Rights ("European Court" or "Court") in its jurisprudence pertinent to this area, under Articles 5 and 6 of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("European Convention" or "Convention"). See European Convention, supra note 3, arts. 5-6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226-28.
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dence and in safeguarding the rights of defendants, including
those detained for pre-trial interrogation. It then addresses the
right to counsel in connection with the extended period of incommunicado detention and the role of defense counsel in the
SSC system. Finally, this Part focuses on the period of pre-trial
detention in state security cases, the role, of coercive interrogation techniques during this period, and the use of torture-induced testimony in SSC proceedings.
B. Turkey's Obligations Under InternationalLaw
The primary international instrument ratified by Turkey
and bearing on the right to fair trial is the European Convention. 8 Article 5 of the European Convention sets out standards
governing the pre-trial detention phase of a proceeding. Article
6 contains standards for a fair hearing. These standards, which
are binding in Turkish and international law,1 ° include the following rights.
" Protection from the arbitrary deprivation of the right to
20
liberty and security of person.
* The right to be informed promptly of the reasons for
arrest and any charges.21
" The right to be brought promptly before a judicial au22
thority and to trial within a reasonable time.
* The right to challenge the lawfulness of detention before
a court (habeas corpus). 2 3
24
" The right to compensation for wrongful imprisonment.
" The right to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
25
time by an independent and impartial tribunal.
26
" Presumption of innocence.
18. See id. Turkey has not ratified the ICCPR, the leading globally applicable standard that sets out the right to a fair trial.
19. Under Article 90 of the Turkish Constitution, international treaties ratified by
the government and approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly have the force
of law. See TuRK. CONST. art. 90.
20. European Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(1), at 226.
21. Id. art. 5(2), at 226.
22. Id. art. 5(3), at 226.
23. Id. art. 5(4), at 226.
24. Id. art. 5(5), at 228.
25. Id. art. 6(1), at 228.
26. Id. art. 6(2), at 228.
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* Due process safeguards including defendants' rights to be
informed in detail of the case against them.2 7
* The right to adequate time and facilities and to legal
assistance in preparing a defense. 8
" Defendants' right to present witnesses on their behalf and
to examine prosecution witnesses.2 9
Although comprehensive, this list is not fully exhaustive
with respect to the requirements of fairness in criminal proceedings. For example, the right to counsel appears expressly in Article 6(3), which deals with the rights of defendants in criminal
trials. 30 The European Court of Human Rights ("European
Court" or "Court") has also held that this right is implicit in both
the Article 5(3) right of the detained person to be "brought
promptly before a judge" and the Article 5(4) right of detained
persons to "take proceedings" of habeas corpus.3' The European
Court has also found additional features implicit in the right to
counsel, including the right to communicate with counsel,3 2 and
confidentiality in lawyer-client relations. 33 Although not without
limits, 34 these features of the right to counsel are applicable to
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art.
art.
art.
art.

6(3)(a), at 228.
6(3)(b), (c), at 228.
6(4), at 228.
6(3), at 228; see Artico v. Italy, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16,

33

(1980).
31. See European Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(3), (4), at 226; see Artico, at 1533.
32. -See Campbell & Fell v. United Kingdom, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 41, 1 99
(1982).
33. See S v. Switzerland, 220 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992). It may be noted that the
Court, in the case of S v. Switzerland, cited the United Nations' Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1955) in support of its conclusion that the right
of confidential communication with lawyers is a basic requirement of a fair trial and
hence is implicit in Article 6. Article 93 of the Standard Minimum Rules states that a
prisoner is entitled
to receive visits from his legal adviser ... and to prepare and hand to him[,
and to receive,] confidential instructions. For these purposes, he shall if he so
desires be supplied with writing material. Interviews between the prisoner and
his legal adviser may be within sight but not within hearing, either direct or
indirect, of a police or institution official.
StandardMinimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,First U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, E.S.C. Res. 663C, U.N. ESCOR, 24th
Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3408 (1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, U.N.
ESCOR 62d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977).
34. The European Convention permits restrictions on the right of counsel for
good cause. The question in each case is whether the restriction, in the light of the
16,
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Turkey under the European Convention and are of particular
importance because domestic Turkish law does not require the
state to provide lawyers for defendants in the SSCs.
The European Convention permits a state party to derogate
from certain obligations "in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation."3 5 Turkey has so derogated from its obligations under the European Convention, including obligations relating to fair trial, citing the threat to the
nation caused by internal terrorist activity, principally aligned
with Kurdish-separatist factions including the PKK. Between
1990 and 1992, Turkey derogated from Articles 5, 6, 8, 10, 11,
and 13 of the European Convention.16 Since 1992 it has reported its derogation solely from Article 5.37 Neither the European Court nor the European Commission on Human Rights
("European Commission" or "Commission") has questioned
Turkey's stated grounds for derogation. In its 1996 decision in
Aksoy v. Turkey, for example, the Commission simply ruled that
"[i]n view of the grave threat posed by terrorism in this region,
the Commission can only conclude that there is indeed a state of
emergency in South-East Turkey which threatens the life of the
entirety of the proceedings, has deprived the accused of a fair hearing. See Murray v.
United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Feb. 8, 1996, 1 Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 30, 54-55, 63 (1996-I). The issue of the lawfulness of a restriction, therefore,
is determined by the effect on the particular individual's trial, not by the legality or the
illegality of the measures in the domestic law. The Court has observed that "even a
lawfully exercised power of restriction is capable of depriving an accused, in certain
circumstances, of a fair procedure." Murray, at 55,
65.
The Court has found several restrictions permissible. For example, in a case-in •
which the defendants were accused of terrorist offenses, the Court found permissible a
three or four-week initial ban on visits by lawyers to arrested persons; a requirement of
prior notice to the authorities for visits; the separation of lawyer and client by glass
paneling; and a ban on defense lawyers tape recording visits with detained clients. The
Court has required, however, that paper correspondence between defense lawyers and
detained clients be permitted without delay or interruption, although judicial supervision is permissible. See Kr6cher & M61ler v. Switzerland, App. No. 8463/78, 26 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 24, 53-54, 15 (1981).
In Campbell & Fell v. United Kingdom, the Court stated that "there may be security
considerations which would justify some restriction on the conditions for visits by a
lawyer to a prisoner." Campbell & Fell v. United Kingdom, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at
45-46,
113 (1982). In one case, for example, there was a question of risk that evidence might be suppressed. See Can v. Austria, 95 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985). The
point was not discussed in depth because a settlement was reached in the case.
35. European Convention, supra note 3, art. 15(1), at 233.
36. See 33 Y.B. EUR. CoW. ON H.R. 14 (1990).
37. See 35 Y.B. EUR. CoNv. ON H.R. 16 (1992).
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nation. " "
Despite Turkey's declared derogation, the Court has not
shrunk from finding violations of Article 5 in complaints
brought before it under the right of individual petition provided
for in Article 25 of the European Convention.3 9 The Court has
repeatedly based its decisions in these cases on findings that the
particular measures have not been "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation" as required under Article 15(1), which
deals with derogation in time of war or other public emergency.4" The Court has dealt with complaints on a case-by-case
basis rather than finding a systemic failure of pre-trial detention
procedures in SSC cases. 4 ' The Court has also taken a very
broad view of fair-trial guarantees. The Court has emphasized
that in assessing fair-trial issues, it is important to look at the
entire process to determine the point at which various component rights are implicated. Similarly, the Commission has stated
that Article 6 rights "must be guaranteed4 2throughout the process,
rather than at a particular stage in them.
Turkey has also ratified both the U.N. Convention Against
Torture and the European Convention for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
("European Torture Convention"). s Both of these treaties abso-

lutely prohibit torture during criminal interrogation and require
38. Aksoy v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Dec. 18, 1996, 26 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2260, 2304, 179 (1996-VI) (Commission report).
39. Since 1995, the European Court has found violations of Article 5 of the European Convention against Turkey in the following cases: Mitap and Mfiftfioglu v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Mar. 25, 1996, 6 Reports ofJudgments and Decisions 402
(1996-I); Yagci & Sargi v. Turkey, 319 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Mansur v. Turkey,
3; Sakik and Others v. Turkey, Eur.
319 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Aksry, at 2264,
Ct. H.R. judgment of Nov. 26, 1997, 58 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2609, 2628,
2, 5, 7 (1997-VII); Kurt v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Apr. 25, 1998,
Holding
74 Reports ofJudgments and Decisions 1152, 1197, Holding 5 (1998-Il).
40. Aisling Reidy et al., Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the European Convention on Human Rights in the Case of Turkey, 15 NETH. Q. HUM; RTS. 161, 162 (1991).
41. For a full discussion of the challenges facing the mechanisms illustrated by
Turkey's and other nations' near-permanent state of emergency, see Oren Gross, "Once
More Unto the Breach": The Systemic Failure of Applying the European Convention on Human
Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YA.LE J. ITrr'L L. 436 (1998).
42. W v. Switzerland, App. No. 9022/80, 33 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 21, 37,
6 (1983) (emphasis added).
43. European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126 [hereinafter European Torture Convention].
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"that any statement which is established to have been made as a
result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceed44
ings.
Beyond the binding international treaties ratified by Turkey, other international instruments are relevant to a consideration of the right to fair trial before SSCs. The U.N. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment 4 5 amplifies and reinforces the due
process rights and pre-trial detention safeguards contained in
the European Convention. Similarly, the U.N. Basic Principles
on the Independence of the Judiciary4 6 (or "Principles on Lawyers") establish more detailed standards in the area of judicial
independence, while the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of
Lawyers47 elaborate the right of access to counsel provided for in
the binding treaty documents. Although not treaties, these instruments represent an authoritative set of internationally-recognized standards adopted by consensus by the U.N. General Assembly. 48 In each of these instruments, states are exhorted to
implement the principles therein and in so doing bring practices
in every country closer to the standards envisaged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights4 9 and the treaties derived from
it, including the European Convention.

44. Id.; Convention Against Torture, supra note 3, art. 15.
45. G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 49, at 298, U.N.
Doc. A/43/49 (1988).
46. The U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary was adopted
by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Milan in 1985, and was endorsed by General Assembly Resolution 40/32 of November 29, 1985 and Resolution 40/146 of December 13, 1985. See
G.A. Res. 40/32, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 204, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1985); G.A. Res. 40/146, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 254, U.N. Doc. A/
40/53 (1985) [hereinafter Principles on Judiciary].
47. The U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers was adopted by the Eighth
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders,
held in Havana in 1990, and welcomed by the General Assembly in Resolution 45/121
of December 14, 1990. See G.A. Res. 45/121, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. No. A/
CON. 144/28 (1990) [hereinafter Principleson Lawyers].
48. See CHRISTOPHER L. AVERY & AMNESTY INT'L, A GUIDE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
BODY OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROTECTION OF ALL PERSONS UNDER ANY FORM OF DETENTION OR IMPRISONMENT (London 1989).

49. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
at 135, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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C. State Security Courts andJudicial Independence
1. SSCs and the 1982 Constitution: Problems of
Special Jurisdiction
State Security Courts fulfill a powerful function within the
Turkish State as described in the ringing rhetorical language of
the Turkish Constitution. The 1982 Constitution stipulates
countering threats to the integrity of the eternal Turkish Nation
and motherland as the reason for its promulgation.50 The preamble of the 1982 Constitution, which, according to Article 4,
shall not be amended nor shall its amendment even be proposed, proclaims the absolute supremacy of the will of the nation. The preamble further asserts that "no protection shall be
afforded to thoughts and opinions contrary to Turkish National
interests, the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity with its State and territory, Turkish historical and
moral values, or the nationalism, principles, reforms and mod51
ernism of Ataturk."
In the 1982 Constitution, the interests and integrity of the
Turkish State clearly take priority over the rights and liberties of
its citizens. Indeed, a recent report by rapporteurs of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly called attention to the
negative impact on human rights in Turkey of the language of
the 1982 Constitution. The report stated:
A basic concern of the Assembly, however, is still not being
addressed. The Turkish Constitution, adopted under military
rule in 1982 leaves room for (although it does not necessarily
entail) conceptions of the relationship of the State to the individual which are authoritarian and not compatible with the
Council of Europe's
Statute and the European Convention
52
on Human Rights.
The rapporteurs recommended adjustment to the language of
the preamble as one possible way to address concerns about the
53
authoritarian slant of the Constitution.
50. See Tum. CONST. pmbl.
51. Id.
52. Andras Barsony & Walter Schwimmer, Honouringof Obligations and Commitments
by Turkey: Report to the Committee on the Honoringof Obligations and Commitments by Member

States of the Council of Europe, Doc. No. 8300 28 (Jan. 15, 1999) (visited June 26, 1999)
<http://stars.coe.fr/doc/doc99/edoc8300.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).

53. See id.

31.

2142

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2129

In the context of constitutional language emphasizing the
primacy of the state, the establishment of SSCs as special courts
with jurisdiction over cases of a political nature has proven
highly problematic. The removal of political cases from courts
of general jurisdiction to the SSCs has led to an institutional bias
within the SSCs in favor of security at the expense of individual
liberty. After all, the very existence of SSCs is justified by the
threat to the state posed by the crimes comprising their jurisdiction. As a result, the SSC system has lost the necessary balance
between security and liberty that is found in the European Convention and in much other international human rights law.5 4 In
sum, the SSC has become a primary instrument for repression in
Turkey. The military-enshrined in the Constitution as the
guardian of the State, endowed with executive power through
the National Security Council, and with judicial power through
the presence of a military officer on the judicial panel in the
SSC-is both the interpreter and enforcer of what are described
in the Constitution as "Turkish historical and moral values" or
55
the "will of the nation.
2. Judicial Independence and Military Judges
The international community generally disapproves of
courts in which military judges exercise jurisdiction over civilians
because the independence of such courts cannot be guaranteed.5 6 This subsection reviews the characteristics of the State
54. For example, in Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, the European Court remarked on the need, inherent in the European Convention system, for a proper balance between the defense of the institutions of democracy in the common interest and
the protection of individual rights. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. B) at 27, 48 (1989).
55. TuRK. CONST. pmbl. Indeed, just as in a theocracy where priestly rulers interpret the requirements of the deity and thus determine law and its application, in Turkey the military guardians interpret what the sacred state requires in terms of obedience from its citizens. The objection on human rights grounds to theocracy is not, after
all, that such a system of political authority derives from God. Rather, it is that in such a
system power falls into the hands of an unaccountable group of rulers who claim special
authority to derive law from sacred texts. In Turkey, the military establishment, which
includes military judges, has a constitutionally established special prerogative to interpret the commands of the secular deity of the Turkish nation.
56. See, e.g., Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary,Jurors and Assessors and the
Independence of Lawyers: Report of the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 10,
34, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/1995/39 (1995) (report of Mr. Dato
Param Cumaraswamy of Malaysia, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, submitted on February 6, 1995).
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Security Courts that bear on the question of the independence
of such courts, specifically the participation of a military judge.
The military judges' presence on a SSC panel violates the
requirement of an independent tribunal in two important ways.
First, both the manner and term of appointment for military
judges create dependence on the military establishment. Second, the participation of military judges in criminal procedures
against civilians represents a conflict of interest due to the role
of the military in domestic law enforcement.
The independence of a tribunal depends in part on procedures governing the manner of appointment of judges, their
term of office, and limitations on their transfer and removal
from office.5 7 A review of the procedure for the appointment
and removal of military judges in SSCs reveals that the military
strongly influences each stage of the process. Pursuant to the
Military Legal Service Act, 58 the Secretary of Defense and the
Prime Minister appoint military judges by decree, subject to the
approval of the President. Although the appointment procedure must take into account the opinion of the Court of Cassation and the Ministry of Justice, a special committee of military
members effectively controls the process. 59 The committee is
composed of the personnel director and legal advisor of the
General Staff, the personnel director and legal advisor of the
staff of the branch of the military in which the candidate is serving, and the Director of Military Judicial Affairs at the Ministry of
Defense.
SSCjudges are appointed to a four-year term.6 0 For military
judges, reappointment depends on the committee's evaluation
of the judge's performance and ability. In evaluating the apti57. See id.; Findlay v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Feb. 25, 1997, 30
Reports ofJudgments and Decisions 263, 281-82,
73 (1997-I); General Comment 13, supra
note 16, § 3.
58. See Military Legal Service Act, Law No. 357, Section 16, §§ 1, 3 (Turk.) (translated in Incal v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of June 9, 1998, 78 Reports ofJudgments
and Decisions 1547, 1560, 29 (1998-IV)).
59. Id.

60. See id. Additional Section 8 (translated in Incal, at 1560,

29) ("Members of

the National Security Courts belonging to the Military Legal Service, shall be appointed
by a committee composed of the personnel director and legal advisor of the General
Staff, the personnel director and legal advisor attached to the staff of the arm in which
the person concerned is serving and the Director of Military Judicial Affairs at the Min-

istry of Defense.").
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tude of military judges to serve on SSCs, the committee members
must review assessment reports drawn up by the Minister of Justice and the Secretary of Defense. 61 The Minister of Justice and
Secretary of Defense also determine the advancement of military
judges in salary, rank, and seniority.6 2 Militaryjudges are therefore subject to oversight by their military superiors, even while
sitting on SSCs. 6
Whether this evaluation and appointment process actually
affects the decision of a military judge in a particular case is not
dispositive of the question of judicial independence. The degree to which the interests of the military influence a case may
be indiscernible to an objective review. Nevertheless,judges who
face reevaluation and reappointment every four years must feel
the pressure of those superior officers evaluating them. Moreover, their presence creates the appearance of partiality, thereby
undermining public confidence in the integrity of the system.
The military judges' continuing accountability to their superior officers after their tenure on the SSCs poses perhaps an
even greater threat to their independence on the bench. The
military judge's subsequent career advancement and future assignments depend upon evaluation by military superiors. Thus,
the legal decisions that military members of the SSCs render may
well determine their professional future whether or not they remain on the bench. For example, a ruling viewed by superiors as
against the military's interest could subject a judge to reassignment in a less desirable position, a loss of status, career frustration, and even disciplinary measures. Such possibilities undermine the capacity for independent judgment of the military
members of SSC tribunals.
The second important threat to the independence of the
SSCs stems from the connection between the interests of the military and the nature of SSC jurisdiction.6 4 The State Security
Courts have jurisdiction over crimes threatening the integrity of
61. See id. Additional Section 7 (translated in Incal, at 1559, 29).
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., id. §§ 18(1), 29, 38 (translated in Incal at 1560,
29).
64. In extraordinary situations such exceptional measures may be necessary, but
they must be temporary and courts must scrupulously provide all the fair trial guarantees of international law. See General Comment 13, supra note 16. The Turkish SSC system does not satisfy these conditions. For example, the Turkish SSC system is not temporary. The SSCs have operated for over a decade and a half.
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the Turkish State, of which the Turkish military is the ultimate
guarantor under the 1982 Constitution. In fulfilling this function, the military has extended its operation to both ordinary law
enforcement and politics. As to the former, the military functions in connection with, and sometimes in lieu of, ordinary police to enforce the Anti-Terror Law in certain regions of the
country. As to the latter, both the coup of 1980 and the military's overt role in forcing the Islamic Refah (Welfare) Party from
power in 1997 indicate an ability and willingness to override the
democratic process. Under the circumstances, the presence of
military judges on the SSCs seriously undermines the ability of
SSCs both to adjudicate fairly cases involving violations of laws
that the military helps to enforce and to protect the rights of
individuals deemed by the military to be threatening to the state.
These concerns have been expressed by both the European
Commission and the European Court. Both the Commission
and the Court have found that the presence of a military judge
on SSC panels violates a defendant's right to an independent
and impartial tribunal. For example, in Incal v. Turkey,6 5 the European Commission found that the Turkish SSCs violated Article
6(1)66 of the European Convention.
The Commission is of the view, under the current legislation
on the composition of the National Security Courts, the manner of appointment and assessment of military judges raises a
number of questions and may cast doubt on the image of independence which they should project. The Commission
notes in this regard that military judges are accountable to
their commanding officers in their capacity as military officers. [Moreover,] [t]he fact that a military judge participates in criminal proceedings against a civilian, in cases not
in any way involving the internal order of the armed forces,
highlights the unusual nature of these proceedings and can
also be regarded as an intervention by the armed forces in a
non-military judicial domain, that is, a domain which should
remain, in a democratic country, above any suspicion of de65. Incal v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of June 9, 1998, 78 Reports ofJudgments
and Decisions 1547 (1998-IV).
66. Article 6(1) states, "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations of
any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and' public hearing... by
an independent and impartial tribunal." European Convention, supra note 3, art. 6(1),
at 228.
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67
pendence or partiality.

The European Court also found that the presence of a military judge on the SSC's panels violates the European Convention's guarantee of an independent and impartial tribunal. Noting that the military judges sitting on the SSCs are still soldiers
and thereby under the control of the executive, that their military superiors assess and discipline them and determine their career, and that their term of office is only four years and renewable, the Court found that an applicant "could legitimately fear
that because one of the judges... was a military judge it might
allow itself to be unduly influenced by considerations which had
nothing to do with the nature of the case."6 8
3. Judicial Independence: The Appointment and Promotion
of Non-Military Judges and Prosecutors
The Turkish Constitution guarantees judicial independence
of non-military judges in a variety of ways. The Constitution
states that "U]udicial power shall be exercised by independent
courts on behalf of the Turkish Nation."6 " It insulates the judiciary from outside influence by prohibiting orders or instructions
relating to the exercise ofjudicial power from any authority and
any legislative debate concerning a pending trial, and it provides
that the legislative and executive branches must implement
court decisions without alteration or delay.7" The Constitution
also provides judges with security of tenure7 1 andputs the bur67. Incal v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment ofJune 9, 1998, 78 Reports ofJudgments
and Decisions 1547, 1587,
74-75 (1998-IV) (Commission report).
68. Id. at 1573, 72.
69. TURK. CONST. art. 9.

70. Id. art. 138. Article 138 states that:
Judges shall be independent in the discharge of their duties; they shall give
judgement in accordance with the Constitution, law, and their personal conviction conforming with the law. No organ, authority, office, or individual
may give orders or instructions to courts or judges relating to the exercise of
judicial power, or send them circulars, make recommendations or suggestions.
No question shall be asked, debate held, or statement made in the Legislative
Assembly relating to the exercise of judicial power concerning a case under
trial. Legislative and executive organs and the administration shall comply
with court decisions; these organs and the administration shall neither alter
them in any respect, nor delay their execution.
Id.
71. Id. art. 139. Article 139 states that:
Judges and public prosecutors shall not be dismissed, or retired before the age
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den upon judges to discharge their duties in accordance with
the principles of the independence of the courts. The provisions apply to all non-military judges, including the non-military
members of the SSC.
The Constitution also creates the Supreme Council of
Judges and Public Prosecutors ("Supreme Council"), a seven
member body of executive and judicial personnel charged with
overseeing the judiciary. The Minister of Justice serves as the
President of the Supreme Council. The undersecretary to the
Minister of Justice is an ex officio member. The President of the
Supreme Council appoints the remaining five members, each to
a four-year term, selecting three from a list of nominees
presented by the High Court of Appeals from among its ranks
and two from a list of nominees prepared by the Council of
State. The Supreme Council in turn oversees appointment to
posts, admissions into the profession, promotions, removal from
office, and other administrative functions of the judiciary. Decisions of the Supreme Council are not reviewable. 7 2 As with nonmilitary judges, security of tenure for public prosecutors is recognized by the Constitution 7 3 and all other personnel matters are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Council."4
The system for appointing and overseeing non-military
judges is clearly vastly superior to that for militaryjudges. Neverprescribed by the Constitution; nor shall they be deprived of their salaries,
allowances or other rights relating to their status, even as a result of the abolition of court or post. Exceptions indicated in law relating to those convicted
for an offence requiring dismissal from the profession, those who are definitely established as unable to perform their duties on account of ill health,
and those determined unsuitable to remain in the profession, are reserved.
Id.
72. See id. art. 138.
73. See id. art. 139.
74. See id. art. 140. Article 140 states:
The qualifications, appointment, rights and duties, salaries and allowances of
judges and public prosecutors, their promotion, temporary or permanent
change of their duties or posts, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against them and the subsequent imposition of disciplinary penalties, the conduct of investigation concerning them and the subsequent decision to prosecute them on account of offences committed in connection with, or in the
course of, their duties; the conviction for offences or instances of incompetence requiring their dismissal from the profession, their in-service training
and other matters relating to their personnel status shall be regulated by law
in accordance with the principles of the independence of the courts and the
security of tenure of judges.
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theless, despite these efforts to secure the independence of nonmilitary SSC judges, several features of the appointment and
oversight process provide reason for concern. The membership
structure of the Supreme Council creates a potential for political
influence in many essential personnel decisions. For example,
although the Constitution prohibits the dismissal of judges except under limited circumstances, it does not address the transfer or reassignment of judges. Thus, a judge may be removed
from a case by reassignment or effectively demoted through
transfer to another, less desirable, region. The lack of an appeal
mechanism from the decision of the Supreme Council, though
intended to ensure independence, makes this situation worse.
Several lawyers suggested that, because of his rank, the presence of the Minister of Justice in the Supreme Council creates
undue political pressure on judges and prosecutors. Moreover,
the delegation was told of instances in which judges had recused
themselves from cases, apparently under official pressure. Adnan Gines, an Istanbul SSC prosecutor, told the delegation that
despite guarantees of judicial independence, a judge can be removed at any time by the Minister of Justice and his undersecretary acting through the Supreme Council, and because any objection to such a decision to remove ajudge can only be referred
to the same body, appeal is futile. Mr. Gfines also criticized the
current system for promoting judges as "opaque." He called for
a larger judicial council with more members elected by the judiciary.75
D. The Roles of the Prosecutorand Lawyers in Securing a Fair Trial
Turkey maintains an inquisitorial criminal justice system in
75. Interview with Adnan Gfines, Istanbul SCC Prosecutor, in Istanbul, Turk. (May
27, 1998). All of the interviews cited in this report were conducted by one or more
members of the Crowley Program/Lawyers Committee joint mission to Turkey. Hereinafter the interviews are cited by date and location. The vast majority of the interviews
were conducted in person during the two week mission in May/June 1998. Others were
conducted in New York prior to the mission or in various Turkish cities during a one
week follow-up mission in January 1999. A few follow-up interviews were conducted via
telephone from New York. Complete notes of all interviews are on file with the Crowley
Program at Fordham University School of Law. Most of the interviews were conducted
through the use of an interpreter. The quotations contained in this report appear as
translated and recorded in the notes of team members. Although we have made every
effort to represent the words and meaning of the speakers as accurately as possible, we
regret any misrepresentation that might have occurred in the process of translation.
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which the prosecutor plays a critical role in the investigation, indictment, and prosecution of a case. Because the role and
power of the defense attorney in such a system is limited relative
to that of the prosecutor, prosecutorial independence is particularly important to the guarantee of a fair trial. The delegation
found that this essential independence is lacking in SSC proceedings in a number of ways.
1. The Relationship Between the Prosecutor and the
Security Forces
Turkish law expressly authorizes public prosecutors to conduct investigations in the preparatory stages and to determine
jurisdiction over a case. Nevertheless, in practice, prosecutors
frequently delegate both duties to the security forces or, not uncommonly, acquiesce as security forces usurp control over these
duties. This problem pervades the criminal justice process, beginning with arrest and detention.
Security forces are responsible for capturing and detaining
suspects. Article 5(a) (2) of the October 1998 Regulation on Apprehension, Police Custody and Interrogation ("October Regulation") authorizes members of the security forces to take suspects into detention "where there are strong traces, indications,
circumstantial evidence and proof that they have committed or
have attempted to commit a crime."76 Since the security forces
have broad powers to detain on the basis of suspicion alone and
without an arrest warrant issued by the prosecutor, the prosecutor may not be notified of an arrest and detention until after the
fact.
This situation creates several problems. First, the security
forces, in effect, make the jurisdictional decision by electing
whether to bring the suspect before a SSC prosecutor or an ordinary criminal court prosecutor. Although certain cases fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SSCs, there is substantial
concurrentjurisdiction between the SSCs and the regular courts.
In these concurrent areas, or in cases in which the political aspect of the alleged crime is ambiguous, authorities exercise considerable discretion in deciding whether to pursue a case
76. October 1998 Regulation on Apprehension, Police Custody and Interrogation
art. 5(a) (2) (1998) (Turk.) [hereinafter October Regulation] (official translation provided by Turkish embassy in Washington, D.C.).
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through the regular.courts or through the SSCs. This decision is
important due to the differences in procedures in the two systems. For example, detainees and defendants have significantly
fewer protections in SSCs than they do in the regular courts, and
the State has no duty under domestic law to provide a lawyer to
detainees and defendants in SSCs, as it does in ordinary courts.
Second, the control of the security forces over the period of
detention undermines the role of the prosecutor in overseeing
interrogation and collection of evidence. Although the supervisory role of the prosecutor is critical to protect the rights of a
detainee who is undergoing criminal investigation, the prosecutor's responsibilities are often delegated or usurped. For example, in the case of one defendant, Hasan Demir, the arrest warrant required the police to take the defendant directly to the
prosecutor. Instead, the police took him straight to interrogation, leaving him vulnerable to mistreatment and torture. When
the defendant later complained to the prosecutor, the prosecutor claimed that he had delegated the task of interrogation to
the police. The defense lawyers appealed to the Minister of Justice, but the Ministry declined to take any action against either
the police or the prosecutor for this apparent violation of procedural law.77
The Turkish government is apparently aware of the important role that prosecutors should play in protecting the rights of
a detainee. In February 1998, then-Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz
issued a circular to prosecutors and police officers establishing
measures for "obtaining just, expeditious and efficient results in
the judicial system, protecting human rights and preventing activities that do not conform to human rights."7 8 This circular
placed responsibility on public prosecutors to inspect detention
facilities where detainees were held during police interrogation.
It also authorized prosecutors to supervise the police by listening
in on radio conversations between police and gendarmery
forces. The then-Minister of Justice, Oltan Sungurlu, authorized
prosecutors to carry out their inspections at all times and without hindrance or obstruction from the security forces.
When the delegation asked prosecutors whether the new
77. Interview with Oguz Demir & Several Demir in Istanbul, Turk. (June 1, 1998).
78. Justice, Interior Ministers Supersede PM CircularPermitting Inspections of Police Stations by Public Prosecutors,TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Oct. 3, 1998 [hereinafter PM Circular].
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regulation and circular had changed the way that they carried
out their work, most of them responded that it had not. They
explained that they lacked the resources necessary to prepare
cases for trial, let alone to take on additional duties safeguarding
the rights of defendants and overseeing the conduct of the security forces in this area.7 9
Despite the likely inefficacy of the new procedures, the police and gendarmery opposed the changes, perceiving them as a
threat to their control over the detention, centers. On October
1, 1998, the then-Minister of Justice, Hasan Denizkurdu, and
then-Minister of the Interior, Kutlu Akta6, enacted the October
Regulation. Article 25 of this new regulation places the responsibility for supervising detention facilities firmly in the hands of
the police, limiting the prosecutors' role to visiting detention facilities "as a prerequisite of their judicial task."8 The Tuikish
Daily News reported that "based on the new regulation, the police and gendarmery forces will not permit prosecutors to enter
the police stations .... With this regulation, public prosecutors
are prevented from obtaining any information about the events
occurring in the police stations." a The capacity to listen in on
confidential police and gendarmery radio wavelengths was not
mentioned in the new regulation, but is reportedly not envi82
sioned as part of the prosecutors' role.
The significance of the reversal of policy regarding
prosecutorial supervision of detention centers may be mostly
symbolic, given the limited effectiveness of the circular issued by
Prime Minister Yilmaz in February 1998. Nevertheless, the success of the police and gendarme in overturning even minor
changes indicates that the security forces alone control the period of detention and that prosecutors and judges have little
power in this area. This lack of prosecutorial or judicial oversight over the period of detention is extremely problematic because it is during this period that torture and ill-treatment most
79. For example, the Adiyaman Chief Prosecutor told the delegation that prosecutors have both economic and technological difficulties. They have limited human resources, a heavy case load, an inefficient administrative system, and inadequate forensic
medical resources in cities and towns. He also noted that the judiciary, of which prosecutors are considered a part, is the least funded branch in Turkey. Interview with
Adiyaman Chief Prosecutor, in Adiyaman, Turk. (May 31, 1998).
80. October Regulation, supra note 76, art. 25.
81. PM Circular,supra note 78.
82. See id.
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often occur. SSC procedures give the security forces every incentive to rely on custodial interrogation as their primary means of
obtaining evidence, and they control the setting in which such
interrogation is conducted. It is common for the defendant to
confess during the incommunicado detention period, and once
the confession has been put into the defendant's file, it becomes
very hard to remove, despite evidence of torture.
Many members of the judiciary with whom the delegation
met believe that a specialized judicial police force would help to
83
prevent human rights violations within the judicial process.
The creation of such a force under the control of the Ministry of
Justice and with responsibility for criminal interrogation would
have the effect of separating the detaining authority and the interrogating authority. This proposal has long been discussed as
a way to end the violations of human rights that currently plague
the pre-trial detention phase in the criminal justice process.84
Whatever the merits of such a plan, the fate of the far less ambitious proposals for increasing prosecutorial scrutiny over the interrogation made by Prime Minister Yilmaz in February 1998 indicates that this major structural reform would face determined
opposition from the security forces and their supporters in government.
2. The Role of the Defense Attorney
a. Denial of the Right to Counsel During Detention
In light of the ways in which the prosecutorial function has
been compromised in the SSCs, the role of the defense attorney
takes on added importance. Unfortunately, that role is undermined in practice before SSCs, where procedures safeguarding
the participation of the defendant's attorney in an ordinary
criminal proceeding are suspended.
83. Not all prosecutors favor the idea of a separate judicial police force. For example, the Chief Prosecutor in the Ankara SSCs, Cevdet Volkan, did not support the idea.
"It would take us about 20 years to get such a force up and running," he said. "Our
country lacks the resources to do this." He preferred, rather, to educate the security
forces about issues of human rights and fair trial standards. Interview with Cevdet
Volkan, Ankara SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Ankara, Turk. (June 4, 1998).
84. See, e.g., Nazim Tural, Judicial Police: A Long-Delayed Measure to Protect Human
Rights, TURKISH DAILY NEWS, July 30, 1997 (reporting that proposal to establish judicial
police force has been around for over 50 years). The Ministry of Justice drafted a law
for its formation in 1992, which was updated in 1997.
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The most serious problem in this regard is the denial of the
detainee's right of access to counsel during the initial phase of
detention. Turkish law currently permits a detainee accused of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the SSCs to be held for four
days before being given access to counsel. During that period,
the detainee may be interrogated and tortured and will often
confess. The confession, in turn, often serves as the sole basis
for prosecution notwithstanding evidence of torture. Thus, a detainee's defense may be irrevocably damaged before he ever consults with counsel.
The delegation spoke with several judges and prosecutors
who recognized the desirability of shortening the detention period, a view shared by some government officials. Although a
draft. revision of the Criminal Procedure Code prepared by the
Ministry of Justice under the Yilmaz Government proposed reform in this area, the legislation has not been enacted by the
Parliament. On the contrary, the trend has been away from reform. For example, Article 20 of the October Regulation explicitly denies SSC detainees access to counsel during the critical
phase of the proceeding, when the prosecutor takes a formal
statement from the accused to be presented in court. After establishing the right of access to counsel in ordinary cases, the
article makes clear that "[iun crimes falling under the scope of State
Security Courts, the apprehended person may meet his lawyer only
upon extension of the custody period by order of the judge."85
Even family members of SSC detainees need not be informed of
the detention before the scheduled appearance before a judge
after four days.
When asked why Turkey imposes the four-day period of incommunicado detention, both SSC prosecutors and judges and
85. October Regulation, supra note 76, art. 20 (emphasis added). Members of the
judiciary also clarified for the delegation the basis for this incommunicado detention
period under Turkish Law. The Chief Prosecutor of the Istanbul SSC, Erdal Gocken,
noted that the text of the law does not explicitly deny access to counsel during the first
four days of detention. He explained that "the four-day rule comes from our interpretation of an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code." That amendment gives a
judge the discretion to extend the initial four-day detention by three days and states
explicitly that the detainee has the right to counsel during those additional three days.
"We interpret this to mean that there is no right to access to a lawyer during the initial
four days." See Interview with Erdal Gokcen, Istanbul SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Istanbul,
Turk. (May 26, 1998). The October Regulation has now erased any ambiguity that may
have existed about the domestic law on the question of access to counsel for state security detainees.
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Ministry of Justice officials referred to Brogan and Others v. United
Kingdom, a decision of the European Court regarding length of
detention. They emphasized that if the European Court were to
deem four days too long, Turkey would reduce the incommuni6
cado detention period.
This argument conflates the issue of length of detention with
the detainee's right of access to counsel during the period of
preliminary investigation. Brogan, the case relied upon by Turkish officials, deals specifically with the "right to be brought
promptly before a judge.""7 It does not refer to incommunicado
detention. The government's reading of Brogan ignores other
decisions of the Court addressing the right to counsel. For example, in Murray v. United Kingdom, the Court affirmed the right
of access to counsel at the preliminary investigation phase,8 8
which, in SSC cases in Turkey, certainly begins and often is completed within the first four days of detention. Thus, even if the
European Court were to accept a four-day detention period, the
denial of access to counsel during that period may constitute a
separate violation of the detainee's rights.
Ministry ofJustice officials defended the imposition of a period of incommunicado detention as necessary due to the serious nature of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the SSCs, particularly terrorism. According to these officials, in such crimes
there is a heightened fear that the lawyer, or anyone else who
may meet with the detainee, might either assist in the destruction or suppression of evidence against the detainee or leak information to others outside the legal process who may be intent
on committing terror crimes or acting against the State. 9
86. An official at the Ministry of Justice stated, "If the [European Court] sees any
conflict between the rules applied in Turkey and the European Convention, Turkey will
see to it that it conforms to the [European Court]." Interview with Ministry of Justice
officials, in Ankara, Turk. (June 5, 1998).
87. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 30, 55
(1989).
88. See Murray v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Feb. 8, 1996, 1 Reports ofJudgments and Decisions 30 (1996-I).
89. The Director General of the Ministry of Justice pointed out that in terror-related crimes and crimes against the State, a defendant cannot see his lawyer until four
days after his arrest so that the investigation can continue and the authorities can
gather evidence. The concern is that the lawyer may facilitate the destruction of evidence and communicate with an illegal organization. Interview with Ministry ofJustice
officials, in Ankara, Turk. (June 5, 1998).
The Chief Prosecutor of the Ankara SSCs, Cevdet Volkan, states that the reason for
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Several SSC judges and prosecutors also cited terrorism as
justification for special procedures in SSC cases. The Chief Prosecutor and two prosecutors in the Istanbul SSCs, however, commented that, as lawyers, they believed that the defendant should
have access to his attorney during these first four days of detention.90 Seraffettin Iste, the ChiefJudge of the Istanbul SSC, conceded that "it would be better to let defendants see their attorney and to prosecute lawyers who assist terrorists by passing information outside of detention facilities." 9 ' The Chief
Prosecutor of the Ankara SSC, Cevdet Volkan, disagreed and argued that the suggestion to prosecute separately the lawyers who
pass information was unworkable. According to Volkan:
The claim that lawyers transmit information is our opinion;
we cannot prove it. It would be difficult to prove after the
fact. The four-day period is meant for the collection of evidence, not for interrogation. Think of the Akin Birdal case.
His assailants would not have been captured if not for the
detention and investigation period.9 2
the four-day incommunicado detention period is that "we need time to collect evidence, particularly in multinational, multi-defendant cases. We limit the detainee's
right to access a lawyer in order to prevent the lawyer from leaking the material evidence out. We have problems dealing with our lawyers." Interview with Cevdet Volkan,
Ankara SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Ankara, Turk. (June 4, 1998).
One Istanbul SSC prosecutor, Muzaffer Yalzin, explained that during the first four
days of detention, a detainee, theoretically, should be able to see his lawyer. But, this is
not allowed in order to stop the lawyer from passing messages out of the detention
center. Interview with Muzaffer Yalzin & Adnan Gfines, Istanbul SSC prosecutors, in
Istanbul, Turk. (May 27, 1998).
Officials in the Ministry ofJustice reasoned that terrorist crimes are a very complex
issue in Turkey, and sometimes the lawyer makes connections with terrorist groups.
The detainee is not allowed to see a lawyer because material evidence may be destroyed
or hidden by the detainee with the help of a lawyer. Interview with Ministry of Justice
officials, in Ankara, Turk. (June 5, 1998).
90. Istanbul SSC prosecutor Muzaffer Yalzin conveyed his belief that during the
first four days of detention, a detainee should be able to see his lawyer. Interview of
Muzaffer Yalzin and Adnan Gfines, Istanbul SSC prosecutors, in Istanbul, Turk. (May
27, 1998). The Chief Prosecutor separately echoed the same sentiment, "In general,
the detainee is kept for the first four days .... If the detainee could see the lawyer, the
lawyer could warn the others. As a lawyer, I am against this procedure. If there is a
principle that defense is an integral part of the judicial system, then we shouldn't worry
about secondary concerns like warning others." Interview with Erdal Gokcen, Istanbul
SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 26, 1998).
91. Interview with Seraffettin Iste, Chief Judge of the Istanbul SSC, in Istanbul,
Turk. (May 27, 1998).
92. Interview with Cevdet Volkan, Ankara SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Ankara, Turk.
(June 4, 1998) (referring to pending prosecution of individuals charged with May 1998
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With respect to terrorism, the European Court has held that
"the context of terrorism . . . has the effect of prolonging the
period during which the authorities may, without violating Article 5(3), keep a person suspected of serious terrorist offences in
custody before bringing him before a judge or other judicial officer."9" At the same time, however, the Court cautioned that
any such special factors "cannotjustify... dispensing altogether
with 'prompt' judicial control .... The degree of flexibility is, in
fact, very limited." Moreover, the threat of terrorism, even if
credible, cannot justify a blanket four-day incommunicado detention for all SSC detainees. Rather, the exigencies of a particular situation must be measured against the requirement of Article 5 on a case-by-case basis.
b. Obstacles to Client Access After the Four-Day Period
After the first four days of incommunicado detention, the
judge, at the request of the prosecutor, may approve an extension of the detention period for the SSC detainee. At that point,
however, the detainee has the right to contact a lawyer. Nevertheless, even though access to counsel is granted in theory, serious obstacles remain to the effective representation of defendants.
First, security forces may pressure detainees not to request
legal counsel. 94 Through psychological and physical mistreatment, members of the security forces may easily dissuade a detainee, who may be ignorant of his rights under the law, from
95
insisting on access to a lawyer.
Second, attorneys may encounter obstacles to providing effective legal representation to the client. The most basic problem the attorney may encounter is simply locating the client.
Members of the security forces may deny that the client has been
detained or insist that he has been transferred to another detention center. Once he identifies the location of the client, the
defense attorney must apply for permission to visit the detainee.
attempt to murder Akin Birdal, President of Turkey's largest human rights organization).
93. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 33, 61
(1989).
94. Id. at 33,
62.
95. Meeting with those members of the Istanbul Bar Association practicing in the
State Security Courts, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 25, 1998).
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Although prosecutors usually grant such permission, attorneys
often will not visit for fear of harassment by police. 96 When the
attorney does meet with his client, the police are always present,
making it difficult for the lawyer and the client to communicate
effectively. Such meetings usually lasts for no longer than ten
minutes.9 7
An experience of Sedat (inar, an attorney with the
Diyarbakir Bar Association, illustrates the problems that many
defense attorneys encounter. In 1993, Qinar obtained the acquittal of his client in the SSC. As the client left the prison, the
security forces detained him again, before he saw his family or
his lawyer, and took him to the Mardin gendarmerie." Attorney
Cinar went to the gendarmerie and asked to see his client. Because a prosecutor's permission was necessary to see him, Cinar
visited the prosecutor's office to get such approval. After waiting
five hours, the prosecutor finally called the gendarmerie to authorize Cinar to see his client. The gendarme commander replied that the defendant was a terrorist, that Qinar was a terrorist
lawyer, and that he therefore would not grant him access to his
client. Although the prosecutor argued that (Qinarwas entitled
by law to see his client, the gendarme commander refused access. The prosecutor then advised the lawyer not to go to the
gendarmerie because the gendarme would only harass him and
would not permit him to see his client.99
In addition to being denied access to their clients, attorneys
representing defendants in SSCs may be unable to prepare adequately for trial because they have been denied access to their
clients' files during the period of extended pre-trial detention.
By the time the lawyer sees the file, hearings in the case have
often already begun.1 °0
96. Interview with Sedat (Iinar, Diyarbakir Bar Association, in Diyarbakir, Turk.
(May 25, 1998).
97. Interview with defense lawyer, who prefers to remain anonymous, practicing in
the Istanbul SSC, in Istanbul, Turk. (May/June, 1998).
98. A gendarmerie is the physical building where the gendarme, a security force
within the military command structure, is headquartered.
99. Meeting with Diyarbakir Bar Association, in Diyarbakir, Turk. (May 25, 1998).
100. More generally, intimidation and harassment of defense attorneys, a serious
problem discussed more fully in Part III, may contribute to an effective denial of access
to counsel in that many lawyers are deterred altogether from defending cases in the
SSCs. See infta Part III.
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c. Limitations on the Defense Lawyer's Role in the
Trial/Hearing Setting
Once in court, defense attorneys face further obstacles, beginning literally and figuratively with the defense attorney's
place in the courtroom. In Turkish courtrooms, the defense lawyer is physically on a lower level than the prosecutor. This imbalance is increased in many SSC courtrooms in that the judges and
prosecutor often look down on the defense lawyers and the defendant from an intimidating height. The defense attorney
stands on the same level as the defendants while the prosecutor
sits next to the panel of judges on a platform raised above both
the defendant and the defense attorney.
The importance of this physical location of the prosecutor
and defense attorney in the courtroom may be more symbolic
than practical, but the imbalance of power that it reflects sometimes has more serious consequences. For example, the delegation was told of numerous occasions in which lawyers were excluded altogether from hearings. Under Turkish law, the judge
may exclude the defendant and the lawyer if the peace of the
courtroom will be disturbed. The judge need not give any reason for doing so. 101 Also, the lower status of defense attorneys
sometimes translates into physical vulnerability in the courtroom. Defense attorneys have been attacked by police, gendarme, and hostile bystanders in SSC courtrooms. 10 2 Ilknur
Aksu, a member of the Istanbul Bar practicing in the SSCs, described an incident where she and her client were attacked by
bystanders belonging to the right wing, ultra-nationalist MHP
political party while trying to defend the case in the courtroom.
The prosecutor offered no protection for the defense lawyers.
Such treatment forms part of a broad pattern of harassment of
defense lawyers in political cases in the SSCs 103 and obviously
impedes defense lawyers' ability to provide a full defense for
their clients.
Prosecutors and defense attorneys also have very different
levels of participation in the hearing process. For example, un101. Meeting with Istanbul office of the Human Rights Association ("HRA"), in
Istanbul, Turk. (May 30, 1998). Thejudge may also decide to close the proceedings to
the public and need not give a reason.
102. Id.
103. See infra Part III.
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like trials in many countries where a court reporter generates a
complete transcript of what is said by all parties during a hearing
or trial, the Turkish courts employ a stenographer, using a manual typewriter, to generate an account of. the trial or hearing.
The typist, however, does not record verbatim what is said in the
courtroom. Rather, the typist puts into the record what the
judge or the prosecutor dictates. A judge summarizes the testimony of witnesses, statements of defendants, and arguments of
defense counsel. The defense lawyer is not permitted to dictate
his defense argument directly into the court record and instead
must rely on the judge's summary. The defense lawyer can object to the judge's summary during the hearing, but it is within
the judge's discretion whether to accept the objection or even to
dictate it into the record.1" 4 By contrast, theprosecutor has the
right to summarize his own case during the hearing, dictating it
directly to the court reporter.
Finally, defense lawyers in SSCs must be concerned that
statements that they make in the course of defending their clients may result in charges against the lawyers themselves.1 °5
Although under Turkish law attorneys enjoy immunity from
prosecution for statements made in the course of representing
their clients, this immunity may not be respected in political
cases. For example, in 1997, a lawyer was defending a client in a
hearing in the Istanbul SSC. After a police officer gave his testimony, the judge asked whether the defense lawyer had anything
to say. The defense lawyer responded that this particular officer
had made a career of torture. The lawyer was subsequently
charged and tried in heavy penal court for insulting the police
officer. Commenting on the prosecution of this lawyer, a member of the Human Rights Association ("HRA") suggested that
"the boundaries of the lawyer's immunity are indistinct and the
judge has broad latitude. The immunity is interpreted very narrowly in State Security Courts."1" 6 In another case, defense lawyers attempted to intervene when the police and gendarme began beating their clients. The defense lawyers themselves were
104. Meeting with members of the Urfa Bar Association, in Urfa, Turk. (May 30,
1998).
105. Except where indicated, the following discussion reflects the delegation's
meeting with the Istanbul office of the HRA, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 30, 1998).
106. Interview with Eren Keskin, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 30, 1998).
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prosecuted for interfering with police action."0 7 According to
Oenal Sarihan, a prominent defense attorney practicing out of
Ankara, "they are trying to make State Security Courts impossi108
ble places for lawyers to work."
3. Confrontational Attitudes Between Prosecutors
and Defense Lawyers
The relationship between defense lawyers and the prosecutors and judges in the criminal justice system, and particularly in
the State Security Courts, is characterized by a high level of antagonism. For example, Cevdet Volkan, the Chief Prosecutor of
the Ankara SSC, had a particularly hostile attitude towards members of the Ankara Bar practicing in the SSCs. He stated,
In Ankara, there are approximately fifteen lawyers who take
cases in State Security Courts. You always see the same lawyers. They are the lawyers of the terrorist groups. This shows
the power of the terrorist groups in Turkey. These fifteen or
twenty lawyers in the SSC in Turkey, all they do is make
prop10 9
aganda in the courts and false allegations of torture.
Such attitudes, however honestly expressed, undermine the
proper functioning of the legal system and frustrate the resolution of a range of important substantive and procedural
problems in the system. For example, when asked why the fourday incommunicado detention period was -necessary, Mr. Volkan
explained, "[W] e know that the lawyers are working for the PKK,
but sometimes it is hard for us to prove it. However, we do have
cases in which the lawyer is convicted because he is a member of
the PKK."" 0 Similarly, although not as antagonistic towards defense lawyers as his Ankara counterparts, the Chief Prosecutor in
the Istanbul SSC, Mr. G6kcen, informed the delegation that "we
have strong evidence against some lawyers who pretend to be
lawyers but act as liaisons between the terrorists." ''
Whereas those defense attorneys practicing in the SSCs la107. Id. These lawyers were eventually acquitted based on the testimony of the
original judge.
108. Interview with Oenal Serihan, in Ankara, Turk. (June 3, 1998).
109. Interview with Cevdet Volkan, Ankara SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Ankara, Turk.
(June 4, 1998).
110. Id.
111. Interview with Erdal Gokcen, Istanbul SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Istanbul,
Turk. (May 26, 1998).
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mented the condition of their practice, in general they refrained
from direct attacks on the members of the judiciary. They appeared skeptical, however, of the interest of prosecutors in improving procedures in the SSCs, or more broadly, of prosecutors' commitment to the cause of justice. For example, when
one lawyer in a group meeting at the Istanbul Bar Association
suggested that prosecutors were "ready to listen to concerns
about criminal procedure," he was shouted down by his col12
leagues.'
The above comments suggest a certain lack of respect
among prosecutors for the integrity of the defense bar practicing
in the SSCs, and a lack of confidence among defense lawyers in
the good faith of prosecutors. This mutual antagonism makes it
more difficult for lawyers, prosecutors, and judges to work together effectively on individual cases and for the profession as a
whole to resolve systemic problems and to increase public confidence.
E. Pre-TrialDetention, Torture, and the Use of Coerced
Testimony in SSCs
1. Pre-Trial Detention
Despite recent amendments, the period of pre-trial detention without charge is far longer in SSC cases than in regular
criminal prosecutions. The 1997 amendments to the Criminal
Procedure Code brought the periods for pre-trial detention
without charge down from ten to seven days in the security zone
of southeastern Anatolia and provided for judicial review of detention after four days.11 3 The new legislation also reset the limits for detention without judicial supervision, whether outside or
within a State of Emergency Region, to forty-eight hours for one
or two persons accused and to four days for three or more peo112. Meeting with those members of the Istanbul Bar Association who practice in
SSCs (May 25, 1998) (reflecting comments of Mehmet Gfinsel, Istanbul Bar Association).
113. Before the 1997 amendments, the period of detention was seven days for one

or two persons accused of crimes falling within SSCjurisdiction outside a State of Emergency Region, and fourteen days if three or more persons were accused. Within a State
of Emergency Region, the same pre-trial detention without charge lasted fifteen days if
one or two persons were accused, and 30 days if three or more persons were accused.
See Law No. 2845 on the Creation and Rules of Procedure of the State Security Courts
art. 16, § 2845.5.4 (Turk.) (translated in Incal v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment ofJune
28 (1998-IV)).
9, 1998, 78 Reports ofJudgments and Decisions 1547, 1558,
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ple accused. This four-day period may be extended with the permission of the judge to seven days and again from seven to ten
114
days within a State of Emergency Region.
The Chief Prosecutor in a city in the southeast explained
that, when deciding whether to extend the period of detention
beyond the initial four days, the judge will take into consideration (i) the number of defendants, (ii) the nature and number
of crimes at issue, and (iii) the difficulty of gathering evidence.
Applying these basic criteria, the decisions are made on a caseby-case basis." 5 In practice, an extension is routinely granted.
The police and gendarme may bring a request to extend the detention period for a prisoner on the grounds that they need
more time to finish the investigation. The Chief Prosecutor normally forwards the request to the judge. In connection with the
judge's consideration of the request, the detainee is rarely
116
brought before the court.
Turkish officials insist that this four-plus-three framework
complies with the standards articulated by the European Court
in interpreting Article 5. Article 5(3) requires that a detained
person shall be brought promptly before a judge for a determination of the lawfilness of the detention. In interpreting Article
5(3), the Court has never set down an inflexible time limit with
respect to the maximum permissible period of detention before
the detainee must be brought before ajudge. Rather, it has pro114. The October Regulation clarified the 1997 amendments regarding the terms
of extension. Article 14 of the October Regulation states:
Extension of the Custody Period: For reasons such as difficulty in gathering evidence or the presence of a large number of defendants and similar reasons,
the Public Prosecutor may prolong this period by a written order up to four
days in cases of collective crimes, including for crimes falling under the scope
of the State Security Courts. In spite of the four day extension, if the investigation is still not completed, upon the request of the Prosecutor and the decision of the Judge, the arraignment of suspects before the Judge may be extended to 7 days. For crimes committed in emergency regions and falling
under the scope of State Security Courts, the 7-day period may be extended to
10 days upon request of the Prosecutor of the republic and the decision of the
Judge.
October Regulation, supra note 76, art. 14.
115. Interview with (name withheld), Chief Prosecutor in (city withheld), Turk.
(May/June, 1998). Extension is permitted only for multiple defendant crimes; crimes
committed by an individual alone are not eligible for extension of the detention period.
116. Interview with Hayri Demir, Batman Heavy Penal Court judge, in Batman,
Turk. (May 26, 1998).
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nounced on a number of specific time periods as they have
arisen.
In Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom," 7 for example, four
applicants were held under the United Kingdom's Prevention of
Terrorism Act for time periods ranging from four days and six
hours to six days and sixteen hours. The reason for detention
was the same in each case: reasonable grounds for suspicion of
involvement in acts of terrorism. Because none of the four applicants was ever brought before a judge, the question for the
Court was whether the time periods before release were reasonable. After taking the impact of terrorism into consideration,
the Court held that even the shortest period of time, four days
six hours, violated the standard of Article 5(3). Specifically, the
Court stated:
To attach such importance to the special features of this case
[(i.e., to the context of terrorism) ] as to justify so lengthy a
period of detention without appearance before a judge or
other judicial officer would be an unacceptably wide interpretation of the plain meaning of the word 'promptly.' An interpretation to this effect would import into Article 5(3) a serious weakening of a procedural guarantee to the detriment of
the individual and would entail consequences impairing the
very essence of the right protected by this provision ....The
undoubted fact that the arrest and detention of the applicants were inspired by the legitimate aim of protecting the
community as a whole from terrorism is not on its own sufficient to ensure compliance with the specific requirements of
Article 5(3).118
The Turkish government appears to have deliberately misconstrued the Broganjudgment to interpret a four-day period as
the maximum permitted duration of detention without judicial
supervision. 1 9 Such a construction of the judgment is erroneous in that Brogan does not establish a maximum permitted
117. Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1989).
118. Id. at 33-34, 62.
119. This interpretation is reflected in the fact that judicial approval of prolonged
detention is required after four days in the 1997 amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code. In addition, Erdal Gokcen, the Istanbul SSC Chief Prosecutor, claimed that
the European Court had established four days and six hours as the limit for incommunicado detention and that therefore Turkish law was in compliance with the standard.
See Interview with Erdal Gokcen, Istanbul SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Istanbul, Turk. (May
26, 1998).
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length for detention without judicial supervision; it merely states
that four days and six hours is too long. Moreover, the fact that,
under Turkish law, the four-day period applies to incommunicado detention makes it even more problematic due to the denial of access to counsel.
Of course, these legal limits, troubling as they are, might
not be observed. Between 1991 and 1995, the police frequently
post-dated the arrest to allow for longer detentions. Although
this practice apparently occurs less frequently now, it has not
12 0
been eliminated entirely.
Another means of circumventing the legal limit is to subject
a detainee to successive charges. One mother told the delegation the following story:
They came one night when my daughter was sleeping.
They woke us up and took her only for questioning. She
never came back. She was first accused of inciting members
in the Gazi case. Later, she was accused of being a terrorist.
When they found out that she was not guilty of such criminal
activity, they made up 1another
charge. If one charge failed,
21
they made up another.
In such a case, the technical limit on detention is observed, but
its purposes are completely undermined.
Due to the often secretive nature of the arrest and detention, family members and the detainee's lawyer have no way of
verifying the location or duration of detention.1 22 According to
the October Regulation, the police may refuse to disclose the
place of detention or even the fact that the detainee is being
held. 123 Lawyers or the family may request this information
from the prosecutor, but unless the prosecutor ordered the detention, he may have no information. Further, families are often
prevented from entering the SSC buildings when they are looking for their family members.
120. Meeting with those members of the Istanbul Bar Association who practice in
the SSCs, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 25, 1998).
121. Interview with Gulsah Togac, mother of a defendant in the Istanbul SSC, in
Istanbul, Turk. (June 2, 1998).
122. Except where indicated, the following discussion reflects the delegation's
meeting with the Diyarbakir Bar Association, in Diyarbakir, Turk. (May 29, 1998).
123. Article 9 of the October Regulation states, in relevant part, "For crimes falling
under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, the relatives will be informed
through the same way if there is no harm to the outcome of the investigation." October
Regulation, supra note 76, art. 9.
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2. Torture and the Use of Coerced Testimony
in SSC Prosecutions
The critical danger of this extended incommunicado detention period is that it permits, and indeed encourages, the use of
torture as an investigative tool. The detainee may be coerced,
through physical and psychological intimidation, to make a false
confession, to sign a statement drafted by the police, or to give
false statements implicating others. Defense lawyers practicing
in SSCs recounted many examples involving their clients and, in
some cases, themselves. For example, lawyers from the
Diyarbakir Bar, who themselves had been detained and tortured,
stated that each of them had been instructed by a member of the
gendarme to sign a statement that the gendarme had prepared. 124 In no case was the detained attorney permitted to read
the language of the statement.
The Director General of the Ministry of Justice and other
Justice officials insisted to the delegation that statements coerced by torture cannot be used under any circumstances in
legal proceedings.1 25 They pointed to Article 138-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that a statement should be
based on the free will of the defendant and that interrogators
may not employ any coercive treatment, such as torture, drugging, or false promises. They stated that Turkey's Criminal Procedure Code, Article 135, specifically prohibits certain methods
of interrogation. 126 Also, Article 254 of the Criminal Procedure
Code requires that if the manner of an interrogation or investigation is unlawful, the evidence should not be taken into account. 127
The position of the Ministry of Justice officials clearly reflects the state of the law on the subject of exclusion of evidence
obtained through coercive measures. The delegation learned,
however, that in practice evidence is rarely excluded. Several
factors may account for this situation. First, comments from
judges and prosecutors within the SSC system reflect a skepticism toward claims of torture. For example, the Chief Judge of
124.
Case).
125.
126.
127.

See infta notes 310-19 & accompanying text (discussing Twenty-Five Lawyers
Meeting with Ministry of Justice officials, in Ankara, Turk. (June 5, 1998).
Id.; CIuM. PROC. C. art. 135 (Turk.).
CRIM. PROC. C. art. 254 (Turk.).
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the Istanbul SSC declared, "I do not accept evidence produced
as a result of torture."12 8 He went on to note, however, that
"[d]etainees who bring torture cases before the [European
Court] have purposely injured each other while in detention.
One forensic doctor told me that detainees used springs in beds
in jail to leave marks on themselves." 129 Judges sharing this view
may be reluctant to disregard self-incriminating statements of
the defendant despite evidence of torture.
Second, forensic evidence of torture is difficult to obtain
due to inadequate procedures for gathering medical evidence
and a lack of accountability among police during the period of
interrogation. 3 °
Third, when there is evidence of torture, the judge may simply direct the victim to request that a separate case against the
police be opened in the heavy penal court. However, this may
have no impact on the ongoing SSC case. Although in principle,
the two cases should be coordinated, in reality, this rarely happens.
Finally, whether the judge actually disregards a defendant's
statement when there is credible evidence of torture is impossible to determine. The allegedly coerced statement is not literally removed from the case file, and the court is not required to
make a specific finding regarding the torture allegation. 3 According to Eren Keskin of the HRA, "[y] ou cannot tell how the
court views the testimony because the court gives no explanation
of their treatment of the evidence. 1 32 Oenal Sarihan, a prominent Ankara lawyer, commented thatjudges read the verdict and
make no reference to coerced statements. 13 3 On appeal, the ap128. Interview with Seraffettin Iste, Istanbul SSC Chief Judge, in Istanbul, Turk.
(May 27, 1998).
129. Id.
130. For a more complete discussion of the problems in establishing torture
claims, see infra Part II.
131. A member of the Ankara Bar Association explained that the judge does not
give his verdict on the grounds of the one statement alone. Rather, the judge takes into
consideration all of the evidence. "The law doesn't say that the statement should be
taken out of the file, but that the coerced evidence should not be the main evidence on
which the case is- considered." Meeting with the Ankara Bar Association, in Ankara,
Turk. (June 3, 1998). Notably, the statements of the Ankara Bar Association were exceptionally similar in tone to those of government representatives.
132. Interview with Eren Keskin, member of HRA, in Istanbul, Turk. (June 1,
1998).
133. Interview with 6 enal Serihan, in Ankara, Turk. (June 3, 1998).

1999]

JOINT MISSION TO TURKEY

2167

pellate court does not see any reference to this testimony in the
opinion of the lower court. Thus, the Court of Appeals has no
way to enforce the rule of excluding testimony obtained by torture.
Sarihan noted, however, that there have been some encouraging judgments in the last six months in the SSC of Ankara.
Even these judgments acquitting the defendants, however, made
no reference to the fact that the defendants' statements were
obtained under torture. "They don't talk about the torture of
the defendant," she said, but rather refer euphemistically to a
"lack of evidence."1 3 4 In her view, these encouraging judgments
were not faithful applications of the law on coerced testimony,
but the actions of two highly qualified judges on the High Court
of Appeals. These judges wished to reach a correct result, but
were nevertheless reluctant to confront the issue of torture and
its adverse impact on the trial process in SSCs directly.13 5
Despite these few encouraging decisions, the delegation is
convinced that torture-based testimony is accepted as evidence
in SSC proceedings, and, in some cases, forms the entire basis
for the conviction of the defendant. This reliance upon coerced
statements by the SSCs creates, in turn, an incentive for members of the security forces to continue the practice of torturing
and mistreating detainees during interrogation.
F. Conclusion
The Turkish SSC system has faced challenges to its legitimacy since its inception. In 1976, three years after the creation
of the courts, Turkey's own Constitutional Court annulled SSCs
because they violated principles embodied in the Turkish Constitution. The SSCs were only reinstated after the military drafters of Turkey's 1982 Constitution specifically provided for them
within that instrument. While that action has prevented the
Turkish Constitutional Court from revoking the jurisdiction of
the SSCs a second time, these courts remain a target for internal
criticism, although to mixed result. Erdal Gfincer, the Chief
Prosecutor of the Istanbul SSCs, viewed such criticism in political
terms, stating that "when political parties are in opposition they
say they will abolish the State Security Courts, but when they are
134. Id.
135. Id.
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in government they praise the system."1" 6
The SSC system has also been the target of sustained criticism from Turkish human rights organizations. For example, in
a statement on October 24, 1998, the Istanbul branch of the
HRA called for the elimination of SSCs. Objecting to the way in
which SSCs are used to punish non-violent political dissidents,
the HRA noted that to that point, "more than 10,000 people
have been tried in State Security Courts for expressing viewpoints that differ from the official line and for their political
identities. There are still 6,000 dossiers containing lawsuits because of Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code and Article 8 of
the Anti-Terror Law."' 37 The HRA also criticized the presence
of a serving military officer among the judges in the SSC panels.
Just one week after the HRA's public objections, the thenMinister of Justice, Hasan Denizkurdu, setting out on a visit to
the European Court in Strasbourg, stated in his personal capacity that he too favored a change in the composition of the SSC
panel.1 38 The Chief Judge of the Ankara SSC allowed that,
"[t]echnically speaking, the detention period should be shorter
than what we have right now, but we have problems dealing with
terrorism. We need time."'3 9 He also said, "I do believe that the
period of detention should be shorter. However, we need time
to investigate because of the threat of terror, but as the threat
140
diminishes, human rights should be restored.
Officials at the Ministry of Justice recognized that conditions of detention are a general problem and pointed to the proposed new criminal procedure law as a solution. This law would
allow lawyers to see their clients immediately upon detention.
Under the proposed law the detention period would be fortyeight hours maximum in all circumstances, extendable only
upon a judge's ruling. The defendant will have access to an attorney at all times, including the interrogation phase.' 41 The
136. Interview with Erdal Gfincer, Istanbul SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Istanbul,
Turk. (May 26, 1998).
137. IHD Istanbul Callsfor Removal of State Security Courts, TURKISH DuALY NEws, Oct.

24, 1998.
138. Minister Advocates Change to Security Courts, REUTERS WORLD REPORT, Nov. 1,

1998.
139. Meeting with Mehmet Turgut Oksay, Ankara SSC Chief Judge, in Ankara,
Turk. (June 4, 1998).
140. Id.
141. Meeting with Ministry of Justice officials, in Ankara, Turk. (June 5, 1998).
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proposed new law would likely contribute to the reduction of
torture.142 The Director General warned, however, that the proposed law is a preliminary draft that is perhaps too idealistic, is
subject to change, and would take time to implement even if
enacted.14
Leading parliamentarian Sema Pi~kinsut also
thought it unlikely that the Ylmaz Government would be able to
enact this reform in the criminal procedure code, a prediction
that turned out to be correct. She was optimistic that reform
may come in 1999.
Support for reform of SSC structures and procedures that
fail to meet international standards is widely shared among many
influential groups and individuals in Turkish society. These include the organized bar, leading human rights organizations,
leading parliamentarians, some ministers, and some judges and
prosecutors with extensive SSC experience. Given such support,
it is remarkable and perplexing that change has not come.
There can be no doubt that SSCs-whatever their proponents
may claim for their efficacy in the fight against terrorism or
drug-trafficking-serve a primarily political purpose that is inimical to the protection of human rights and the rule of law. SSCs
are simply too open to abuse by those in Turkish society who
would ensure their continuing hold on power by resort to authoritarian repressive measures.
II. TORTURE AND POLICE IMPUNITY IN TURKEY
A. Introduction
Torture of individuals held in detention by police continues
to be one of the most serious human rights problems in Turkey.
Despite the prevalence of torture, especially in cases involving
enforcement of the Anti-Terror Law,1 44 investigation, prosecu142. Meeting with Ankara Bar Association, in Ankara, Turk. (June 3, 1998).
143. Meeting with Ministry of Justice officials, in Ankara, Turk. (June 5, 1998).
144. The 1991 Anti-Terror Law, Law No. 3713 ("Anti-Terror Law") was adopted
April 12, 1991. Anti-Terror Law, Law No. 3713 (1991) (Turk.). Offenses defined by the
Anti-Terror Law comprise the majority of cases in the State Security Courts. See TuRK.
CONST. art. 143 (establishing State Security Courts and defining their jurisdiction).
Some attorneys interviewed by the delegation suggested that torture is more pervasive
in cases involving anti-terror investigations by the police. This is consistent with recent
U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Piactices for Turkey and a
recent report by Human Rights Watch on the anti-terror police. See 1998 STATE DEP'T
REPORT; HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI, TuRKEY. TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT, supra
note 1, at 1.
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tion, and punishment of members of the security forces are
rare.1 45 The failure of the Turkish government to enforce domestic and international proscriptions on torture has led, in
turn, to a climate of official impunity that encourages systematic
abuse of detainees during the detention period. This Part documents the lack of accountability among members of the security
forces and explores obstacles to the investigation, prosecution,
and punishment of those who engage: in torture and other gross
violations of human rights.
1. Forms and Uses of Torture in Turkey
Although the delegation did not undertake a systematic investigation of the use and prevalence of torture under police detention, interviews with attorneys, victims, prosecutors, and government officials confirmed that torture continues to be a serious problem in Turkey.1 4 6 The Human Rights Foundation of
Turkey ("HRFT"), a domestic non-governmental organization
committed to the documentation and prevention of torture and
to the treatment of torture victims, reported that 537 people applied to their treatment and rehabilitation centers for treatment
during 1997.147 According to the HRFT, coercive techniques
145. Despite conducting scores of interviews with defense attorneys, victims, prosecutors, judges, and government officials over the course of two weeks in Turkey, the
delegation was unable to confirm a single case in which a member of the security forces
had been prosecuted, convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned for the torture or abuse of
a detainee accused of a political crime. Though we cannot say with certainty that such
cases are nonexistent, they are certainly extremely rare. An oft-cited recent example of
the conviction and sentencing of police for torture was the case in which five police
officers were convicted of the killing Baki Erdogan and sentenced to five years imprisonment. One sign that this result was at least unusual was the reaction of shock and
outrage of the supporters of the accused police. When the verdict and sentence were
announced, supporters assaulted the victim's attorneys, the prosecutor, and members
of the press. On December 24, 1998, the convictions were reversed on appeal, and the
case was remanded to the heavy penal court for further proceedings. See Interview with
Hulya Ucpinar, Director of the Human Rights Center, Izmir Bar Association, in Izmir,
Turk. (Jan. 26, 1999). As this report went to press, six police officers were convicted of
beating to death journalist Metin G6ktepe and were sentenced to seven years in prison.
The conviction will be appealed. See Reuters, Turkey: Police Jailed in Journalist'sDeath,

N.Y.

TIMES,

May 7, 1999, at A2.

146. This observation is also confirmed by the reports of many other investigations
by Turkish and international non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), as well as official international bodies over the last decade. See supra note 1 (citing reports of various
organizations on use of torture in Turkey).
147. HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION OF TURKEY, STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TURKEY 8
(1997) [hereinafter 1997 HRFT REPORT]. This figure does not reflect the full scope of
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commonly used by Turkish security forces include beating, insults, threats, blindfolding, stripping, deprivation of food and
water, forcing victims to sleep on a cold floor, solitary confinement, spraying with pressurized or cold water, threats to relatives, electrical shocks, suspension by hands, sexual harassment,
148
squeezing of testicles, and sleep deprivation.
Defense lawyers practicing in the State Security Courts reported to the delegation that torture is routinely used to elicit
confessions from their clients. 149 According to Erin Keskin, one
such lawyer, "Although torture is illegal in Turkey, in practice it
is systematic and, indeed, government policy."1 5 0 Lawyers described cases in which multiple detainees confessed to having
committed the same crime or to having committed crimes that
had never taken place. Despite the allegations of torture, their
clients were then prosecuted based on the illegally obtained confessions.'
Other lawyers had themselves been detained and
tortured and gave firsthand reports to the delegation of the con1 52
ditions of detention.
Many prosecutors acknowledged that torture remains a
problem during the period of detention; 5 ' however, most were
generally unwilling to concede that it was used systematically as a
tool for investigation. Most prosecutors who were willing to discuss the issue of torture with the delegation characterized it as a
product of inadequate discipline or lack of direct control of the
the problem. Many torture victims are unaware of the availability of the services of the
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey ("HRFT") or are discouraged from seeking its
services. Id.
148. According to the HRFT's report for 1996, each of these methods was used on
30% or more of the 576 applicants for assistance in 1996. 1996 HRFT REPORT, supra
note 1, at 30. Over half of those seeking assistance had been subjected to eLeven or more
torture techniques while in detention. Id. at 29.
149. For a discussion of the use of torture and the accountability of police and
prosecutors, see Part II.
150. Interview with Eren Keskin, Istanbul SSC, in Istanbul, Turk. (June 1, 1998).
151. According to the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code, evidence gathered
through illegal interrogation cannot be considered. TuRK. CrM. PROC. C. art. 135/a.
152. For a discussion of the harassment and intimidation of attorneys, including
the use of torture against them, see infra Part III.
153. Rarely did government officials at any level deny the existence of torture altogether. One prosecutor did insist simply that "[t]orture is illegal in Turkey" and indicated that he was unwilling to assume that public servants, including members of the
security forces, engaged in torture knowing that it is forbidden under Turkish law. See
Interview with Cevdet Voltan, Ankara SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Ankara, Turk. (June 4,
1998).
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anti-terror police by the prosecutor's office.15 4 Others were considerably more skeptical of torture claims. For example, Cevdet
Voltan, the Chief Prosecutor in Ankara, insisted that claims of
torture were exaggerated by members of illegal organizations in
155
order to discredit the security forces or escape punishment.
The same prosecutor explained that the high rate of confession
in State Security Courts was a result not of torture, but of the
control exercised by illegal organizations over individual defendants. 15 6 Mehmet Turgut Oksay, the Chief Judge of the Ankara
State Security Court, stated that there was "a standard defense
imposed on defendants by terrorist groups," which included "in15 7
variably claiming torture during interrogation.
Other government officials interviewed also acknowledged
that torture continues to be a problem, though most denied that
it was systematic or routine. For example, the delegation met
with Dr. Hikmet Sami Turk, then Minister for Human Rights.
He noted that "although there is no legal system in the world
that permits torture, from time to time there are reports of torture, even in Turkey. ' 158 Sema Pi~kinsut, Chair of the Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights, was more direct in her
acknowledgment of the problem and the government's responsibility to address it. She noted that her commission had found
implements of torture in police detention rooms and that,
although complaints of torture were common, few cases were
prosecuted. Ms. Pi~kinsut is preparing a report of her findings
that will include specific recommendations to reduce the incidence of torture and increase police accountability.15 9
Notwithstanding the efforts of officials to downplay the
scope of the problem, the delegation is convinced that torture of
154. See Interview with the Adiyaman Chief Prosecutor, in Adiyaman, Turk. (May
31, 1998).
155. Interview with Cevdet Voltan, Chief Prosecutor, Ankara SSC, in Ankara, Turk.
(June 4, 1998). ChiefJudge Seraffettin Iste of the Istanbul SSC told the delegation that
he believed that detainees who bring torture cases before the European Court have
purposely tortured one another while in detention. Interview with Seraffettin Iste, Istanbul SSC Chief Judge, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 27, 1998.)
156. See Interview with Cevdet Voltan, Ankara SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Ankara,
Turk. (June 4, 1998).
157. Interview with Mehmet Turgut Oksay, Ankara SSC Chief Judge, in Ankara,
Turk. (june 4, 1998).
158. Interview with Dr. Hikmet Sami Turk, in Ankara, Turk. (June 5, 1998.)
159. Interview with Dr. Sema Pi~kinsut, Chair, Parliamentary Commission on
Human Rights, in Ankara, Turk. (june 4, 1998.)
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detainees and police abuse more generally remain serious
problems in Turkey. Credible accounts offered by victims and
their representatives as well as reports of domestic and international non-governmental organizations indicate that the use of
torture by security forces is systematic and widespread.1 6 °
2. Torture, Impunity, and Turkey's Obligations Under
International Law
Under international law, Turkey has an obligation not only
to eliminate the use of torture, but also to provide an effective
means of redress for victims of torture and police abuse. Thus,
when a victim reports torture or abuse and the state fails to investigate and prosecute the claim adequately, the violation of international law is not limited to the act of torture itself but extends
to the failure of process.
Although not a party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), Turkey has signed the European
Convention, Article 3 of which specifically addresses torture. Article 3 provides that "[n] o one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment." 161 Article 5
encompasses police abuse more generally and provides that
"[e]veryone is entitled to liberty and security of person." 6 2 Article 13 of the European Convention addresses the issue of remedy: "[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
'1 63
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.'
The U.N. Convention Against Torture, which Turkey ratified in 1988, provides for more specific measures to eliminate
torture. Article 2 calls on "[e]ach State Party... [to] take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction [s]. ''"64
Article 4 requires that acts of torture be defined as criminal
16 5
under domestic law and punishable by appropriate penalties.
160. For an account of the torture of lawyers detained in Diyarbakir, see infra
notes accompanying 310-19 & accompanying test.
161. European Convention, supra note 3, art. 3, at 224.
162. Id. art. 5, at 226-28.
163. Id. art. 13, at 232.
164. Convention Against Torture, supra note 3, art. 2.
165. Id. art. 4.

2174

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2129

Article 13 provides that "[e]ach State Party shall ensure that any
individual who alleges he has been subjected to torture.., has
the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined by, its competent authorities. '"166 Article 14
adds an obligation to provide redress and adequate compensa167
tion to torture victims.
In a formal sense, the domestic law of Turkey meets some of
these international obligations by criminalizing torture and police abuse. Article 17 of the Turkish Constitution provides that
"[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or ill-treatment incompatible with human dignity.""1 6 Moreover, the Turkish Penal
Code prohibits the use of torture by police. Article 243 establishes that an official who "tortures an accused person or resorts
to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment in order to make
him confess his offense, shall be punished by heavy imprisonment for up to five years and shall be disqualified from the civil
service either temporarily or for life. ' 169 Article 245 applies to
police abuse generally and provides that
[t] hose persons authorized to use force and all police officers
who, while performing their duty or executing their superiors' orders, threaten or treat badly or cause bodily injury to a
person or who actually beat or wound a person in circumstances other than prescribed by laws and regulations, shall
be punished by imprisonment from three months to three
years 7and
shall be temporarily disqualified from the civil ser0
vice.'
Notwithstanding these proscriptions of torture in its domestic law, to the extent that Turkey fails to investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute claims of torture, it is in violation of in166. Id. art. 13.
167. Id. art. 14. Under the Turkish Constitution, "International Agreements duly
put into effect carry the force of law. No appeal to the Constitution can be made with
regard to these agreements on the ground that they are unconstitutional." TuRK.
CONST. art. 14.
168. TuRK. CONST. art. 17. Article 38 states that "[n]o one shall be compelled to
make a statement that would incriminate himself or his legal next of kin, or to present
such incriminating evidence." Id. art. 38.
169. PENAL CODE art. 243 (Turk.).
170. Id. art. 245. Note that Articles 243 and 245 define two separate offenses, torture, where there is an intent to elicit a confession of guilt, and the lesser offense of
abuse, where no such intent is shown. The delegation learned that the lesser charge of
abuse is often invoked whereas the more serious crime of torture is rarely charged,
perhaps due to the difficulty of establishing intent.
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ternational law. 171 Since Turkey ratified Article 25 of the European Convention in 1987, permitting individual petition to the
European Commission, both the Commission and the European
Court have repeatedly held that Turkey has violated Article 3's
ban on torture, Article 5's guarantee of liberty and security of
person, and Article 13's guarantee of an effective remedy,
among other articles.
For example, in Aksoy v. Turkey, the Court found that the
applicant had been stripped naked, suspended by the arms, and
subjected to electrocution of his genitals, during a fourteen-day
period of detention. 172 The Court held that the applicant had
been tortured in violation of Article 3 of the European Convention and denied an effective remedy for his complaint of torture
in violation of Article 13.173 With respect to the requirement of
an effective remedy, the Court noted that it "entails, in addition
to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough
and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the complainant to the investigatory procedure. ' 174 In Aksoy, the Court found Turkey's procedures so inadequate that not only did they constitute a violation of Article
13, but also the applicant was relieved of the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies under Article 26.175 The Court noted
that "[t] here is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which
176
are inadequate or ineffective.
Similarly, in Aydin v. Turkey, the Court held that the detention, torture, and rape of the applicant by members of the secur171. Turkey has signed the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("European Torture Convention"), which established the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CPT"). By doing so, Turkey submitted to the jurisdiction of the CPT, which has since criticized the Turkish government on two separate occasions for its failure to address the problem of torture. See
Council of Europe, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Public Statement on Turkey, Dec. 15, 1992, Ref.:
CPT/Inf (93) 1 [EN] [hereinafter 1992 Council of Europe Statement]; 1996 Council of Europe Statement, supra note 1.
172. Aksoy v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Dec. 18, 1996, 26 Reports ofJudgments and Decisions 2260, 2266,
14 (1996-VI).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2287,
98.
175. For a discussion of these procedures, see infra Part II.B.1.
176. Aksoy, at 2276, 52.
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ity forces violated Article 3.177 Moreover, the Court noted that
"Article 13 imposes, without prejudice to any other remedy available under the domestic system, an obligation on States to carry
out a thorough and effective investigation of incidents of torture. 178 In Aydin, the Court held that the public prosecutor's
failure to visit the scene of the alleged rape, to question the accused in the early stages of the investigation, or to ascertain
whether the victim or her family members had been detained,
all contributed to a violation of Turkey's obligation to provide
an effective remedy. The Court noted especially that the prosecutor's "failure to look for corroborating evidence at the [gendarmerie] headquarters and his deferential attitude to the members of the security forces must be considered to be a particularly
serious short-coming in the investigation."1 79
Based on Turkey's clearly established obligations under international law, the remainder of Part I examines in greater detail domestic procedures in law and in practice for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of individuals who commit
acts of torture and other grave violations of human rights. For
the most part, it documents the failure of such procedures and
describes the resulting climate of impunity for human rights violations. Finally, it makes specific recommendations for improving official accountability and thereby reducing the incidence of
torture and abuse.
B. Why Impunity? PretrialStage
Prosecution of members of the security forces for serious
violations of human rights seems to have increased in recent
years, 18 0 perhaps signaling a somewhat greater commitment on
the part of the government to eliminating the practice of torture. Indeed, the delegation was able to observe hearings in several cases involving the prosecution of police and confirmed that
177. See Aydin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Sept. 25, 1997, 50 Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1866, 1904, Holding 3 (1997-VI). For a discussion of the facts
of Aydin v. Turkey, see infra note 293 and accompanying text.
178. Aydin, at 1895,
103.
179. Id. at 1896-97,
106.
180. This perception was shared by a number of the lawyers that we interviewed.
See 1998 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that "although prosecution of
reported perpetrators has increased, punishment remained poor").
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others were pending during the two weeks of the mission.' 8 '
Nevertheless, the scope of the government's commitment must
be measured not merely by the frequency but by the success of
such prosecutions. As the remainder of this Part demonstrates,
serious obstacles must be overcome before the climate of impunity can be eliminated. At the pre-trial stage, these obstacles include a combination of jurisdictional hurdles and prosecutorial
reluctance. This section explores the way that these problems
frustrate the prosecution of complaints of torture such that cases
rarely progress beyond the investigatory phase.
1. Jurisdictional Hurdles
Under Turkish law, civil servants, including police, cannot
be prosecuted without the permission of administrative authorities. 18 2 This procedural protection has the effect of removing
certain police misconduct cases from the judicial process entirely. In other cases, investigation and prosecution may be seriously delayed while the cases are channeled through the administrative procedure.' 83
The Law on the Procedure for the Investigation of Civil Servants'

84

("Civil Servants Law") provides that administrative bod-

181. In Adana, one such trial involved the prosecution of police for the killing of a
man who had been detained on suspicion of theft. He died while in police custody.
Autopsies revealed that he had lesions all over his body and that he had died from
serious internal bleeding caused by blows to the abdomen. See Interview with Mustafa
Cinkilic & Filiz Feyhan Aksoy, in Adana, Turk. (May 28, 1998.). Another case in which
a member of the delegation attended a hearing was the Diyarbakir Prison case, discussed at some length later in this section. See infra Part II.B.3. The delegation interviewed a number of other attorneys involved in cases of this type, including the Manisa
case, also discussed herein. See infra Part lI.D.
182. See TUGRUL ANSAY & DON WALLACE, INTRODUCrION TO TURKISH LAw 71 (1996)
(describing Law on Procedure for Investigation of Civil Servants ("Civil Servants
Law")). This protection of civil servants is included, in a general way, in the Constitution, which provides that "[p] rosecution of public servants and other public employees
for alleged offences shall be subject, except in cases prescribed by law, to the permission of the administrative authority designated by law." TURK. CONST. art. 129.
183. In Kaya v. Turkey, this administrative procedure was challenged as inadequately protecting the right to life guaranteed by Article 2 of the European Convention.
The European Court found that it was unnecessary to decide this question given its
finding that the investigation in the case was so inadequate as to violate Article 2. See
Kaya v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Feb. 19, 1998, 65 Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 297, 324, 86 (1998-I).
184. The name of the law is often translated as the Draft or Temporary Law on the
Procedure for the Investigation of Civil Servants, though it has existed in some form
since 1913.
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ies, not prosecutors, shall determine in the first instance whether
civil servants shall be prosecuted for a crime. 18 5 Three conditions must be met for the administrative protections to apply.
First, the person must be a civil servant, meaning that he or she
is employed in the public sector with responsibility for public
administration. Second, the civil servant must be charged with a
crime that is not excluded from the scope of the law. Excluded
crimes generally involve public corruption, for example, crimes
under the election laws, corruption, bribery, embezzlement, and
treason. 8 6 Third, the crime charged must have been committed
18 7
in the course of the civil servant's duties.
In cases that fall within the scope of the law, the prosecutor
does not make the initial determination as to whether the de1 88
fendant will be charged. Rather, an administrative board,
made up of bureaucrats mostly lacking in legal training,18 9 determines whether the civil servant should be prosecuted or simply
disciplined by his or her superiors. 9 ° If the board determines
185. See Law on the Procedures for Investigation of Civil Servants art. 4 (Turk.)
(noting that following preliminary investigation, "the relevant boards will decide if
there is a need to prosecute the civil servant or not").
186. See Briefing by Yasar Alturk, Diyarbakir Bar Assocation, in Diyarbakir, Turk.
(May 25, 1998) [hereinafter Alturk Briefing].
187. See Law on the Procedures for Investigation of Civil Servants art. 1 (Turk.)
(procedures cover "crimes committed in the course of the civil servant's duties or for
crimes stemming from his responsibilities as a civil servant").
188. The administrative board may be constituted at the municipal or the provincial level, or, in the case of a high official, the High Court of Appeals for the Administrative Court may make the determination whether to prosecute. See id. art. 4; Alturk
Briefing, supra note 186. Municipal and regional boards are made up of local representatives of the national bureaucracy, such as the city health manager or regional agricultural administrator. They are not standing councils, but are convened on an ad hoc
basic when cases arise. See Interview with Kamil T. Sfirek & Semih Mutlu, in Istanbul,
Turk. (June 1, 1998); Interview with Sedat Ozevin, head of Batman HRA, in Batman,
Turk. (May 26, 1998).
189. See Interview with Kamil T. Sfirek & Semih Mutlu, in Istanbul, Turk. (June 1,
1998); Interview with Sedat Ozevin, head of Batman HRA, in Batman, Turk. (May 26,
1998).
190. The prosecutor has no involvement in the administrative council's investigation; if the prosecutor is the first to receive information on an alleged transgression by
civil servants, then he or she is required to turn that information over to the administrative board. See Interview with Sedat Ozevin, head of Batman HRA, in Batman, Turk.
(May 26, 1998); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI, TURKEY TORTURE AND MISTREATMENT, supra note 1, at 24 (noting that "under Article 13 of the [Civil Servants Law],
'Unless the order for prosecution is given for crimes committed according to Article 1,
the state prosecutors themselves cannot conduct an investigation'") (quoting Civil Servants Law).
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that prosecution is warranted, then it refers the case to the appropriate criminal court, along with a statement specifying the
crime of which the civil servant is accused and perhaps a report
of its investigation. The prosecutor then proceeds with his investigation and prosecution of the case.' 9 '
The purpose of the law is to afford some degree of immunity for civil servants acting in their official capacities. In theory,
the administrative process shields civil servants from the harassment of unfounded prosecution by permitting bureaucratic review of the charges before the case proceeds. Where appropriate, problems may be addressed within the civil service hierarchy
rather than through criminal prosecution. Under the current
system of arbitrary prosecution and police abuse of detainees,
the harassment of civil servants through unwarranted prosecution may be a legitimate concern. 92 Though often critical of the
current system, those protected by it seem to argue for reform
rather than elimination. Moreover, lawyers interviewed by the
delegation defended a similar protection from prosecution for
attorneys as essential to their professional independence and
cited credible examples of prosecutorial harassment.'9 3
Even assuming that the threat of prosecutorial harassment
is significant, addressing this threat through the creation of bureaucratic review rather than reform of the prosecutorial function contributes to the climate of impunity by further frustrating
and delaying the prosecution of official misconduct. Indeed, in
the view of many of the lawyers, prosecutors, and judges interviewed by the delegation, the administrative review process
rarely serves its intended function and instead frustrates efforts
to hold police accountable for violations of human rights. According to Sema Pi~kinsut, the critical problem is that "the judicial organ does not have full authority over the process. ' 194
Several aspects of the administrative procedure operate to
undermine the prosecution of a civil servant, particularly if the
191. See Law on the Procedures 'for Investigation of Civil Servants art. 5 (Turk.)
192. Of course, ordinary Turkish citizens enjoy no such protections.
193. The Law of Advocates, regulating the practice of law in Turkey, provides similar protections for lawyers facing prosecution for crimes allegedly committed in the
course of their duties. See Law of Advocates arts. 58-61 (Turk.); Alturk Briefing, supra
note 186.
194. Interview with Dr. Sema Pi~kinsut, Chair, Parliamentary Commission on
Human Rights, in Ankara, Turk. (June 4, 1998).
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defendant is a member of the security forces. First, simple confusion over the jurisdictional boundaries of the administrative
process may create delay even if those involved are acting in
good faith. This is particularly problematic in cases involving
members of the security forces because their civil servant status
depends upon the context in which the act in question is taken.
Although classified as civil servants, members of the security
forces are covered by the law only when acting within the scope
of their ordinary law enforcement duties, that is, in their administrative capacity.19 5 For example, if members of the gendarme
take into custody and torture a person suspected of avoiding military service, any complaint of torture would be referred to the
administrative board.1 9 6 Alternatively, when police act under the
direction of the prosecutor, they are acting in a judicial rather
than an administrative capacity and, arguably, should not be covered by the administrative protections of the law. 9 7 Thus, if police arrest and detain a suspect in a criminal investigation, any
complaint of torture, in theory, would be handled directly by the
198
prosecutor.
A second way in which the Civil Servants Law contributes to
the climate of impunity is that it permits officials to ignore or
treat as disciplinary issues crimes committed by their colleagues
or subordinates. Because other civil servants comprise the membership of the boards, the boards cannot be assumed to function
independently. Ajudge of the heavy penal court in a city in the
southeast told the delegation that "in most cases, the councils do
not make the right decision regarding prosecution because they
know the accused and are themselves civil servants." 99 In such
cases, the administrative boards may simply act to protect the
accused from prosecution. In the emergency zones, administrative approval for prosecution is virtually never given; outside
emergency zones, such approval is merely unusual.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of judicial review of such a
195. See Alturk Briefing, supra note 186.
196. Unless, of course, the crime itself is exempted from the scope of the law. See
Law on the Procedures for Investigation of Civil Servants (Turk.); see also supra note 185
and accompanying text.
197. Id.
198. See id. But see infra Part II.B.3 (discussing Diyarbakir Prison Case).
199. Interview with Judge (name withheld), heavy penal court, (location withheld), Turk. (May/June 1998).
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decision is questionable. In Aksoy v. Turkey, the Turkish government defended the administrative process in part by noting that
decisions of an administrative board not to prosecute were always reviewed by the Supreme Administrative Court and sometimes reversed.2 0 0 A number of lawyers and judges interviewed
by the delegation, however, indicated that the lack of effective
appeal when prosecution was denied is an important failure of
the current system.2 0 1 At a minimum, considerable confusion
exists as to the availability of an appeal. Whatever the status of
judicial review for adminitstrative decisions, in Aksoy, the European Court found that the overall procedure was so inadequate
that it not only violated Article 13 of the European Torture Convention but relieved the applicant of his obligation to exhaust
20 2
domestic remedies before applying to the Commission.
The case of Ibrahim Tekbudak illustrates this problem. The
HRFT reported that police officers broke Tekbudak's arm while
beating him at a public demonstration in May, 1996.203
Although the Izmir prosecutor initially launched an investigation of the incident, the prosecutor determined that jurisdiction
was lacking because the defendants were civil servants and the
act took place in the context of their administrative duties. The
prosecutor then sent the file to the Izmir Provincial Administrative Board. Upon conducting its own review, the board found
insufficient evidence and the matter was dropped. 4 In such a
case, even it review of the board's decision is available, the rec200. Aksoy v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Dec. 18, 1996, 26 Reports ofJudgments and Decisions 2260, 2268,
26 (1996-VI).
201. The heavy penal court judge and others criticized this lack of a right of appeal and stated that proposals had been made to change this aspect of the law. See
Interview with Judge (name withheld), heavy penal court, (location withheld) Turk.
(May/June 1998); see also Alturk Briefing, supra note 186.
Article 5 of the Civil Servants Law provides that
[i]f the board decides not to prosecute the civil servant, it prepares a report
that includes an explanation for not prosecuting and sends it to the civil servant's head of administration and to the claimant, if any. The head administrator and the claimant have the right to object to this decision within five
days. In any case, the decision not to prosecute is automatically sent to the
higher investigatory board for review.
Law on the Procedures for Investigation of Civil Servants art. 5 (Turk.).
202. Aksoy, at 2276,

52.

203. See 1997 HRFT REPORT, supra note 147, at 14.
204. See id.
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ord compiled by the board may not be adequate to permit effective evaluation by the Supreme Administrative Court.
Another factor is the delay that the administrative process
often entails. Currently, the law imposes no clear time limit on
the investigation by the administrative board.2 "5 Thus, even if
the board ultimately deems prosecution appropriate, the delay
can be legally or practically fatal to the case. Because the statute
of limitations continues to run during this period at least for certain crimes, even if the case is eventually transferred to the judicial system, prosecution may no longer be possible.20 6 In other
cases, though the statute of limitations may not legally bar prosecution, as a practical matter prosecution may be difficult or impossible due to loss or destruction of evidence or the unavailability of witnesses.
Finally, the problem of delay may not end once the board
sends the case to the prosecutor. The court is not bound by the
factual findings of the board and indeed may even disagree with
the board's conclusion that the case falls within the jurisdiction
of the judiciary. In such a situation, the court may return the
case to the administrative board for additional review and appeal. Such back and forth can lead to substantial delay in the
investigation of the case by a reluctant prosecutor and may make
it virtually impossible to prosecute the defendant effectively once
the jurisdictional issue is settled.20 7
One additional jurisdictional factor creates problems for
those torture victims accused of political crimes and tried in
SSCs. In such cases, the investigation of torture is conducted by
a prosecutor in a completely separate court system, the heavy
penal court. As a result, the victim is less able to monitor the
investigation of the allegations, and any evidence of torture is
less likely to affect. the proceedings in the SSCs. Although the
205. Article 2 of the Civil Servants Law imposes no time limit on the preliminary
investigation. Article 5 states that the board will review the investigative report within
one week, but imposes not time limit on further investigation.
206. See Alturk Briefing, supra note 186.
207. It is interesting to note that in the prosecution of the Diyarbakir Prison Case,
the administrative board found that it lacked jurisdiction instead of exercising jurisdiction to grant permission to prosecute. This "jurisdictional avoidance," also practiced by
the court in that case, seems to reflect a reluctance on the part of both administrative
boards and prosecutors to take responsibility for pursuing claims against members of
the security forces, even in the most notorious cases. See infra Part II.C.1.c (discussing
effects of delay on prosecution of suspects in Diyarbakir Prison Case).
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Criminal Procedure Code provides that confessions obtained
through torture should not be considered as evidence, 20 8 the
findings of fact regarding torture may be inconsistent. Indeed,
the trial of a detainee may proceed in the SSC system based on
an allegedly coerced confession before the investigation of the
torture allegations has been concluded or even begun. For example, the Izmir State Security Court relied on the Manisa students' allegedly torture-induced confessions to convict them well
before the trial of their accused torturers was completed in
20 9
heavy penal court.
2. Unwillingness to Prosecute
Perhaps an even more serious hurdle to police accountability for torture is reluctance on the part of prosecutors to investigate and initiate proceedings against members of the security
forces. International standards guarantee detainees the right to
complain about torture and oblige authorities to investigate any
complaint or evidence of torture. Under Article 13 of the U.N.
Convention Against Torture, each signatory undertakes to "ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to
complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially ex2 10
amined by, its competent authorities."
The Turkish Criminal Procedure Code requires a prosecutor who has received a complaint of torture or other information
indicating that a crime may have occurred to initiate an investigation to determine whether there are grounds for prosecution. 211 The police are obligated to cooperate with the prosecutor's investigation. If the investigation supports the allegations
of torture, then the prosecutor is supposed to charge those responsible. 2 If prosecution is not warranted, the prosecutor
must inform the detainee, who then has the opportunity to ap208. For a complete discussion of the use of torture-induced confessions in SSCs,
see supra Part I.

209. The students in the Manisa case were convicted in State Security Court on
January 16, 1997. Although it resulted in acquittal, the trial of the police accused of
torturing the students did not conclude initially until March 11, 1998, over a year later.
Appeal is still pending. For a discussion of the Manisa case, see infra Part II.D.
210. Convention Against Torture, supra note 3, art. 13.

211. GRuM. PROC. C. art. 153 (Turk.).
212. Id. art. 163,
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2 13
peal the decision to the chief justice of the criminal court.
The chief justice may then order a prosecution if he or she
deems that appropriate in a given case. 4
Notwithstanding the requirements of Turkish and international law, prosecutors themselves professed reluctance to investigate claims of torture for several reasons. First, some prosecutors were simply skeptical of the claims of alleged torture victims.215 For example, Cevdet Volkan explained that "defendants
will accuse police of torture as a defense. We often face false
accusations of torture." 216 The willingness of prosecutors to
credit the accounts offered by the security forces has been criticized repeatedly by the European Court. In Kaya. v. Turkey,2 17
the Court explained that it was struck in particular by the fact
that the public prosecutor would appear to have assumed without question that the deceased was a terrorist who had died in a
clash with the security forces.21 8 In Aydin v. Turkey, the Court
cited the deferential attitude of the prosecutor toward members
of the security forces as "a particularly serious shortcoming in
21 9
the investigation.
Second, although the Criminal Procedure Code authorizes
the prosecutor to investigate directly, in practice prosecutors rely
heavily on the police to conduct the preliminary investigation of
crimes. 220 A potential conflict of interest exists when police investigate allegations of torture against other police officers. At
the same time, the prosecutors' dependence on the police
means that they may be reluctant themselves to investigate allegations of torture for fear of alienating the police. 221 Also, they
may lack the staff that is necessary to conduct independent inves-

213.
214.
215.
(June 4,

Id. art. 165.
Id.
Interview with Cevdet Voltan, Ankara SSC Chief Prosecutor, in Ankara, Turk.
1998).

216. Id.
217. See Kaya v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Feb. 19, 1998, 65 Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 297 (1998-I).
218. Id. at 326, 90.
219. See Aydin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Sept. 25, 1997, 50 Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1866, 1896-97,
106 (1997-VI).
220. See id. The prosecutor in the Aydin case conducted important parts of the
investigation through written correspondence with officials at the gendarme headquarters where the assault was alleged to have occurred. Id.
221. As Adnan Gfines, a prosecutor in the SSC in Istanbul, explained, "Prosecutors
must rely on the police to apprehend criminals, to bring the suspects in, and bring the
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tigations of the police.222 Several prosecutors suggested that the
creation of an independent, judicial police force was necessary
to control police abuse. 22' Although others thought this suggestion unrealistic, most agreed that the lack of resources exacerbated the problem.
Finally, the prosecutors themselves may be intimidated by
the police. The prosecutors interviewed by the delegation were
understandably reluctant to address this question; however, one
noted that "although the prosecutor is free to bring charges
against police officers, the security force administration will create problems. These will not be deliberate threats, but they will
be of a more subtle
nature. Some prosecutors decide not to
224
bring such cases.
3. A Case Study: The Diyarbakir Prison Killings
The ongoing prosecution of sixty-five members of the security forces for killing ten prisoners in Diyarbakir E-type Prison illustrates the pre-trial obstacles to successful prosecution in cases
of torture or police abuse.225 On September 24, 1996, members
of the security forces beat to death ten Kurdish prisoners who
had been accused of political crimes and were awaiting trial. According to one witness, the bound prisoners were forced to lie
on their faces and then were severely beaten by police and gendarme. Wounds on the bodies indicate that they died because of
massive, repeated blows to the head. Photographs of the deceased reveal the absence of wounds to the hands, supporting
detainees to court." Interview with Adnan Gfines, Istanbul SSC prosecutor, in Istanbul,
Turk. (May 27, 1998).
222. One chief prosecutor interviewed by the delegation noted that "with only six
prosecutors, it is difficult to oversee or keep up with the security forces. It also limits
the effectiveness of our efforts to gather evidence." Interview with Chief Prosecutor
(name withheld), in (location withheld), Turk. (May/June 1998).
223. See, e.g., Interviews with Chief Prosecutors in Adiyaman and Istanbul, Turk.
(May/June 1998) (all noting that lack of judicial police force to handle torture cases
was most significant obstacle to enforcing law against torture).
224. Interview with (name withheld) SSC Prosecutor, (city withheld), Turk. (May/
June 1998).
225. This summary of the facts of the case is based primarily on two briefings of
delegation members by Sezgin Tanrikulu and Fethi Gumus, lawyers representing the

victims. See Briefing with Sezgin Tanrikulu and Fethi Gfimfis, Diyarbakir Bar Association, in Diyarbakir, Turk. (May 25, 1998); Interview with Tahir Elci, in Diyarbakir, Turk.
(May 28, 1998) [hereinafter collectively Diyarbakir Briefings]. Facts or quotations derived from sources other than these briefings are indicated by footnote.
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the claim that their hands were bound at the time of the beating.
In addition to the ten who were killed, twenty-four others were
injured and had to be hospitalized.
Lawyers representing the victims in the case suggested that
the prison massacre was, at a minimum, a grossly inappropriate
response to a disturbance at the prison and possibly a premeditated assault. According to these lawyers, on the morning of the
massacre guards escorted thirty prisoners from their cells to
meet visiting relatives. On the way, one of the prisoners opened
a small window of another cell to ask for a plastic container to
store the food that he expected his visiting relatives to bring.
The chief guard berated the prisoner and swore at him for having done this. According to the guards, a fight erupted between
the guards and the prisoners, and the guards then closed the
iron gates at either end of the corridor, confining the prisoners
to the corridor.
I The prison administrator called the prison prosecutor and
the chief prosecutor to the prison for direction on handling the
situation. At noon, prison administrators sent a fax to the Ministry of Justice to ask permission to transfer the prisoners to Gaziantep prison.22 6 At 2:00 p.m., the Ministry gave permission for
the transfer. Prison administrators requested that units of gendarmes and special police be sent to reinforce the prison guards
already on the scene. At 3:00 p.m., the chief prosecutor called a
doctor at the Diyarbakir hospital to warn him to prepare for a
large number of patients. 2 27 At about 3:30 p.m., after reinforce-

ments had arrived, the corridor
guards entered from the northern
gendarmes and special police unit
gether they beat and subdued the

gates were opened. Prison
end of the corridor, and the
entered from the south. Toprisoners. According to one

226. Interview with Sezgin Tanrikulu, in New York (Nov. 22, 1997). The State of
Emergency Law provides that regional governors may request reinforcements with notification to the Ministry of the Interior. See State of Emergency Law art. 22(1) (b)
(Turk.).
227. Interview with Sezgin Tanrikulu, in New York (Nov. 22, 1997). According to
the Secretary of the Diyarbakir Chamber of Medicine, "U]ust before the attack on the
inmates, the hospital staff received a call from the district attorney[']s office. The staff
was told to be ready for an emergency to receive [sic] a large group of injured inmates."
[Turkish] Prisons Oversight Committee, An Investigative Report of the Events in Diyarbakir
Prison When Ten Kurdish Inmates Were Beaten To Death by Turkish Soldiers and Police (visited
Nov. 18, 1997) <http://www.Kurdistan.org/Prisons/diyarbakir.html> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) (citing Dr. Necdet Ipekyuz, Secretary of the
Diyarbakir Chamber of Medicine).
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witness, after the prisoners were bound and pacified, members
of the security forces took some of the prisoners out of the corridor, one by one, into a nearby room where nine of them were
beaten to death. According to guards interviewed by the
Diyarbakir Bar Association shortly after the incident, "whoever
died, died in that room."2 28
The dead and some of the twenty-four injured were taken to
the hospital in Diyarbakir. The nine were pronounced dead on
arrival. The prison doctor, Dr. Serdar G6k, examined the injured and approved sixteen, including Kadir Demir, for transfer
to Gaziantep. When the car arrived at Gaziantep Prison, Kadir
Demir was dead, the tenth victim of the massacre.2 29
Initially, the prosecutor opened two separate investigations:
one of the conduct of the prisoners and the other of the beatings and deaths. The first case, for damaging state property and
causing harm to civil servants, is pending against the prisoners.
The second was subsequently divided into two cases: one naming a prosecutor, the chief prosecutor, and the Minister of Justice for having authorized the action, 230 and a second naming
228. See Diyarbakir Briefings, supra note 225 (quoting guard interviewed).
229. Lawyers at the Diyarbakir Bar Association contend that Demir's death during
the transfer admits of only two possible conclusions: either the doctor's report approving the transfer was a lie or something about the transfer killed Demir. The other
transferred prisoners all told the Gaziantep prosecutor that they had been beaten during the transfer, but the court has not allowed these statements into evidence. The
court trying the sixty-five security force members lists Demir as one of the victims, but
the case covers only the events at Diyarbakir Prison prior to the transfer. In the
meantime, another court is trying Dr. G6k under a fraud-related charge for his assessment that Demir was in a condition to be transferred. See Diyarbakir Briefings, supra
note 225.
230. The case against the prosecutors and the Minister of Justice was quickly dismissed. According to lawyers from the Diyarbakir Bar Association, that case would not
have been brought were it not for the pressures applied by human rights groups.
Although perhaps expected, the quick dismissal raises concerns, since there is no indication that a special prosecutor or other independent investigator was assigned to the
case. The need for such conflict-of-interest safeguards is apparent; a prosecutor could
not be expected to investigate freely other prosecutors as well as the Minister ofJustice,
given that the Minister ofJustice presides over the High.Council ofJudges and Prosecutors and determines prosecutors' career paths. Basic standards on independence of the
judiciary preclude such direct conflict. See PrinciplesonJudiciay, supra note 46, princ. 2;
Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 189
(1990).
Although the Turkish Constitution states that personnel decisions must be made
within the parameters of principles ofjudicial independence, no checking mechanism
exists to guarantee this, and many lawyers assert that the practice is not consistent with
these principles. See TuRK. CONsT. art. 159.
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gendarmes, police, and guards for excessive use of force and
manslaughter. This latter case was again divided into two, separating prison guards in one case from gendarmes and police in
another.
In the case against the prison guards, the prosecutor quickly
dismissed the counts against thirty or so defendants based on
limited questioning of the injured prisoners. Each prisoner was
asked only who had injured him, and not whether he had seen
others harmed. By indicting on the basis of this questioning, the
prosecutor reduced the case from approximately forty to seven
defendants, all of whom the injured witnesses had identified by
name as having harmed them. The limited questioning also precluded indictments for any killings since, as attorney Sezgin
Tanrikulu observed, "the dead could not be asked who had
killed them. 2 3 1
The most visible case to arise out of the prison melee is the
case now pending in Diyarbakir Heavy Penal Court III against
twenty-nine gendarmes and thirty-six police officers for the use
of excessive force and manslaughter ("Diyarbakir Prison
Case") .232 Before proceeding in heavy penal court, this case had
to work its way through the jurisdictional maze created by the
Civil Servants Law.23 Its progression through the system illustrates the problems created by the administrative procedure
even in cases that are eventually prosecuted.
After the initial investigatory phase, the prosecutor had in
his purview a case against the sixty-five police and gendarmes.
Because the defendants had acted on the authority of the prosecutor and allegedly had committed the crimes in a detention
center, they were functioning in their judicial role and should
231. Diyarbakir Briefings, supra note 225 (quoting Sezgin Tanrikulu). In light of
these investigative practices, it is worth noting that prison guards and the charging prosecutors both answer to the Ministry ofJustice, again raising serious questions about the
integrity and independence of the investigation.
232. According to Sezgin Tanrikulu, the Minister of Justice's permission was required to prosecute this case. Interview with Sezgin Tanrikulu, in New York (Nov. 22,
1997). This raises serious questions as to the independence of the proceedings because
the Ministry of Justice was involved in the events at issue in the case. See, e.g., Letter
from Judge Cernal Sahin Gurcal, Director General of Prisons and Detention Centers,
Ministry ofJustice, to Diyarbakir State Prosecutor's Office (Sept. 24, 1996) (authorizing
transfer of prisoners) (obtained from case file) (on file with author). Indeed, as mentioned above, the Miniser ofJustice was a named defendant in one of the investigations
arising from the incident.
233. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Civil Servants Law).
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not have been permitted to invoke the protections of the Civil
Servant Law. Nevertheless, evidently hoping to avoid responsibility for this politically controversial case, the prosecutor referred the matter to the city administrative council.23 4 After reviewing the case, the council found that "since the forces were
called in by the prosecutor, and therefore they were [performing a] judicial function, the council is not authorized to decide
[the case] .235 This finding obliged the prosecutor to proceed
with the case in the heavy penal court in Diyarbakir. The court,
however, declined to hear the case, claiming that it was within
the jurisdiction of the administrative board. This conflict of jurisdictional claims between the council and the heavy penal
court had to be resolved by Turkey's Court of Cassation.2 3 6 The
judges of the penal chambers of the Court of Cassation, sitting
en banc, heard the appeal and determined that the case was not
administrative. It therefore sent the case to Heavy Penal Court
237
III in Diyarbakir where it is now proceeding.
The first hearing in the case was held in June 1997, nine
months after the killings took place. This lengthy delay illustrates the way in which prosecutorial reluctance and jurisdictional confusion can combine to undermine the accountability
of members of the security forces for abuse of individuals in
their custody.
C. Why Impunity? The Trial and Sentencing Stages
Once pre-trial obstacles have been overcome and the case
proceeds to the fact-finding stages, problems frequently emerge
that undermine the integrity of the trial process, including barriers to the participation of the victim's representatives, inadequate investigation and presentation of evidence, and, in cases
where the crime is proven, a reluctance on the part of the court
to convict and sentence members of the security forces appropriately. This section describes the factors in the trial and sentencing stages that contribute to the climate of impunity.
234. See supra notes 182-187 and accompanying text (describing limitations on
scope of administrative protections of Civil Servants Law).
235. See Diyarbakir Briefings, supra note 225.
236. The Court of Cassation is the country's high court of appeals. It has both civil
and penal chambers. See ANsAY'& WALLACE, supra note 182, at 176.

237. See Diyarbakir Briefings, supra note 225 (quoting findings of Council).

2190

FORDHAM INTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2129

1. Difficulty of Developing a Case Against Members of the
Security Forces
a. Conflicts of Interest and Intimidation
Many of the problems in holding the police accountable for
torture arise directly from the conflict of interest inherent in police conducting investigations of their own colleagues. This conflict is exacerbated by the fact that members of the security
forces are not only tried without detention, but also frequently
238
remain on duty while under investigation and prosecution.
This practice permits the defendants in a case to tamper with
evidence, to intimidate witnesses, and to continue the abuse for
which they are being prosecuted.
Again, the Diyarbakir Prison Case offers an illustration of
the problem. In that case, the defense has argued that the
forces were called in to quell an armed riot by the prisoners.
Yet, no weapons were found on the prisoners.2 3 9 When interviewed by a member of the delegation, lawyers for the defendants insisted that various weapons were found in subsequent
searches of the prison and that the lawyers had submitted this
evidence to the court.24 ° Although the delegation was unable
independently to confirm this assertion, the fact that police, gendarmes, and prison guards accused in the Diyarbakir case have
remained on duty, a number of them in the E-type prison, raises
the possibility that any weapons found were planted and therefore undermines the integrity of searches of the prison. Moreover, members of one or more of the three branches of the security forces implicated in the killings conducted the investigation in its early stages without the direct supervision of the
prosecutor. 241' Given the importance of this early stage and the
critical role of the prosecutor in ensuring the integrity of the
238. Article 15 of the Anti-Terror Law provides that "officials engaged in fighting
terrorism . . . shall be tried without being detained." Anti-Terror Law art. 15(1)
(Turk.). Although the Anti-Terror Law does not address suspension from duty pending
trial, the delegation was informed that the accused almost always remain on duty.
239. See Diyarbakir Briefings, supra note 225.
240. Interview with Selim Karakoyun & Ziya Ozmen, in Ankara, Turk. (June 5,
1998).
241. Tahir Elgi, a lawyer for the victims, told the delegation that prosecutors were
not involved in the early investigation. He suggested that the reasons might have been
(1) a lack of resources and personnel, and (2) a lack of will on the part of the prosecutors to investigate police and gendarmes. "By law it is the duty of the prosecutor to
either investigate or delegate, and the exception is that security forces investigate; how-
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investigation, this failure to supervise may have undermined the
ultimate success of the prosecution as well as the availability of
other remedies.
The practice of permitting members of the security forces to
remain on duty while on trial permits them access not only to
evidence but also to potential witnesses. This creates an opportunity for the defendant to coach sympathetic witnesses such as
other police officers and to intimidate adverse witnesses such as
other detainees. For example, in the Diyarbakir Prison Case, an
accused gendarme accompanied a prisoner-witness to one of the
hearings as a part of his duty.2 42 The gendarme was in court
armed, contrary to court rules.2 43 The defendant's direct control over the immediate fate of one of the witnesses may undermine the willingness of the witness to testify against the defendant, whether or not any express threat is made.
b. Physical Evidence
The belief widely shared among prosecutors and judges that
defendants routinely allege torture in order to undermine the
reputation of the police means that, as a practical matter, the
testimony of the victim is not sufficient evidence to support a
conviction. 2 " Successful prosecution, therefore, depends upon
physical proof. Because torture techniques are designed to inflict pain and suffering without leaving physical signs that could
incriminate the interrogators, physical evidence of torture depends, in turn, upon timely and thorough medical examinations
and reports. Indeed, such reports are required under Turkish
law.2 45 For a number of reasons, however, comprehensive and
ever, the exception becomes the rule." Interview with Tahir Eli, in Diyarbakir, Turk.
(May 28, 1998).
242. Interview with Sezgin Tanrikulu, in New York (Nov. 22, 1997).
243. Id. Once attorneys for the victims pointed out that the gendarme was both a
defendant and armed, the judge ejected him from the court. The witness then freely
testified, according to these attorneys. Id. Since neither the judge nor the prosecutor
have any control over the gendarmes' access to the witnesses outside the court, the
witness probably was taking a risk in testifying.
244. As one lawyer explained, "The courts do not give credence to the statements
of victims. They only consider such statements to be allegations. As evidence, they are
virtually ignored." Interview with Mehmet Ali Kird6k, defense lawyer, in Istanbul, Turk.
(May 25, 1998).
245. Under Turkish law, a medical examination is required at the beginning and
at the end of the detention period in order to document the physical condition of the
detainee. Moreover, various circulars from the Ministry of Health have defined how the
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reliable medical reports are rarely available in torture cases. 24 6
First and most obviously, the required physical examination
may not be conducted at all or may not take place in a timely
manner. In some cases, the torture report may be missing from
a detainee's file. In other cases, a report may be included in the
file even though the victim maintains that no physical examination ever took place. Attorneys interviewed by the delegation indicated that they believe that in such cases the medical report is
simply forged by the police.2 4 7 In other cases, the medical examination may be deliberately delayed. In such cases, many of the
physical signs of torture may have faded or disappeared, making
it difficult or impossible for the physician to confirm the victim's
allegations of abuse.2 4 8
Second, even if the examination takes place in a timely way,
it may not be sufficiently thorough to yield the necessary information. In some cases, the quality of the examination may be
compromised by the inexperience of the examining physiexamination should be conducted. According to these circulars and under standards
of the Turkish Medical Association, the examination physician should record all physical and psychological complaints, including the victim's account of the circumstances
under which the injuries were suffered. The physician should conduct a thorough
physical examination including the genital region and should make use of x-rays and
laboratory tests where necessary. The information should be recorded on a separate
forensic report signed by the physician. The examination should take place outside the
presence of the police in order to encourage candid communication between the victim and the physician. See 1996 HRFT REPORT (describing protocol for assessment of
torture and citing both Ministry of Health and Turkish Medical Association).
246. The delegation interviewed Dr. Sebnem Korur Fincanci, Vice President of the
Forensic Medical Association of Turkey and Professor of Forensic Medicine at Istanbul
University, as well as representatives of the HRFT, but did not undertake a systematic
survey of doctors regarding their experience with torture victims. This section is concerned primarily with the legal use of medical reports and therefore relies on interviews
with lawyers as well as doctors. For a comprehensive study of the medical profession
and torture in Turkey, see PHYSCIxANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, TORTURE IN TURKEY, supra

note 1; Vincent lacopino et al., Physician Complicity in Misrepresentation and Omission of
Evidence of Torture in Postdetention Medical Examination in Turkey, 276 J. AMER. MED. Assoc. 396 (1996).
247. The torture report document itself is critical; the delegation was informed
that it is unusual for the doctor who prepared the report to be called to testify directly
at the trial itself, and forensic doctors are rarely called as expert witnesses to interpret
torture reports. Interview with Dr. Sebnem Korur Fincanci, Vice President of the Forensic Medical Association of Turkey, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 23, 1998).
248. See, e.g., Interview with Emir Ali Demirpence, Istanbul SSC, in Istanbul, Turk.
(June 1, 1998) (noting that police often alter date of detention so that they can exceed
four-day detention period and that by time defendants get to doctor for examination,
signs of torture have dissipated).
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cian. 24 9 Only thirty-two court houses in Turkey have a forensic
council that can provide a high level of expertise in torture
cases. 25 1 In other locations, ordinary doctors conduct the examinations. 2 1 1 These doctors may not have had any specialized
training in forensic medicine and are therefore often unable to
detect more subtle evidence of torture. 5 2
In other cases, the quality of the examination may be undermined by intimidation of the doctors rather than their lack of
training. The intimidation may be quite direct. For example,
often the police remain in the examining room with the doctor
and the detainee. The delegation observed a hearing in a trial
in State Security Court in which two brothers claimed that they
had been tortured. Their lawyer, Oguz Demir, explained that
one of the alleged torturers brought them to the doctor for a
physical examination. The doctor recorded merely that they
complained of pain but not the physical indications of torture.
Because the prosecutor ordered no physical examination after
the complaint of torture was made, the record contained no
medical evidence of torture.2 5 3 Thus, there was no basis either
for the exclusion of coerced testimony in the trial of the victim
or for the prosecution of the accused torturers. In cases such as
this, the presence of police reduces the likelihood that the doctor will make a thorough investigation even if he suspects torture. It also greatly reduces the likelihood that the victim will
report the abuse in the first place for fear that he or she will be
tortured again.
Doctors may also be intimidated by threats of professional
or legal repercussions for reporting torture. In 1995, Physicians
for Human Rights, an international non-governmental organization, conducted a very thorough study of the role of physicians
249. Interview with Dr. Sebnem Korur Fincanci, Vice President of the Forensic
Medical Association of Turkey, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 23, 1998).
250. See id.
251. This is especially true in the southeast. See PHYSicIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
TORTURE IN TURKEY, supra note 1, at 129.

252. According to Dr. Financi, only 20 of 43 medical schools in Turkey have forensic medicine departments, and consequently many of the doctors who perform forensic

examinations have never been properly trained. Interview with Dr. Sebnem Korur Fincanci, Vice President of the Forensic Medical Association of Turkey, in Istanbul, Turk.
(May 23, 1998).
253. Interview with Oguz Demir, Istanbul SSC, in Istanbul, Turk. (June 1, 1998).
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in the systematic torture of detainees in Turkey.25 4 Their report
indicates that, as state employees, physicians conducting official
medical examinations of prisoners feared loss of their jobs if
they reported torture. 5 5 Others feared that they would themselves be prosecuted or detained and tortured if they reported
torture consistently. 256 They also indicated that reporting torture at substantial risks to themselves was probably futile because
such reports would simply be altered by the police or ignored by
257
the prosecutor.
Third, requests for independent, private medical examinations arranged by the victim's lawyer or family are often denied
or the reports themselves are ruled inadmissable. For example,
the report of the Izmir State Hospital and Izmir Medical Association as well as much of the medical evidence gathered by the
lawyers for a group of students tortured in Manisa was apparently disregarded by the lower court when it acquitted the defendants for lack of evidence of torture. In a potentially important decision, the court of appeals reversed the verdict of acquittal of the police and specifically criticized the lower court for
disregarding this evidence of torture. 2 " The precedential significance of the decision was undermined, however, by the refusal
of the heavy penal court to follow the decision of the court of
appeals. On January 27, 1999, the heavy penal court reinstated
its verdict of acquittal.2 5 9
In some cases, medical evidence of torture may be clear, but
prosecution may fail because the perpetrators cannot be identified. In theory, those responsible for torture might be identified
either directly by their victims or other witnesses or by inference
through records of police custody. Often neither of these methods is available. Direct identification by victims or witnesses is
often impossible because detainees are routinely blindfolded
throughout the detention period.2 60 Identification numbers on
254. See PHYsIciANs FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, TORTURE IN TURKEY, supra note 1.

255. See id. at 127-39.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See RADiKAL, Oct. 15, 1998.
259. See LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF TRIAL OBSERVATION
TEAm (Jan. 27, 1999) (on file with Crowley Program).
260. As one lawyer explained:
When a police officer conducts an interrogation, he puts his number on the
file, not his name. Finding out who that number corresponds with or the rank
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the officers' clothing or license plates on cars used by police are
frequently changed in' order to mask their identity. Although
this practice is justified by the Turkish government as a means of
protecting the security of the police who risk their lives in the
fight against terrorism, it has the effect of undermining the investigation of torture.261 In addition, the practice of permitting
personnel to
remain on duty reduces the willingness of witnesses
26 2
to testify.
Circumstantial evidence of the perpetrator's identity is also
often unavailable. For example, although the investigating officer is required to sign statements taken from detainees, the signature is virtually always illegible and unaccompanied by a
printed or typewritten name. In many cases, no accurate record
is kept as to the identity of detainees or the period of detention.
For example, in Aydin v. Turkey, the log produced by gendarme
officials for the year in which members of the Aydin family were
allegedly detained revealed no record of their detention. Despite the fact that the log contained only six entries for all of
1993, the prosecutor accepted it as credible evidence in support
of the officials' contention that the Aydin family had not been
detained.
c. General Problems in the Collection and
Presentation of Evidence
Legal protections afforded anti-terror forces combined with
prosecutorial reluctance to pursue claims against members of
those forces can frustrate the collection and accurate presentation of evidence in a variety of ways. For example, since hearings
began in the Diyarbakir Prison Case, the proceedings have been
prolonged and delayed because of the inability to gain access to
and present important evidence. Defendants are not required
of the person can be very difficult. The police will not tell whose number it is.

They claim that security concerns prevent them from releasing that information. A State Security Court will rarely compel the police to release the information. If you need to find out who the person is, then you will have difficulty
discovering other information such as whether the officer has the authority to
interrogate the defendant.
Interview with Zeki Ruzgar, in Ankara, Turk. (May 25, 1998).
261. See Anti-Terror Law art. 20(1)-(2) (Turk.) (providing that "[t]he State shall
take necessary protective measure for officials involved in fighting terrorism or anarchy" and enumerating examples of such measures).
262. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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263
to be present in court, even for the purpose of identification.
Victims' lawyers' requests that the court detain the defendants
and compel their attendance in court have been denied. On the
contrary, some of those defendants have been transferred to
other towns, and some continue to serve in the Diyarbakir EType prison. 26 4 This dispersal of the defendants has necessitated
the taking of their testimony in the remote locations. 2 65 Prosecutors in those locations, who may be completely unfamiliar with

the case, ask questions without the benefit of the case file.2 66

The victims' lawyers argue that this practice allows the defendants to invoke their right to freedom from self-incrimination selectively in that their cursory statements given in remote locations are accepted as evidence of a prisoners' riot, but the defendants are not required to give their full testimony at trial
where they would be subject to close questioning.2 6 7 In the
Diyarbakir Prison Case, the court has extended this practice to
witnesses and victims as well. Rejecting the victims' lawyers' requests that the court allow witnesses to be brought to Diyarbakir
to testify, the court, stating that there is no legal obligation to
bring the defendants before the court and to take their testimony in the courtroom, refused the attorneys' request to bring
before the court all defendants, intervening victims, and witnesses who were not in Diyarbakir.26 s
Similarly, the victims' lawyers have been stymied in their attempts to obtain a medical determination of the causes of the
deaths. When the dead and injured were brought to Diyarbakir
State Hospital, the prosecutor was apparently unable to persuade the forensic specialist to work overtime. 269 Thus, only
non-forensic medical personnel viewed the bodies, and these
physicians made no determination as to the causes of the death.
A fifteen-minute videotape of the bodies was taken, however,
263. Diyarbakir Briefings, supra note 225; Anti-Terror Law art. 15(1) (Turk.).
264. Diyarbakir Briefings, supra note 225.
265. The delegation was told that the law permits such arrangements where the
witness cannot afford, or in the case of prisoners cannot obtain permission, to come to
the court to testify. See id.

266. Id.
267. See Part II (describing criminal procedure under Anti-Terror Law, including
procedures designed to safeguard identity of those engaged in fight against terrorism).
268. Trial Observation, Esas [Case] No. 1997/125, Diyarbakir Heavy Penal Court
III (June 5,1998).
269. Interview with Sezgin Tanrikulu, in Diyarbakir, Turk. (June 5, 1998).
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which is now in the court's exclusive possession.2 70 On the
court's refusal to allow the victims' attorneys to copy the videotape, the attorneys requested on April 24, 1998, that the court
2 71
submit the tape to forensic doctors for a determination.
Although this request was granted, the report of the forensic
specialists did not arrive until an hour before the June 5, 1998
hearing, a delay that, according to the court, was caused by
problems in getting the tape to the doctors. The one-page forensic report did not distinguish among the bodies and gave a
general description of heads covered with blood and stitched. It
2 72
give no determination of a cause of death.
Since the delegation's initial visit in June 1998, the delay
and confusion in the gathering and presentation of evidence in
the Diyarbakir Prison Case has continued. In January 1999, a
three-person follow-up mission attended a hearing in the case in
which guards who had witnessed the beatings testified. During
the proceeding, the chief judge summarized the testimony of
two witnesses who had been questioned in another location and
questioned five other witnesses in court. The most striking aspect of the proceeding was the fact that the court was hearing
detailed testimony from these important witnesses for the first
time two and one half years after the killings took place. The
lawyers for the victims in the case expect that the slow pace of
the proceedings will continue and that, ultimately, no one will
be held accountable for the deaths.2 73
Thus, the Diyarbakir Prison Case continues to illustrate the
myriad ways in which a prosecution may be prolonged, forestalling punishment of those responsible and frustrating the participation of attorneys representing the victims. These problems
are due in part to specific legal protections built into the procedures in the State Security Courts and afforded to members of
security forces engaged in the fight against terrorism. Reluctance on the part of the court or prosecutor to pursue investigation of security force members exacerbates the problems in a
system that is inquisitorial rather than adversarial. In such a system, the prosecutor and the court exercise much greater control
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Report on Autopsy Video (June 5, 1998) (copy on file with Crowley Pro-

gram).
273. See Interview with Sezgin Tanrikulu, in Diyarbakir, Turk. (Jan. 29, 1999).
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over the marshaling and presentation of evidence than in an adversarial system. This can mean that justice is delayed and, ultimately, denied.
2. Failure to Convict/Reversal on Appeal
According to lawyers representing torture victims, most torture prosecutions of members of the security forces end in acquittal. Accurate and up-to-date statistics are difficult to obtain
as the Turkish government has declined to follow the 1996 recommendation of the U.N. Committee to Prevent Torture to
track and review the conviction rate and sentences of police accused of torture or abuse of prisoners.2 7 4 Nevertheless, available
information suggests that the conviction rate is quite low
whether measured against cases reported or even cases prosecuted. For example, the HRFT has reported that of seventy
cases from 1980 to 1995 in which the government acknowledges
that the victims died of torture, fewer than one-third of those
cases had resulted in convictions as of the end of 1996.275
This pattern probably reflects, in part, the view shared by
many judges that torture allegations by political prisoners are
fabricated to undermine the police.2 7 6 It also reflects the difficulties that prosecutors and advocates for victims face in collecting evidence to support allegations of torture and ascertaining
the identity of the victims. In the view of many lawyers working
in the State Security Courts, however, the low conviction rate in
these cases also reflects a general lack of commitment on the
part of the Turkish government to hold police accountable for
their conduct. These lawyers told the delegation that convictions were rare even in cases such as the Manisa case described
below, in which there is compelling evidence of torture and
clear identification of the perpetrators.
In the unusual event that members of the security forces are
convicted at the trial level, their sentences are often overturned
on appeal on either substantive or procedural grounds. For example, in a highly publicized investigation and trial lasting over
two years, five police officers were convicted of beating to death
274. See 1996 Council of Europe Statement, supra note 1, para. 7.
275. See 1996 HRFI REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
276. See, e.g., supra note 155 (discussing skepticism of prosecutors toward claims of
torture).
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journalist Metin Goktepe and were sentenced to seven and one
half years in prison. Seven others were acquitted. On July 17,
1998, the High Court of Appeals in Ankara overturned both the
convictions and the acquittals and remanded the case to the trial
court with instructions to correct for certain irregularities in the
original proceeding. Similarly, on December 24, 1998, the convictions of five police officers the beating death of Baki Erdogan
were overturned on appeal, again for procedural reasons. In
both cases, hearings before the original courts have resumed,
and the convictions may or may not be reinstated. Lawyers involved with these cases note that, even if the convictions are ultimately reinstated by the trial court, the process may take months
or even years and may again be subject to appeal.2 7 7
D. A Case Study: Detention and Torture in Manisa
The investigation and prosecution of police accused of torturing of a group of teenagers in Manisa, a town in western Turkey, illustrates many of the obstacles to holding police accountable, particularly the reluctance to prosecute and ultimately to
convict those responsible for torture.
In December 1995, sixteen people were arrested and detained by the Anti-Terror Department of the Manisa Security Directorate. Most of those detained were high school students,
seven under the age of eighteen. The students were detained
until January. 5, 1996, when they were arraigned on charges of
having been members of an illegal organization and having acted on behalf of that organization. At that point, four were released to stand trial without arrest and the remaining twelve
were held pending trial.2 78 Two cases were brought against the
students, each consisting of two charges (writing political slogans
on a wall and throwing Molotov cocktails). The property crimes
fell within the jurisdiction of the ordinary penal court, where the
students were tried and acquitted. The political crimes were
tried in State Security Court, where the students were initially
convicted. After their conviction was reversed on appeal, the
case was remanded to the State Security Court where it is still
pending.
277. Interview with Hulya Ucpinar, Director, Izmir HRA, in Izmir, Turk. (Jan. 27,
1999).
278. Eventually, seven more students were released pending trial.
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The students claim that they were severely tortured while in
detention. The families were permitted to visit the students
twice while they were in detention, once on December 31, 1995
and once on January 2, 1996. Although the visits lasted only a
minute or two each time, relatives were able to learn of the students' claims that they had been tortured. The families immediately filed a torture complaint with the prosecutor. On December 31 andJanuary 2, the students were sent for a medical examination at the request of the families. The students report that,
during these medical examinations, the police stood either next
to them or near enough to hear the conversations during the
examinations. No one asked the police to leave. The examining
physicians did not ask the students to undress. Instead, the physicians simply looked at them from a distance, fully-clothed.
They did not ask them any questions about their physical complaints or trauma that they might have suffered. None of the
students had a urogenital examination or a psychological examination. Not surprisingly, these official reports included no confirmation of torture having taken place.
The families continued their efforts to obtain medical evidence of torture. The Izmir Medical Chamber (Izmir Tabip
Odasi, ("ITO")) attempted to arrange for independent medical
examinations of the students but were denied access to them.
The ITO then arranged to survey the youths about the medical
examinations that they had undergone and to record their accounts of torture and their physical complaints as precisely and
comprehensively as possible. Based on the official medical reports, these surveys, and hospital records, the ITO concluded
that the students had been subjected to a range of torture techniques including beating, hosing with cold water, deprivation of
clothing, electrical shocks to the genitals, anal rape with a truncheon, squeezing of the testicles, and psychological harassment
and humiliation.
Despite this evidence, the prosecutor refused to open a case
against the police. Subsequent medical examination revealed
that the students suffered from deformation in their ears from
cold water spray, chronic pain from electrical shocks to their
genitals, injuries from the squeezing of the boys' testicles, and
tuberculosis. This medical report was also sent to the prosecutor
who again refused to open a case. Media attention increased,
and an eyewitness came forward who had been detained at
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the same time. Sabri Ergul, a Member of Parliament from the
region, who had witnessed a part of the torture, went directly
to the President about the case. Finally, on June 4, 1996, six
months after the alleged incidents of torture, the prosecutor
opened a case against the police.
The trial of the police proceeded in heavy penal court simultaneously with the trials of the students both in the SSC and
in heavy penal court. The lawyers for the students attempted to
introduce evidence of torture from the police trial at the students' trials in SSC and in heavy penal court in order to call into
question the statements that were taken under detention. After
much public controversy about the case, the heavy penal court
acquitted the students, noting that there was no conclusive evidence, other than their police statements, that the defendants
committed the offenses. The SSC, however, apparently relied
upon the allegedly coerced statements and reached a conviction
well before the trial of the police for torture was concluded.
The defendant police officers, who were never arrested, did
not attend the hearings in their trial. Moreover, their lawyers
argued that they should be identified by the students through
photographs rather than in person, a procedure designed to
protect the identity of police officers engaged in anti-terror
work. The court agreed to the use of the procedure because the
officers remained on duty throughout the trial. On March 11,
1998, the police officers were acquitted by the heavy penal court
due to insufficient medical evidence of torture. Both the conviction of the students and the acquittal of the police were appealed.
Throughout the three-year period since the students were
detained, this case has received an unusual amount of attention.
The acquittal of the police was strongly criticized by human
rights advocates and others, both within and outside of Turkey.
In October 1998, the verdict of acquittal of the police was overturned by the court of appeals. 279 Explaining its decision, the
court of appeals stated that "[t] hese youths have been subjected
to physical and psychological violence. Torture is a crime.
There will inevitably be sanctions. 28 ° The case was returned to
279. The conviction of the students was also overturned, and they are being retried in State Security Court.
280. See RADiKAL, Oct. 15, 1998.
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the Manisa Heavy Penal Court for further proceedings.
In a communication with members of the delegation, the
Turkish government's Minister for Human Rights cited this decision as an important development, noting that the officers
would be retried. Given the importance of the case, a trial observation team attended the hearing on January 27, 1999, in which
the Manisa Heavy Penal Court's decision was expected to be announced. After the initial discussion regarding the presence of
cameras and recording devices and a ten minute break, the substantive part of the hearing lasted less than five minutes. Without any further investigation or argument, the Manisa Heavy Penal Court simply announced that, notwithstanding the decision
of the court of appeals, it had decided to reinstate its earlier de281

cision of acquittal.
The Turkish government, Turkish citizens, and domestic
and international human rights organizations have come to see
the Manisa case as a test of the government's resolve to end impunity for human rights violations. Unfortunately, the outcome
in this case suggests that, even if the current government would
like to punish those guilty of torture, it lacks the power to do so.
Although the Minister for Human Rights might have welcomed
a different outcome in Manisa, certain prosecutors and members
of the judiciary seem committed to protecting the impunity of
the security forces. Consequently, there is currently no credible
threat that a member of the security forces who commits acts of
torture will be held accountable. Until those responsible for the
investigation, prosecution, and trial of members of the security
forces begin to take serious allegations and evidence of torture,
the climate of impunity will persist and serious human rights
abuses will continue in Turkey.
E.

Impunity and Women Victims of Torture: Special Concerns

Women all over the world face special risks when they are
held in detention. 28 2 In addition to the forms of torture suffered
by men, women more often suffer gender-specific harassment
281. The victims' lawyers will have another opportunity to appeal the case. They
plan to do so. They will also file a petition with the European Commission. See Interview with Pelin Erda, in Manisa, Turk. (Jan. 27, 1999).
282.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WOMEN'S RIGHTS PROJECT, THE HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS

(1995).
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and humiliation and may become pregnant as a result of rape.28 3
In Turkey, cultural and political conditions contribute to the climate of impunity when the victims of torture and abuse are women. 284 Eren Keskin, a lawyer working on a project to assist women abused under detention, has documented fifty-four cases of
women who were raped or sexually abused while in detention.28 5
She believes that virtually all women who are detained are sexually abused. 28 6 She estimates that ninety-five percent are naked
while they are being questioned by the police and that they2 87are
often touched sexually and verbally abused in the process.

Women who are raped or sexually abused in prison or by
police continue to feel the effects long after the assault. Given
the obstacles described above to the successful prosecution of
their assailants, women know that they have little to gain by reporting the incident to the prosecutor. Alternatively, they have
much to lose by making a such a report. If they disclose their
abuse, then they risk suffering the social stigma of having been
raped. 288 They may be ostracized by their communities and even
their families.2 8 9 Women are sometimes forced into arranged
29 °
marriages to eliminate the family's shame of sexual assault.
Thus, social attitudes are an additional obstacle to reporting
283. Of course, in Turkey, as elsewhere, men are not immune from the use of rape
as torture. The delegation was informed that it is common for security forces to rape
men in detention with batons. See Interview with Ercan Kanar, in Istanbul, Turk. (May
29, 1998).
284. Id. Kanar noted that rape was a sensitive and emotional issue in Turkey. It is
viewed as a grave violation, as the social consequences for women are often permanent.
Therefore, there is great social pressure for conviction when rape is credibly alleged.
Kanar asserted that the justice system has responded to this sensitivity by specially insulating officials accused of rape. He said that police officers accused of rape are not
called in to appear in court. See id. This is a serious obstacle to successful prosecution
since, in addition to the de facto requirement of corroboration, the absence of the accused in court denies a victim the opportunity to identify the accused as the rapist
before the court.
285. Interview with Eren Keskin, in Istanbul, Turk. (June 2, 1998); see TURKISH
LEGAL AID PROJECT AGAINST RAPE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER DETENTION, THE STORIES OF THE VICrIMS (Aug. 28, 1997) [hereinafter TURKISH LEGAL AD PROJECT, STORIES
OF THE VICTIMS].

286. Interview with Eren Keskin, in Istanbul, Turk. (June 2, 1998).
287. See id.
288. Interview with Muruvet Yilmaz, Director of the Kurdish Women's Organization, in Istanbul, Turk. (June 2, 1998).
289. See id.
290. See id.; Interview with Ercan Kanar, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 29, 1998).
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rape and, therefore, to treatment and rehabilitation as well as
prosecution.
As with other forms of torture, physical evidence of rape is
critical to the prosecution of police. Here again, women face
additional problems in the collection of physical evidence beyond those already discussed. According to Eren Keskin, if the
woman had not had sexual intercourse prior to the rape, then
the incident must be reported within seven to ten days in order
for a medical examination to reveal evidence of violation. If the
woman had had sexual intercourse prior to the rape, then the
evidence must be taken within forty-eight hours in order to
prove that intercourse took place. This amount of time often
passes while the woman is still in detention.2 9 ' Thus, physical
evidence of rape is very difficult to obtain. Psychological testing
is possible at trauma centers, but prosecutors generally do not
seek this type of evidence in torture cases. The woman's testi29 2
mony alone is not enough.
The following descriptions of three rape cases demonstrate
the particular difficulties that rape victims and their families face
when they decide to pursue charges against the assailant. Taken
together, they explain both the reluctance of victims to report
rape and to pursue prosecution and the climate of impunity that
surrounds the security forces in such cases.
The Case of Sukran Aydin. 291 Sukran Aydin was born in Derik
village of Mardin in 1976. Because the men in her family had
refused to become Village Guards, they were unpopular with the
security forces. 294 On June 29, 1993, members of the security
291. Interview with Eren Keskin, in Instanbul, Turk. (June 6, 1998).
292. See id.
293. This account and the account of the Case of X are drawn from a report by the
Turkish Legal Aid Project Against Rape and Sexual Harassment Under Detention. See
TURKISH LEGAL AID PROJECT, STORIES OF THE VICTIMS, supra note 285. In addition, certain facts from the Aydin case are drawn from the findings of the European Court in
Aydin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Sept. 25, 1997, 50 Reports ofJudgments and
Decisions 1866, 1896-97,
106 (1997-VI).
294. The Village Guards are, by tradition, the locally appointed police forces in
Turkish villages, though they are increasingly under the control of Turkey's central
security apparatus. They are overseen by the gendarmeries in the provinces in which
they operate, and they are paid by the gendarmerie. In zones under a state of emergency, Village Guards are under the command of the state of emergency regional governor and afforded the same legal protection as other security forces. See Decree Having the Force of Law on the Establishment of the State of Emergency Regional
Governancy, No. 285, art. 4(b), (d) (1987), as amended by Decree No. 286 (1987), in
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forces came to the village dressed in civilian clothes and began
to harass the villagers. Accusing them of "helping the terrorists,"
they beat some of the men and took Ms. Aydin, her father, and
two of her relatives to the Derik Gendermerie. They put them in
separate rooms and blindfolded them. Two men beat Ms. Aydin,
attempted to force her to admit to helping the terrorists,
stripped her, and then raped her. Four days later, she and her
family members were released without any explanation. Ms. Aydin told her mother what had happened to her. Her mother
then took her to the Derik hospital where a medical examination confirmed that she had had forced intercourse and had
multiple lesions on her thighs. She was then sent to Mardin
State Hospital where a second medical report confirmed these
findings. As a result of the medical evidence, the prosecutor
started an investigation of Derik Gendarmerie commander Musa
Citil. Meanwhile, convinced that the prosecution would prove
futile, her lawyers applied to the European Commission. The
European Court eventually ruled against Turkey, finding that
the rape had taken place and that Ms. Aydin's rights under Articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention had been violated.
Nevertheless, more than five years after the initial report was
made, the Mardin Heavy Penal Court is still considering the case
against Citil for the rape of Ms. Aydin and the abuse of her relatives. Notwithstanding the ruling of the European Court and
the medical evidence, the heavy penal court has yet to determine
whether a rape was committed. The defendant has never attended the hearings. The Aydin family, including Sukran Aydin
and her new husband, is still experiencing harassment. Her
home is under surveillance. Recently, her husband was detained
in Diyarbakir without any apparent reason.
The case of X. 29 5 X is from Eryol village of Diyarbakir. In
November 1996, her parents went to Diyarbakir, leaving tenyear-old X at home alone. She alleges that Suleyman Askan, a
Village Guard from the same village came to her house and
raped her, putting a gun to her head. He then threatened to kill
her if she mentioned the attack to anyone. Eventually, X told
her aunt what had happened to her, and her aunt told her parKURDISH HUMAN

RIGHTS PROJECT,

DUE PROCESS:

GENCY POWERS IN SoUTH-EAST TURKEY

295. See id.

STATE

app. 3 (1997).

SECURITY COURTS AND
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ents, who filed a complaint with the prosecutor. X's father was
later threatened by an officer in the Mermer Gendarmerie, who
told him not to pursue the matter. After the father filed a second complaint in Diyarbakir on February 21, 1997, the prosecutor eventually opened a case against Askan. Askan was charged
with "raping and consequently causing serious psychological
trauma to a person younger than fifteen years of age" and trespassing private property. Notwithstanding the report from the
Forensic Medicine Association establishing that X had been
raped, the prosecutor urged acquittal due to lack of evidence.
Although X's lawyers requested additional time to collect evidence to support the forensic report, including an examination
of X in a state mental hospital, the court denied these requests
and acquitted the defendant. The case is currently on appeal.
The Case of Remziye Din. 2 96 Gfinluce is a remote village in
Kozluk township in Batman province. It is a small village and
therefore under the protection of Village Guards. In early 1995,
Remziye Dine, then seventeen years old, was raped four times by
three brothers, Nevzat, Ceyhan, and Ekrem Altuner, who were
all Village Guards. According to Ms. Dini;, Nevzat Altuner had
been the first to rape her in February. The rapes occurred in
Gfinluce where Ms. Dine lived with her sister and grandparents.
Ms. Dini; told no one about the rapes for a few months, as Nevzat
had threatened to kill her family unless she remained silent. In
the summer, however, she discovered that she was pregnant. No
longer able to conceal her situation, she began to tell her story
and filed a complaint with a prosecutor in August 1995.
The prosecutor interrogated the three brothers, all of
whom denied the charges. After Ms. Ding gave birth in October
1997, the prosecutor ordered a paternity test, which revealed to
a 99.8% certainty that Nevzat Altuner was the father of Ms.
Dine's child. The Batman prosecutor then opened a case
against Nevzat on October 16, 1996. Despite the fact that the
paternity test corroborated Ms. Dine's account, the prosecutor
refused to open a case against the other two brothers. On the
strength of additional medical reports that corroborated her
296. Batman Heavy Penal Court, Esas [Case] No. 1996/139 (case documents on
file with author). The primary source for the procedural and factual history of this case
is an interview with Sedat Ozevin. See Interview with Sedat Ozevin, President, HRA of
Batman, in Batman, Turk. (May 26, 1998).
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claims, Ding's lawyers were eventually able to have the other two
brothers joined as defendants.
The case began in Batman Heavy Penal Court, under the
former chief judge of that court. According to Ms. Ding's attorneys, this judge was particularly diligent in his efforts to insulate
the three Village Guards from liability. For example, one of her
lawyers received a phone call in his office on the day before the
hearing on which Nevzat Altuner was due to appear in court to
testify. He was told that the three judges were taking Nevzat's
testimony immediately and in chambers rather than at the next
day's scheduled public hearing. Ms. Ding was scheduled to arrive in Batman the next day for the hearing, where she would
have the opportunity to identify Nevzat Altuner. Having had no
advance notice, the lawyer arrived at the court only in time to
register an objection to the testimony that he had just missed.
Ms. Ding arrived the next day, but was denied the opportunity to
identify Altuner in court.
Throughout the trial, the accused remained at large, the
other two brothers continuing their service in the Village
Guards. Ms. Dine surrendered her baby for adoption and
moved to Istanbul for her safety, where she received counseling
and support from women's and human rights groups. In the
meantime, the case dragged on. The former head judge was
relocated, and another judge took over the chairmanship of the
Batman Heavy Penal Court and began to preside over the case.
In February 1998, the judge issued a warrant for the arrest of the
three. 29 7 The same gendarmerie that supervises the Altuners'
Village Guard unit was charged with arresting them. When the
delegation visited Batman on May 26, 1998, the three Altuner
brothers were still at large. Lawyers interviewed by the delegation were unable to determine whether the three Village Guards
were in hiding or whether the gendarmerie were simply refusing
to act on the warrant.
On June 16, 1998, Nevzat Altuner was convicted of "consented rape" and his brothers were acquitted. The crime of consented rape is a form of statutory rape in which the defendant is
297. While Mr. Ozevin was cautiously optimistic about the new judge, Ms. Keskin
stressed that public awareness about the case had created pressures on the judges and
prosecutor that had not been there before. See Interview with Eren Keskin, in Istanbul,
Turk. (June 2, 1998).
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charged with having sexual intercourse with a woman who was a
virgin. Despite the fact that the brothers had initially denied
ever having intercourse with Ms. Ding, after the paternity test
confirmed that he was the father of the child, Nevzat Altuner was
permitted to introduce evidence of consent. The court apparently rejected Ms. Din4's claim that she was forcibly raped and
convicted the defendant of the least serious crime possible in the
face of the evidence of paternity. The case has been appealed.
All three of these cases reflect the reality that women and
girls who are raped by members of the security forces have much
to lose and little to gain from even reporting the rape, much less
pursuing its prosecution. Even Ms. Aydin, who prevailed in her
claim against Turkey in the European Court, continues to live
with official harassment and has yet to see a resolution of the
criminal prosecution. In the case of sexual assault by police, the
general skepticism toward rape claims combined with the tendency of prosecutors to credit the accounts of officials over that
of victims exacerbated the overall climate of impunity.
F. Conclusion
Torture continues to be one of the most serious human
rights problems in Turkey. Notwithstanding the Turkish government's assertions that it is committed to ending the practice, the
systematic use of torture as an interrogation technique persists,
in part due to the climate of impunity surrounding the police.
Under the current system, police accused of torture face no
credible threat of prosecution and conviction. They are protected by corrupt bureaucratic procedures, reluctant prosecutors, poorly designed and rarely observed protocols for the collection of evidence, and a court system in which many judges are
highly skeptical of claims of torture, particularly when raised by
political prisoners. This failure of the Turkish government to
investigate torture claims and to hold police accountable for
their acts of torture not only encourages the continuing use of
torture by police, but also constitutes an independent violation
of the human rights of torture victims.
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III. INTIMIDATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LAWYERS AND MONITORS
A. Introduction
The guarantee of a fair trial discussed in Part I of this report
and the elimination of the climate of impunity advocated in Part
II depend in part on the ability of lawyers and human rights advocates to function effectively in Turkey. This Part documents a
pattern of intimidation and abuse of lawyers and human rights
advocates that constitutes both a violation of the rights of those
individuals and seriously impairs their ability to perform their
work.
Section B of this Part begins with a review of Turkey's legal
obligations to protect lawyers set forth in the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers and implicit in the European Convention's guarantee of the right to a fair trial. This section then
documents examples of abuses ranging from detention and torture to state-sponsored or state-tolerated harassment. Section C
focuses on the situation of human rights advocates. Again, the
section begins with a review of Turkey's legal obligations with
particular attention to the rights of free speech and association
under the European Convention. The section then documents
examples of abuses of human rights advocates and closures of
human rights organizations.
B. Treatment of Lawyers
1. Turkey's Legal Obligations to Lawyers as
Citizens and Professionals
The right of every citizen of Turkey to speech, to free association, to personal security, and to be free from torture are recognized in domestic and international law. 298 Whenever any Turkish citizen is denied these rights, the State's obligations are implicated, regardless of that citizen's profession or status in
society. But when lawyers are targeted for harassment, intimidation, and violence for performing their legitimate legal work,
298. See Tum. CONST. arts. 17, 19, 22, 26, 33 (providing for right to liberty and
security of person); see also Universal Declaration, supra note 49, arts. 3, 10, 11, at 72-73;
European Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3, 5, 19, 20, at 224, 226, 234. The respective
authoritative interpretations of those provisions provide additional expressions of these
rights.
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not only are the lawyers' individual rights as citizens threatened,
but also other protected rights are compromised, including the
right to counsel and the right to fair trial. 299 This threat is compounded in legally-declared emergency situations and other
contexts in which the due process rights of defendants are abrogated. In such situations, the role of defense counsel is even
more critical, and adherence to basic international standards
protecting the legal profession is therefore more, not less, important. At the same time, this added importance of defense
counsel during emergency situations often places defense lawyers in commensurately greater danger. 0 0
The role of the legal profession in safeguarding fundamental rights is recognized in the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role
of Lawyers. 30 1 Approved by the General Assembly in September
1990, the Principles on Lawyers are the international community's authoritative statement of acceptable practices with regard
to the role of lawyers. As such, they form an important part of
the growing body of customary international law protecting fundamental human rights. The Principles on Lawyers begin with a
declaration of the importance of effective legal representation in
the protection of fundamental rights of all persons. The Preamble states, "adequate protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms to which all persons are entitled, be they economic,
social and cultural, or civil and political, requires that all persons
have effective access to legal services provided by an independent legal profession. "302 The Principles on Lawyers then,set forward twenty-nine core standards, addressing issues ranging from
access to lawyers to the protection of lawyers to special safeguards in criminal justice matters.
Several of the standards set forth in the Principles on Lawyers are particularly relevant to the situation in Turkey. For example, Article 16 of the Principles on Lawyers states that
"[g] overnments shall ensure that lawyers.., are able to perform
all of their professional functions without intimidation, hin299. For a discussion of these rights and Turkey's obligations under international
law, see supra Part I.C.
300. See Martin Flaherty, Human Rights Violations Against Defense Lawyers: The Case of
Northern Ireland, 7 HARv. H. RTs. J. 87-97 (1994).
301. Principles on Lawyers, supra note 47.
302. Id. pmbl.
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drance, harassment or improper interference."3 °3 Article 17 further provides: "[w] here the security of lawyers is threatened as a
result of discharging their functions, they shall be adequately
safeguarded by the authorities."" 4 The delegation observed,
however, that defense attorneys working in SSCs face a vast array
of intimidation and harassment, sometimes sponsored by the
state and at other times simply tolerated by it.
Article 18 states that "[1]aywers shall not be identified with
their clients or their clients' causes as a result of discharging
their functions."305 This principle is critical to ensuring proper
representation of politically unpopular defendants such as those
appearing before State Security Courts. The delegation observed, however, that many members of the Turkish government
and legal profession-including judges, prosecutors, and other
lawyers-share the view that defense lawyers are "terrorist lawyers" because they defend clients accused of crimes against the
Turkish state.3 °6
To the extent that defense lawyers facilitate their clients' alleged criminal activity, these lawyers should be both disciplined
professionally and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law,
consistent with international human rights standards." 7 The
Principles on Lawyers do not sanction impunity for lawyers. Indeed, the Principles on Lawyers recognize that the legal profession has distinctive responsibilities, including a duty to "maintain
the honour and dignity of their profession as essential agents of
the administration ofjustice."30 8 The Principles on Lawyers also
-recognize that bar associations "have a vital role to play in upholding professional standards and ethics, protecting their members from persecution and improper restrictions and infringements, providing legal services to all in need of them, and cooperating with governmental and other institutions in furthering
303. Id. princ. 16.
304. Id. princ. 17.

305. Id. princ. 18.
306. For a more extensive discussion of this problem in the context of SSC representation, see supra Part I.C.
307. In the same spirit, lawyers should comply with all lawful searches, warrants,
and other court orders.
308. Principles on Lawyers, supra note 47, princ. 12. In addition, Principle 13(b)

qualifies counsel's duty to the client, limiting the representation to "assist[ing] clients
in every appropriateway." Id. princ. 13(b) (emphasis added).
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the ends of justice and public interest."" 9 Nevertheless, the recognition of these responsibilities in the Principles on Lawyers
does not justify either attitudes or policies that undermine lawyers as a profession on the ground that some lawyers may act
inappropriately. Not only do such policies directly violate the
Principles on Lawyers and undermine the rights guaranteed by
the European Convention, but also they have the further effect
of exposing lawyers to non-governmental threats, assault, and
other forms of intimidation, simply for doing their jobs.
2. Problems Faced by Lawyers in Turkey
Lawyers in Turkey, particularly defense lawyers practicing in
the SSC system, face a variety forms of intimidation and harassment in the course of providing legitimate legal services to their
clients. The most immediately threatening forms include arrest
and detention, sometimes for prolonged periods and sometimes
involving physical and emotional abuse and torture. The case
described in this subsection of twenty-five lawyers detained and
tortured in Diyarbakir exemplifies these methods of intimidation. Less immediate, but no less threatening, are criminal prosecutions of lawyers. Such prosecutions threaten not only the
lawyer's liberty, but also the lawyer's license, reputation, and professional and personal relationships, often for periods of years as
allegations are raised, investigated, tried, and appealed. In addition to the pending prosecutions of the twenty-five Diyarbarkir
lawyers, the case of defense lawyer Oenal Sarihan, discussed below, illustrates this problem. Finally, less threatening but nevertheless objectionable forms of harrassment-such as disrespectful or threatening treatment of lawyers by members of the security forces, including unnecessary searches and verbal abusereflect both the open hostility that defense counsel face in Turkey and the willingness of the government to ignore the problem.
a. Arrest, Detention, and Abuse of Defense Lawyers:
The Twenty-Five Lawyers Case
In one of the worst instances of abuse of lawyers, twenty-five
defense lawyers practicing in the Diyarbakir SSC were arrested in
November and December 1993, detained, tortured, and ulti309. Id. pmbl.
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mately prosecuted for their professional legal activities ("TwentyFive Lawyers Case"). This case alone involves almost ten percent
of Diyarbakir Bar Association and close to half of the lawyers
practicing before the SSC at the time. 10 This report focuses on
sixteen of the lawyers in this case,31 all of whom were detained
in November and December 1993 without access to counsel for
up to twenty-six days. 12
The lawyers were charged with membership in the PKK-a
violation of Turkish Penal Law, Article 168-and various ancillary provisions. The Article 168 charge carries a possible prison
term of between twelve and one half to twenty-two years. The
charges against most of the defendants have since been reduced
to a sole charge of aiding and abetting the PKK, in violation of
Article 169. This charge carries a prison term of four and one
half to seven years. Any conviction would also result in lifetime
disbarment.
All sixteen lawyers claim that they were tortured and mistreated under detention and presented their allegations to Turkish authorities, both in and out of court. All sixteen also filed
applications for review with the European Commission,313 alleg310. Diyarbakir SSC III, Esas [Case] No. 1993/658 (Dec. 22, 1993).
311. They are Sabahattin Acar, Hfisniye 0lmez, Tahir Eli, Mesut Bestas, Meral
Danis Bestas, Vedat Erten, Mehmet Selim Kurbanoglu, Imam Sahin, Aruz Sahin,
Mehmet Arif Altunkalem, Fuet Hayri Demir, Baki Demirhan, Mehmet Gazanfer Abbasioglu, Nevzat Kaya, Sinasi Tur, and Niyazi Cem. The nine other lawyers in the case were
charged by supplemental indictment. They are Mehmet Bicen, Zafer Gfir, and Sinan
Tanrikulu (chargedJan. 13, 1994); Feridun Celik (charged Feb. 2, 1994); and Abdullah
Akin, Edip Yildiz, Fevzi Veznadaroglu, Cabbar Leygara, and Sedat Aslantas (charged
Sept. 21, 1994).
312. The specific periods of detention are as follows: Sabahattin Acar (Nov. 15Dec. 10), Sinasi Tur (Nov. 15-Dec. 10), Hfisniye Olmez (Nov. 16-Dec. 10), Tahir Elgi
(Nov. 23-Dec. 10), Mesut and Meral Danis Bestas (Nov. 16-Dec. 10), Mehmet Arif Altunkalem (Nov. 16-Dec. 10), Baki Demirhan (Nov. 16-Dec. 10), Nevzat Kaya (Nov. 18Dec. 10), Nevzat Kaya (Nov. 18-Dec. 10), Vedat Erten (Nov. 23-Dec. 10), Mehmet Selim
Kurbanoglu (Nov. 23-Dec. 10), Mehmet Gazanfer Abbasioglu (Nov. 30-Dec. 10), and
Niyazi Cem (Nov. 23-Dec. 10), Fuet Hayri Demir (Dec. 3-10), and Imam and Aruz Sahin

(Dec. 10-21).
313. An application on behalf of fourteen of the defendants was introduced to the
European Commission on December 3, 1993 and registered, under Application No.
23145/93, on December 21, 1993. The application of the remaining two defendants,
Arzu and Iman Sahin, was introduced on April 28, 1994, and registered, under Application No. 25091/94, on September 8, 1994. On December 2, 1996, the European Commission deemed admissible the allegations of "torture, ill-treatment and undue pressure
under police custody" under Article 3 of the European Convention, but found seven of
the applications inadmissible for procedural reasons under Article 26 of the European
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ing that Turkey had violated Article 3 of the European Convention, which prohibits torture and inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.3 1 4 In addition, at various opportunities
the defendants have repeated their claims of abuse to representatives of numerous human rights organizations. Nevertheless,
the Turkish officials have never initiated an investigation or
criminal proceedings against any of the alleged abusers.
The lawyers' claims of torture and mistreatment under detention include being continuously blindfolded in cold and
damp cells or corridors for up to twenty-six days, deprived of
food other than a meager supply of bread and water, and permitted access to toilet facilities only twice every twenty-four
hours. Most report having been physically beaten and made to
listen to the cries of other detainees, who were being tortured.
Many report having been threatened with death. Some report
having been forced to endure mock executions. Others were
stripped naked in frigid conditions and buffeted with pressurized cold water for sustained periods, in some cases up to an
hour at a time. Detailed reports of the lawyers' accounts are included in the European Commission's determination of admissibility of the application on their behalf;3 15 two of their accounts
are illustrative.
Convention. See Elci and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 23145/93, (Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. 2, 1996).
314. The applications also alleged that Turkey violated other provisions of the European Convention, including Article 5 (protecting right to liberty and security of person); Article 8 (protecting right to respect for privacy);' Article 25 (binding High Contracting Parties to respect right to petition Commission); and Article I of Protocol 1
(protecting right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions).
315. With regard to the claims under Article 3, the Commission found that the
applicants had met their obligation to exhaust domestic remedies by raising allegations
of torture and ill-treatment before the examining judge on December 10, 1993, and
before the State Security Court on February 17, 1994, and April 28, 1994. Importantly,
the Commission found that even though the applicants did not lodge criminal complaints against their abusers, they had "done all that was expected of them under the
circumstances." In coming to this conclusion, the Commission stated that
[t]he applicants raised in proceedings before the examining judge or the
State Security Court their complaints concerning their alleged ill-treatment
during their time in police custody. These allegations of torture or ill-treatment were duly entered into official records, and it should have been a matter of
considerableconcern to the judicialauthoritiesthat a large number of lauyers-members
of the Bar-complainedof havingbeen subjected, almost at the same time, to such treatment during their detention. Nevertheless, and despite the duty of the authoritiesunder
Turkish law to act ex officio when confronted with suspicions of torture, the examining
judge, the State Security Court and the public prosecutor who was present at these hear-
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One lawyer, Meral Danis Bestas ("Bestas"), told the delegation that three plainclothes policemen detained her and her
husband, Mesut Bestas, also a defense lawyer, as they left
Diyarbarkir SSC on November 16, 1993.316 They were blindfolded, put in an unmarked police car, and driven to a detention
center. During the drive, the police joked about'taking a notorious route-one through a nearby town named Silvan where the
bodies of a number of victims of "unknown perpetrator killings"
had been discovered.
After arriving at the detention center, Bestas was separated
from her husband, searched, and placed in a moderately sized
single cell. Instead of a bed, the cell had two wooden slats and a
blanket that was "so dirty that [she] did not dare use it." She was
told that she would be permitted to use the bathroom facilities
only twice per day, that she would receive only one piece of
bread per day, and that she would have to "drink from the toilet." The cell was very cold and dark, with a small opening that
allowed her to see into the corridor where other defendants
were being held. Continuous loud military music played in the
cellblock throughout the period of detention.
Bestas was repeatedly interrogated. Early on, the interrogators told her that, as a lawyer, she must be familiar with their
methods, including electric shocks and a technique known as
the "Palestinian hanger." During the first brief interrogation session, she was blindfolded, thrown to the floor, and told to "kneel
before" her captors. They threatened her in various ways, saying
such things as "you know what we can do to you," "electric
shocks are better with a wet blanket," and "you will get a whole
hour because we are thinking of you." She told them that she
had nothing to hide and would answer their questions, but that
ings before the court all chose to ignore the complaints and not to examine the allegations
or transmit them to the local public prosecutors' offices or to local administrativebodies.

El~i and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 23145/93, (Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. 2, 1996). The
Commission also found the applicants' Article 5 claims admissible, except for those that
were time-barred under Article 26. The claims under Articles 8 and 25 of the European
Convention were likewise deemed admissible. Seven of the applications, however, were
deemed inadmissible because they had been filed too late, in violation of Article 26 of
the European Convention.
316. The following account is a summary of the delegation's interview with Meral
Bestas. See Interview with Meral Danis Bestas in Diyarbakir, Turk. (May 30, 1998). English language quotes reflect the contemporaneous translation of Ms. Bestas's responses,
which she delivered in Turkish.
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she had done nothing illegal. Ultimately, she was returned to
her cell.
Two days later, Bestas was told that her answers were "not
sufficient." She was then asked about her activities as a defense
lawyer and as a member of the HRA. For example, she was questioned as to why she "represented terrorists," why she had
helped to prepare press releases that denounced human rights
abuses, and why she had filed applications with Strasbourg (referring to the European Commission). She responded that she
was not connected to any illegal organization and that her activities had been in the proper pursuit of her professional duties.
At one point, someone slapped her hard on the face. She was
then accused of acting as a courier for imprisoned PKK members, a charge that she denied.
On December 8, 1993, Bestas was again interrogated and
told to sign a prepared statement. She asked to read the statement, but the interrogators laughed and told her, "You can't
read, there is no reading here." She refused, stating, "I am a
lawyer, I am not going to sign anything I have not read." The
gendarmes took her to a room where the floor was wet and told
to remove her clothes. She initially resisted, but relented when
resistance proved futile. She was then targeted with high-pressure jets of cold water. After approximately fifteen minutes of
this treatment, she fainted. The next day, after she again refused to sign a confession, she was twice more subjected to the
same type of torture. Freezing and exhausted, she was convinced that she was going to die.
On December 10, 1993, she was taken to a forensic doctor,
who refused to examine her but issued a report stating that she
had no physical injuries. She was then brought to court, along
with the other defendants, where she complained to both the
prosecutor and the examining judge about the abuse that she
had suffered during detention. Although she told the authorities that she could identify her torturers, no investigation was
initiated. The judge ordered Bestas' release, but instead she was
again blindfolded and, along with the other defendants, brought
back to detention center. There, one of the senior officers lectured them that they had been "treated better" than normal villagers because they were lawyers. They were also told that they
could not get away and that, even if the court did not convict
them, they would be killed. After an appeal from the Bar Associ-

1999]

JOINT MISSION TO TURKEY

2217

ation, they were finally released in the early hours of the morning. Three days later, Bestas obtained a physical examination by
a private physician, who diagnosed her as suffering from tuberculosis.
On November 15, 1993, Sabahattin Acer, another Kurdish
lawyer from Diyarbakir, "was arrested and taken to the Regiment
Headquarters Interrogation Center, where he was put in a small,
dark, cold and damp cell." 31 7 Although the night-time temperature fell below freezing, he had no bed and instead was forced to
sleep on a wooden slat with a single blanket. He was allowed
access to the toilet twice per day. His food ration was one piece
of bread per day, sometimes less.
After a while, Acer was blindfolded and brought to an interrogation room for the first time. There, he was asked a number
of questions, such as why he attended hearings in the SSCs on
behalf of suspected terrorists and whether he had prepared reports of human rights abuses to be submitted to international
human rights organizations. At one point, he was asked about
the activities specified in the indictment. When Acer refused to
admit to the charges against him, he was taken back to his cell.
During a second interrogation, Acer was beaten. At one
point, the interrogators took him outside, loaded their weapons,
made him remove his clothes, and informed that if he did not
admit his crimes, he would be taken to the hills and executed.
During the third interrogation, in which Acer was again
blindfolded and beaten, he agreed to sign a confession. He did
so because he knew that he could not withstand further torture,
such as the pressurized water treatment experienced by some of
his colleagues. He was not allowed to read his statement before
signing it.
Like Meral Bestas, Acer was brought to a doctor before he
was taken before a judge. Afraid for his life, he did not tell the
doctor of the abuse that he had suffered during his detention.
On December 10, 1993, at the prosecutor's urging, the examining judge refused to release Acer from custody. He was not released on bail until February 17, 1994.
A number of factors support the credibility of these and
317. The following account is a summary of the delegation's interview with
Sabahattin Acer. See Interview with Sabahattin Acer, in Diyarbakir, Turkey. (May 30,
1998).
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other accounts of torture and mistreatment of the defendants in
the Twenty-Five Lawyers Case. First, the defendants not only
lodged their complaints as soon as possible, i.e., the first time
they were brought before the examining judge on December 10,
1993, but also have repeated these allegations, both in court and
out of court, to Turkish authorities, inter-governmental organizations, and members of non-governmental organizations. In
addition, their allegations are remarkably detailed, specifying
time, place, and method of torture. Further, the defendants'
claims are consistent with abusive practices that have been documented by various international monitoring groups, including in
previous reports by the Lawyers Committee, as well as findings
and public statements by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
318
Punishment.
If these accounts are true, then the torture and mistreatment of the lawyers under detention constitute violations of Articles 5, 6, 7 and 12 of the Convention Against Torture, and Article 3 of the European Convention. Moreover, irrespective of the
veracity of the defendants' claims, Turkey's failure to investigate
these charges constitutes an independent violation by Turkey
under these instruments. Finally, the detention and torture of
these defense lawyers based on their legitimate professional actions violates the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers
and undermines the ability of these lawyers to fulfill their important function within the criminal justice system. 1 9
318. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LAW UNDER SIEGE (1995) [hereinafter LAw UNDER SIEGE]; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE UNDERMINED (1996); THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, ATrACKS ON JUSTICE: THE
HARASSMENT AND PERSECUTION OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS (1993-94); KURDISH HUMAN
RIGHTS PROJECT, DUE PROCESS: STATE COURTS AND EMERGENCY POWERS IN SOUTH-EAsT

TURKEY (1997); 1992 Council of Europe Statement, supra note 171; 1996 Council of Europe
Statement, supra note 1.
319. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 3, art. 12 (imposing duty on parties to investigate allegations of torture "whenever there is a reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed"); Yasa v. Turkey, Application No.
22495/93, Judgment No. 63/1997/847/1054, Sept. 2, 1998,
107 (Eur. Ct. H.R. deci-

sion not yet published in Series A) (visited Apr. 13, 1999) <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/
hudoc2doc2/HEJUD/199810/yasa%20batj.doc> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) (asserting that failure to investigate killing by force violates Article 2 of
European Convention); Kaya v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Feb. 19, 1998, 65
Reports ofJudgments and Decisions 297, 318,
61, 62 (1998-I); see also Velasquez Rodriguez, Case 4 Inter-Am.. C.H.R. 61, OEA/ser.C./4 (1988), reprinted in 9 HUM. RTS. L.J.
212 (1988), 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989) (stating that "[t]he State has a legal duty to take
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b. Prosecution of Defense Lawyers for Legitimate Legal Work
Compounding the abuse and torture sometimes suffered by
defense lawyers in detention in Turkey is the more common harassment inflicted by baseless, prolonged, and often repeated
criminal prosecutions for conduct arising out of the lawyers' legitimate representation of their clients. This harassment includes not only the ultimate threat of conviction and loss of liberty, but also the threat of disbarment and the resulting deprivation of livelihood, injury to personal and professional
reputation, and severe disruption of professional and personal
relationships. This disruption often lasts for years while specious
allegations are raised, investigated, tried, and appealed.
The Twenty-Five Lawyers Case, for example, is now entering
its sixth year and has been fully submitted without a decision
since January 1997. This alone may constitute a violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention, which upholds the right
to trial "within a reasonable time." A number of the defendants
have reported that the disruptive influence that this delay has
had on their lives has been one of the worst aspects of their
ordeal. For example, Meral Bestas stated during her interview,
This case is still going on, and we don't know what is going to
happen to us. We cannot make any long-term decisions. We
are trying to carry on a normal life with extraordinary effort.
Sometimes I look at my son and say 'What is going to happen
to us? Will I be able to see him again?'
The fact that the case is now in its sixth year despite the lack
of credible evidence against the defendants by itself strongly suggests that this prosecution is designed to punish the defendants
for their legitimate activities as lawyers and human rights advocates. But other factors buttress this conclusion. For example,
the allegations in the indictment explicitly condemn permissible
human rights activity such as communicating with the HRA in
Europe regarding activities of the security forces in the region.
The chief prosecutor in Diyarbakir, Bekir Selcuk, has admitted
reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal
to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to
identify those responsible, to impose appropriate punishment and to ensure to the victim adequate compensation"); Principles on Lauyers, supra note 47, princ. 17 (stating
that "[w] here the security of lawyers is threatened as a result of discharging their functions, they shall be adequately safeguarded by the authorities").
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that these and other similar allegations in the indictment refer
to petitions filed with the European Commission.3 2' The prosecutor's willingness to include these allegations in the indictment
is an obvious attempt to criminalize conduct protected under
international law3 2 1 and is strong evidence that this prosecution
was initiated to punish the defendants and to deter them from
engaging in human rights advocacy.
Although the Twenty-Five Lawyers Case is one of the most
notorious examples of the prosecutions of lawyers for their legitimate activities, it is not unique. Moreover, this problem is not
limited to the southeast of Turkey. For example, Oenal Sarihan,
a nationally prominent human rights lawyer in Ankara, has been
subjected to numerous threats, acts of intimidation, and abusive
prosecutions during her legal career. She is currently being
prosecuted for statements that she made while representing a
group of university students in Ankara who were prosecuted for
peacefully protesting university fees and apparently tortured
while in detention.3 2 2
Sarihan's legal troubles began at a press conference outside
the courthouse after the students were convicted. Commenting
on the harsh sentences handed down by the court, she stated
that "in Turkey, murderers receive more lenient sentences than
those imposed on these students. 3 23 Her comments along with
portions of her defense statement were reported in various newspapers. Thereafter, two judges sitting in the case filed a complaint in the SSC claiming that she had "insulted the court" and
320. See LAw UNDER SIEGE, supra note 318, at 19. The questions put to the defendants under detention-such as why they "helped prepare press releases that denounced
human rights abuses" and why they "filed applications with Strasbourg"-also support
this contention.
321. Turkey has accepted the competence of the European Court to receive individual petitions and has undertaken not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of
this right under Article 25 of the European Convention.
322. The protests included unfurling a banner in the Grand National Assembly
and presenting a petition with over 350,000 signatures to the Deputy Minister of the
Parliament. The students allege that while in detention, they suffered various types of
torture including having their feet beaten, electric shocks, and being strung up on what
is known as the "Palestinian hanger." See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TusRE. STUDENT
CAMPAIGNERS TORTURED AND IMPRISONED (Sept. 1997).
323. Interview with Oenal Sarihan, in Ankara, Turkey (June 5, 1998). Although
five of the students were convicted and sentenced to long prison terms-ranging from
12 to 20 years in jail-their convictions were overturned on appeal. Jailed during the
pendency of the case, the students were recently released after being acquitted in the
re-trial.
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"intervened in an ongoing case." Sarihan refused to be interviewed by the prosecutor on the ground that he had failed to
obtain the requisite permission to interrogate her from the Ministry of Justice. Since then, the case has been transferred from
the SSC to the regular criminal court, where it is still pending. If
convicted, she faces a maximum of six years' imprisonment and
disbarment for life.
Despite this intimidation, Sarihan continued to represent
the students. After a favorable intermediate appellate ruling in
the students' case, Sarihan made another statement to the press
that produced yet another complaint from one of the SSC
judges. Another investigation was opened against her and,
again, she refused to speak to the prosecutor without proper authorization from the Ministry of Justice. This second case, like
the first, is still pending.
The process repeated itself a third time when Sarihan responded to press questions about the basis for her second prosecution. The charges in this third case-that she exposed the
judges to the risk of terrorist attacks by making disparaging remarks about the judiciary-is the most serious of the three cases
against her and is currently pending before the SSC in Istanbul.
Sarihan and her colleagues are entitled to the same rights of
freedom of expression as everyone else. Moreover, as legal advocates, they have an obligation to promote justice and the rule of
law. The statements for which Sarihan is being prosecuted fall
well within her right to free expression, as protected by Article
10 of the European Convention and Principle 23 of the U.N.
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers. In addition, each of her
statements relates to her duties as a lawyer for the university students and, therefore, is protected independently under Principle 16.
As with the Twenty-Five Lawyers Case, the weak basis for the
charges against Sarihan, and the failure of the prosecutor to follow proper procedures in bringing them, suggest that these prosecutions are intended to punish for, and deter the defendants
from their legitimate activities as lawyers and human rights advocates. These prosecutions therefore violate Article 25 of the European Convention and Principles 14, 16(a), and 16(c) of the
Principles on Lawyers. Furthermore, the Twenty-Five Lawyers
Case is an especially clear example of identifying. lawyers with
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their clients and the clients' causes, in violation of Principle 17
of the Principles on Lawyers. Finally, the protracted delay in resolution of these proceedings creates an additional burden and
coercive restraint on the defendants for their legitimate activities
as lawyers and human rights advocates and, as such, is an independent violation of Article 6(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights and Principles 16(a) and 16(c) of the Principles on Lawyers.
c. Other Harassment of Defense Lawyers
Less threatening but more common forms of harassment,
including physical and verbal abuse of lawyers in the performance of their duties, contribute to, and help to maintain, the
climate of intimidation created by these patterns of arrest, detention, and prolonged prosecution of lawyers. Statements and actions of officials in the Turkish government often aggravate
rather than ameliorate the problem. Further, the Turkish government's failure to protect lawyers adequately even in the
courtroom, leaves counsel vulnerable to harassment and sometimes to violence by third persons, including right-wing organizations and off-duty members of the security forces.3 24
For example, the delegation heard credible accounts of
physical intimidation especially of lawyers representing torture
victims in actions against the police. Lawyers have allegedly
been punched, kicked, slapped, and otherwise physically abused
upon entering or leaving the courts. Although the assailants frequently have been identified, the Turkish government has, for
the most part, failed to initiate any legal action in such cases.
In the so-called Aydin case, for example, police officers were
on trial for torturing and killing Baki Erdogan during a ten-day
period of detention.3 25 Throughout the case, the victims' lawyers reported overt and constant harassment by police officers
and others, sympathetic to the defendants. On the day of the
final verdict, April 21, 1998, the courtroom filled with police officers, both in plain clothes and in uniform. After the verdict
was announced, these officers attacked the lawyers, the plaintiffs,
the journalists, and even the prosecutor. For a time, the lawyers
324. Trial Observation, Instanbul SSC, in Istanbul, Turk. (June 2, 1998).
325. Meeting with members of the Izmir Bar Association, in Izmir, Turk. (May 29,
1998).
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could not leave the Palace of Justice. They were eventually were
able to leave with the prosecutor on the case, protected by police
officers on duty.
According to the president of the Ankara Bar Association,
incidents such as in the Aydin case are "single, isolated
events. 3 1 6 A significant number of defense lawyers practicing in
politically sensitive cases maintain, however, that these incidents
are part of a widespread, systematic pattern of intimidation
against lawyers who represent torture victims or defend clients
accused of crimes against the state in SSCs. Moreover, they believe that the attack after the verdict was carefully premeditated. 2 7
In the "Gazi Massacre" case, another case in which police
are on trial, lawyers representing the victims have reported that
hostile groups in the city of Trabazon have thrown stones at
them when they enter the city to work on the case. They also
claim that the police there routinely stop them, confiscate their
identification cards, and generally treat them as suspects themselves. The lawyers complained to the Trabazon court, which allegedly sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice and on to the
Supreme Court. The lawyers also complained directly to the
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Governor of Trabazon about the attacks, to no avail. When the lawyers
filed a complaint, the prosecutor refused to pursue the case because the lawyers could not identify specific perpetrators.
The failure of the Turkish authorities to control threats
against lawyers from right-wing groups sympathetic to the security forces has become an increasingly serious problem for lawyers
representing unpopular clients and victims of police abuse. Defense lawyer Savim Akat met with members of the delegation
who attended a hearing in a case that Akat was defending in
326. Interview with President of the Ankara Bar Association, in Ankara, Turk.
(June 3, 1998). Nonetheless, presidents of bar associations around Turkey were sufficiently alarmed by the Aydin incident to meet together with the Prime Minister of Turkey, who assured them that swift and immediate action would be taken to punish those
present and to prevent such events from reoccurring.
327. Meeting with members of the Izmir Bar Association, in Izmir, Turk. (May 29,
1998). They based this belief in part on the presence of the chief of police in the
courtroom before the hearing and on the police's limitation of courtroom access to
journalists and lawyers rather than the general public. During the hearing, the interviewees added, plain clothed police officers blocked the exit routes of the courtroom.
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SSC.3 28

She reported that during the first two hearings in the
case, the defense lawyers had endured physical and verbal abuse
from members of a right-wing organization. She repeated that
the lawyers had requested protection from the prosecutor and
the Istanbul Bar Association, to no avail. In response to the lawyers' petition to the court, the court stated that it could provide
security inside, but not outside the courtroom. Akat planned to
continue her work on the case, but reported that she and her
family continued to fear for her safety.
Indeed, the delegation observed first hand a small indication of the physical intimidation that defense lawyers in Turkey
suffer. On June 2, 1998, two members of the delegation observed a hearing at the Istanbul SSC in which a member of a
leftist organization was on trial for killing a police officer and a
member of a right-wing organization. Defense lawyers told the
delegation that during every previous hearing in the case, they
had experienced serious physical and verbal harassment by
members of a right-wing group. In the hearing attended by the
delegation, police presence had been increased significantly
and, although the atmosphere in the hearing was tense, no violence occurred. After the hearing ended, members of the delegation left the building with the defense lawyers. As they were
leaving, members of the right-wing group lingering outside the
court house shouted and shook their fists as the delegation
members and defense lawyers drove away. The lawyers attributed the relative calm during the hearing and afterward to the
presence of a foreign delegation and the resulting increased police presence.
In addition to physical intimidation, lawyers report a pattern of verbal intimidation consisting of statements from key
Turkish officials,3 29 prosecutors 33 0 and other members of the
328. Istanbul SSC III, Esas [Case] No. 1997/127. Interview with defense lawyers
Gulizar Tunler, Yuksel Hos, Ilknur Asku, Muharrem Gopur, and Savim Akat in Istanbul,
Turk. (May 30, 1998) (statement from Savim Akat).
329. Interview with Dr. Hikmet Sami Turk, then State Minister for Human Rights,
in Ankara, Turk. (June 5, 1998).
330. Prosecutors in the SSCs expressed to
tudes towards defense lawyers who work in the
SSCs having the most antagonistic views toward
the Istanbul SSCs and the southeast having views
international standards.

the delegation sharply divergent attiSSCs, with prosecutors in the Ankara
defense lawyers, while prosecutors in
more consistent with professional and
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legal profession,"' including representatives of prominent bar
associations 332 and members of the security forces. Often these
statements reflect the assumption that lawyers who appear in
court on behalf of clients suspected of terrorist activities not only
endorse the activities of their clients, but also actively promote
those activities as well. Lawyers report being openly referred to
as "terrorist lawyers." In an extreme example of improperly associating a defense lawyer with the motives or acts of a client, one
lawyer, Keles Ozturk, reported to the delegation that when one
of his clients, Hatijuh Edejar, filed a complaint against the police
for harassment, the police not only raided the client's home, but
also raided Ozturk's home as well. 3
Such attitudes deepen the climate of intimidation discussed
above and render attorneys more vulnerable to threats and attacks by extremist groups. In light of such threats, a number of
lawyers reported that they fear for their safety in certain locations and settings. One defense attorney, Sezgin Tanrikulu,
stated: "I don't go the gendarme center outside of Diyarbakir
because I am not sure how I'll be treated. 33 4 Another lawyer,
Tahir Elgi, echoed these remarks, stating that in Central Anatolia, "attorneys fear being in the same part of town as the police
331. Defense attorneys in the SSCs at times also faced hostility from lawyers and
other members of Turkish society. Some lawyers and other members of the Turkish
legal community have explicitly or implicitly endorsed the idea that defense lawyers in
SSCs are themselves "terrorist lawyers." In the Diyarbakir Prison Case, for example, the
lawyers for the accused members of the security forces have openly called the lawyers
for the victims "terrorist lawyers." The lawyers for the accused have also in court said,
"we are defending the honorable and high gendarmes and police, and these attorneys
are defending terrorists." Interview with Tahir Elvi, victims' lawyer in the Diyarbakir
Prison Case, in Diyarbakir, Turk. (May 28, 1998).
332. During a meeting with the president and leading members of the Ankara Bar
Association, the Director of the Turkish Foreign Relations Committee, who was also
present, told members of the delegation that the "[l]awyers who face harassment are
members of terrorist organizations. But lawyers who simply practice law are not
harassed at all." He added that Turkey's priority was not to protect defense lawyers but
its integrity. "At the moment, Turkey has to safeguard its existence. In this struggle, it
is very difficult to keep normalcy. From time to time, we witness events we regret. But
our initial goal is to fight the threat to our integrity." Interview with Unsal Toker, President and Foreign Relations officer of the Ankara Bar Association, in Ankara, Turk.
(une 3, 1998).
333. Interview with Keles Ozturk, defense lawyer, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 27,
1998).
334. Meeting with members of Diyarbakir Bar Association, in Diyarbarkir, Turk.
(May 25, 1998) (presentation by Sezgin Tanrikulu).
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and gendarmes."'3 3 5 In part for this reason, of the eighty-three
attorneys officially involved in the Diyarbakir Prison Case, only
ten regularly appear at the hearings. 6 Such threats not only
violate the rights of the attorney, but also undermine his or her
ability to represent his of her client.
Dr. Hikmet Sami Turk, former Minister for Human Rights,
has himself acknowledged the failure of the Turkish government
to counter the assumption that defense lawyers are associated
with their clients' causes. During a meeting with the delegation,
Dr. Sami Turk admitted that Turkish lawyers are assumed to be
associated with their clients' causes, stating simply, " [i] t is regrettable, but true." To explain this unfortunate situation, he added, "Evidence exists to show that sometimes, certain lawyers are
indeed connected with terrorist organizations." Even assuming
such evidence exists, such statements should be made and interpreted with extreme care. To the extent that lawyers facilitate
terrorist activity, they should be prosecuted in accordance with
the law. Any such illegal activity, however, does not justify either
blanket policies or remarks about lawyers in general. Moreover,
official statements about illegal activity conducted by lawyersunless carefully qualified-too often leave all lawyers open to official and unofficial persecution based on facile assumptions that
lawyers who defend unpopular clients are no different from the
clients themselves.
Although it should be noted that not all defense lawyers interviewed claimed to have faced intimidation,3 3 7 the problem is
significant and is not isolated to the emergency regions. The
incidents described in this report reflect a larger pattern of physical intimidation against lawyers defending unpopular clients
and representing victims of abuse by members of the security
335. Interview with Tahir Elgi, in Diyarbakir, Turk. (May 28, 1998). Mr. Elgi is one
of the lawyer-defendants in the Twenty-Five Lawyers Case.
336. Meeting with members of Diyarbakir Bar Association, in Diyarbarkir, Turk.
(May 25, 1998) (presentation by Sezgin Tanrikulu).
337. Mehmet Kemal Aydin, for example, told the mission that he has not experienced harassment. He further stated that he has had no problem with the police because he has no connection with them and the only time that he sees them is in court
when they testify. Members of the mission met Mr. Aydin at the Istanbul SSC VI where
he was defending clients accused of being members of an illegal organization, the Communist Party of Construction Organization ("KPIO"). Mr. Aydin's clients alleged that
members of the security forces tortured them while they were in detention. Interview
with Mehmet Kemal Aydin, defense lawyer in Istanbul SSC, in Istanbul, Turk. (May 29,
1998).
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forces. This delegation's experiences are consistent with those
of earlier Lawyers Committee representatives, who heard many
similar accounts from lawyers in Turkey. The number of and
consistency among these reports suggests that a significant problem exists. Moreover, whether or not the lawyers' claims of physical intimidation are true, 'the failure of the domestic legal system to investigate these charges and to secure an environment
in which lawyers may perform their functions without fear of reprisal represents a violation of Turkey's international obligations.
C. Treatment of Human Rights Advocates
Like defense lawyers, human rights advocates and human
rights organizations in Turkey suffer official and officially-tolerated harassment, intimidation, and obstruction in the performance of their legitimate works. The most obvious form of intimidation consists of direct official actions undertaken through
vague and overbroad security laws. These actions include prolonged, repetitive prosecutions of human rights activists and the
repeated closure of human rights organizations. Although the
delegation found that the worst excesses appear to be past, systematic intimidation persists-often with remarkable insensitivity to international opinion. 3 s
1. Turkey's Obligations to Human Rights Advocates
The U.N. General Assembly recently approved the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Human Rights Defenders
("Defenders Declaration").9 In addition to reiterating the responsibility of states to safeguard human rights under international law, the Defenders Declaration emphasizes the right, in
Article 9, "to complain about the policies and actions of individual officials and government bodies with regard to violation of
human rights and fundamental freedoms" through both domestic and international channels,3 40 and, in Article 10, to "partici338. See, e.g., Ilnur Cevik, Editorial, Is this How the State Pictures Itsel?, TURKISH
DALY NEWS, Oct. 28, 1998.
339. Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 53/144, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/53/144 (1998) [hereinafter Defenders Declaration].
340. Id. art. 9.
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pate in peaceful activities against violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms." 4 1 Moreover, the Defenders Declaration further obliges states to
take all necessary measures to ensure the protection by the
competent authorities of everyone, individually and in association with others, against any violence, threats, retaliation, de
facto or dejure adverse discrimination, pressure or any other
arbitrary action as a consequence of their legitimate exercise
of the rights referred to in this Declaration.3 4 2
In other words, the state has an obligation not only to permit
human rights advocacy, but also to ensure a climate in which
human rights advocates are protected from harassment and violence as a result of their work.
Like the U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, the
Defenders Declaration represents a recognition by the international community of the important role of human rights advocates in securing protection of international human rights and
fundamental freedoms. One need not accept the Defenders
Declaration as binding international law to conclude that the intimidation and harassment of human rights advocates in Turkey
is a violation of fundamental rights. In an important sense, the
Defenders Declaration merely elaborates upon rights already legally protected in the form of rights to speech, to assembly, and
to participate in one's government and translates them into the
specific context of human rights advocacy. Under Articles 10
and 11 of the European Convention, Turkey has an obligation to
protect the rights of free speech and freedom of assembly of all
persons. The Defenders Declaration emphasizes the added importance of safeguarding the rights of speech and assembly
when those rights are exercised to promote human rights.
Turkey's practice of prosecuting intellectuals and human
rights activists for nonviolent speech and advocacy clearly violates both the principles elaborated in the Defenders Declaration and the right to free speech guaranteed by Article 10 of the
European Convention. Article 10 of the European Convention
is written in two parts. The first part sets out a broad right to
freedom of expression, to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public au341. Id. art. 10.
342. Id. art. 12.
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thority. The second part of the article sets conditions on the
exercise of these freedoms "as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society. " "' Specifically, Article 10(2) sets
out six purposes according to which speech may be limited: national security, territorial integrity or public safety, prevention of
disorder or crime, protection of health or morals, the rights and
reputation of others, privacy, and maintaining the authority and
integrity of the judiciary. The European Court has held, however, that it is faced not with a choice between two conflicting
principles but with a principle of freedom of expression that is
subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly inter44
preted.1
The Turkish government has argued before the European
Court that, in as much as Turkish law establishes as a criminal
offense separatist propaganda 345 or incitement of "hatred ...
thereby creating discrimination based on membership of a social
class, race, religion sect or region,"3 4 6 prosecutions brought
under these provisions do not violate Article 10 because the interference with the right to freedom of expression is prescribed
by law. 3 4 7 The European Court has made clear, however, that
freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual's self-fulfillment.
Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention, it is
applicable not only to information or ideas that are favorably
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such
are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broad34 8
mindedness without which there is no democratic society.
In short, qualifications of the freedom of expression must
be both prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society.
Far from being necessary to a democratic society, the application
of Turkish law to restrict nonviolent political speech and human
343. European Convention, supra note 3, art. 10, at 114.
344. Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27,

63 (1992).

345. See Anti-Terror Law art. 8 (1991) (Turk.).
346. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE art. 312 (Turk.).
347. See Zana v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Nov. 25, 1997, 57 Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 2533, 2546, 47 (1997-VII).
348. Id. at 2547,

51(i).
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rights advocacy is inconsistent with democracy and therefore in
violation of international law.
Applying this standard, the European Court has found that
criminal prosecution of peaceful human rights advocacy violates
Article 10. This principle holds even in the face of government
concern about national security or territorial integrity so long as
the advocacy is neither intended nor likely to incite imminent
violence or lawless action. 4 9 The Court recently reaffirmed this
position in a case from Turkey. In Incal v. Turkey, the Court
ruled that the conviction of Ibrahim Incal, a lawyer and official
in a Kurdish political party, for preparing materials protesting
the treatment of the Kurds, was inconsistent with Article 10 despite domestic apprehension about violent separatism. 5 °
This is not to say that Article 10 prohibits any and all restrictions on speech. Recently, the European Court, in another
Turkish case, upheld the conviction of a former mayor of
Diyarbakir for making a statement that could have been interpreted as supporting armed resistance by Kurdish separatists.3 5 '
The Court emphasized, however, that the applicant had uttered
his remarks among a series of armed PKK attacks against civilians in southeastern Turkey, circumstances that made the statement "likely to exacerbate an already explosive situation in that
region." 35 2 Together, these cases suggest that any limitation on
the Article 10 right to free speech will be justified only in narrow
circumstances and will depend on the situation in which the limitation is applied.
349. More generally, these standards have been developed in the Johannesburg
Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,
which were drafted by experts on international law, national security, and human rights
and endorsed by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. See ARTICLE 19, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE AGAINST CENSORSHIP

& KURDISH

HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, STATE BEFORE

FREEDOM: MEDIA REPRESSION IN TuRKEY (July 1998). Comparative law sources point to
similar standards. See THE ARTICLE 19 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION HANDBOOK (S. Coliver

ed., 1993); Meir Schnitzer & 2 Others v. Chief Military Censor & Minister of Defence,
42(4) P.D. 617, para. 13 (Isr.); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968).
350. Incal v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment ofJune 9, 1998, 78 Reports ofJudgments
and Decisions 1547 (1998-IV); see Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992)
(holding that conviction of senator belonging to Basque separatist organization, for
article contending that Spanish government was responsible for violence in Spain's
Basque region, violated freedom of expression.)
351. See Zana v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. judgment of Nov. 25, 1997, 57 Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 2533 (1997-VII).

352. Id. at 2549,

60.
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The European Convention also guarantees the right of freedom of association. Article 11 plainly states: "Everyone has the
right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others."3" 3 The European Commission and European
Court have repeatedly determined that this freedom applies to
individuals seeking to join political parties, trade unions, and
non-governmental organizations.
Like the right to free speech under Article 10, the right of
association is subject to certain narrow limitations. The language of paragraph two of Article 11 closely tracks that of Article
10(2). It permits restrictions on the right to association only
when they (i) are prescribed by law; (ii) serve certain compelling
state purposes; and (iii) are necessary in a democratic society.
As with Article 10, the European Commission and European
Court have strictly construed the last requirement in connection
with freedom of association claims.3 54
It should be noted that Article 15 permits states to derogate
from Articles 10 and 11 during a publicly declared emergency
that threatens the life of the nation. Even assuming the conditions of Article 15 can be met, however, Turkey had not so derogated at the time of any of the prosecutions or closures described in this report and has not since.
Finally, closures of human rights organizations not only violate the rights of individual members, but also of the organizations themselves. International jurisprudence and legal scholarship increasingly support the conclusion that the right of association can only have meaning if the associations themselves enjoy
certain rights. 5 This trend includes case law under the European Convention, where both the Commission and the Court
have assumed without deciding that organizations have standing
to assert freedom of association claims. 356 The Defenders Decla353. European Convention, supra note 3, art. 11, at 232.

354. Ezelin v. France, 202 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1991).
355. See Theo Van Boven, The Role ofNon-Governmental Organizationsin the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights, in THE HONG KONG BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMPARATwE

APPROACH (Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai eds., 1993); MANFRED NowAK, U.N. COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITIAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 387 (1993). See generally LAwYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE NEGLECTED RIGHT: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS LAW (1997).

356. Lavisse v. France, App. No. 14223/88, 70 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 218
(1991); Van der Heijden v. Netherlands, App. No. 11002/84, 41 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 264 (1985).
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ration reinforces this conclusion by recognizing in Article 16
that "[i]ndividuals, non-governmental organizations and relevant institutions have an important role to play in contributing
to making the public more aware of questions relating to all
human rights and fundamental freedoms .... 3 5 7 It follows that
just as Turkey's actions are inconsistent with the associational
rights of individuals, they likewise violate the rights of the organizations that have been shut down or otherwise impeded in their
work as human rights monitors.
2. Problems Faced by Human Rights Advocates
Human rights advocates in Turkey face many of the same
problems as lawyers, including illegitimate detention and prosecution. 5 8 In addition, human rights organizations are frequent
targets of intimidation and harassment, including formal closure
orders from the government. This subsection reviews a number
of examples of problems of the latter type and evaluates them
according to Turkey's international obligations described in the
preceding subsection.
The case of Akin Birdal is an extreme, though not unique,
example of the harassment of human rights advocates through
illegitimate prosecution. Birdal is the Chair of the HRA in Ankara, Turkey's largest human rights organization. As such, he
has been a target for prosecution both individually and on behalf of the organization. From 1995 to the present, Birdal has
been charged in not less than tewnty-one actions.3 5 9 He has
been convicted in three, for which he has been fined a total of
TL870,000 and sentenced to a year in prison, although appeal of
the conviction carrying the prison sentence is pending. 6 ° He
357. Defenders Declaration, supra note 339, art. 16.
358. The Turkish legal system all but guarantees such prosecutions with an array
of broadly worded security laws. For an example of the most commonly employed provisions, see Law of Associations art. 2908 (Turk.) (prohibiting "disseminating separatist
propaganda" and "inciting enmity between people through racial and regional discrimination"); Anti-Terror Law art. 8(1) (Turk.) (banning "disseminating separatist propaganda"); and PENAL CODE art. 312(2) (Turk.) (forbidding "inciting enmity between
people").
359. Unless otherwise indicated, this summary is based upon HUMAN RIGHTS AssoCIATION OF TURKEY, PROSECUTIONS, CASES AND CONVICTIONS LAUNCHED IN THE LAST Two
YEARS AGAINST THE HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION AND ITS PRESIDENT MR. AKIN BiRDAL

(1997).
360. Birdal was sentenced to one year in prison by the Konya SSC under Article
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has been acquitted seven times"' and currently has eleven actions pending against him, some carrying possible sentences up
to six years in prison. Most of the actions pending against him
are for speaking publicly in favor of a peaceful resolution to the
Kurdish problem. 6 2 The government justifies these prosecu312 of the Turkish Penal Code for a speech that he made in a meeting during a "1995
Peace Week" held in Mersin. The case is pending before the court of appeals.
In another action he was sentenced to three months in prison in connection with a
poster discussing a campaign against disappearances. That sentence was commuted to
a fine of TL450,000. And in July 1998, Birdal was sentenced to one year in prison by
the Ankara SSC after being retried for a speech that he made on "World Peace Day" in
1996. (The court of appeals had overturned the original conviction, under which
Birdal had also received a one-year sentence as well as a fine of TL420,000.). See Turk
Rights Campaigner Sentenced to One Year in Jail, REUTERS, July 28, 1998. The court of
appeals affirmed this second conviction on October 28, 1998. See Prisonfor Rights Advocate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1998.
361. Birdal was tried and acquitted in connection with (i) a written statement
made in a book published by the HRA entitled, Present to Emil Galip Sandalcl; (ii) a
speech that he made on December 10, 1996, during "Human Rights Week"; (iii) a
speech that he made on Yfiksel Street in Ankara on June 17, 1997; and (iv) a speech
that he made in connection with the "Peace Journey" in G61basi on September 2, 1997.
Birdal along with three other members of the HRA (Hiisn'i Ondfll, the former Secretary-General, Sedat Aslantas, the former Chair of the Diyarbakir branch, and Erol Anar)
were tried and acquitted in the Ankara SSC in connection with the HRA's 1993 Regional Report entitled, A Cross-Section of the Burnt Out Villages. Along with 17 members
of the HRA's executive board, Birdal was tried and acquitted in connection with a special edition of a bulletin entitled, The Sole Solution Is Peace. And together with ten other
HRA executive board members (Kamil Atesogullari, Selahattin Esmer, Meral Bekar,
Sedat Aslantas, Lutfi Demirkapi, Mahmut Sakar, Eren Keskin, Er~an Demir, Nazmi Cur,
and Gurseli Kaya), Birdal was tried and acquitted in the Heavy Penal Court No. 4 on
February 23, 1998, for organizing a meeting on Peace and Politics during Human
Rights Week in December 1996. See LAWYERs COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RiGHTS, ADvoCACY ALERT: UPDATE, HUMAN RiGHTS ASSOCiATioN-TuRKEY (1998).
362. Birdal faces a possible sentence of one to three years if convicted in the Istanbul SSC of charges under the Anti-Terror Law in connection with a speech that he
made at a symposium in February 1996. He faces the same term for charges under
Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code in connection with a speech that he made in
Istanbul during "Peace Week" in 1995. He is also facing trial in connection with (i) a
speech that he made on April 13, 1997, during a "Democracy Meeting" to protest an
event known as "the Susurluk incident"; (ii) a meeting organized for a campaign called
"One Million Signatures for the Peace"; (iii) a speech that he made marking the opening of the HRA's Mardin branch; (iv) his attendance at a peace conference in Rome in
October 1997; (v) a mission that he undertook to Northern Iraq to obtain release of
Turkish soldiers captured by the PKK (now before the court of appeals); (vi) a speech
made in connection with the United Nations Habitat Conference in Istanbul; (vii) a
speech published in the newspaper Cumhuriyet on February 14, 1996, concerning a mission to Gfilfikonak to investigate an incident there; (viii) a speech that he gave in
Ankara in May/June 1998 that allegedly undermined the State; and (ix) a meeting by
political parties and non-governmental organizations in Kizilay Square on April 13,
1997. Other defendants in this action include Ufuk Uras, President of the Freedom
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tions and others like them on the grounds that they are directed
against statements or activities that promote terrorist activity,
question the territorial integrity of the State, or question the republic's secular foundations. It is clear, however, that this application of the Anti-Terror Law to a wide range of nonviolent
political speech cannot be sustained under Article 10(2) of the
European Convention.
Taken together, the prosecutions against Birdal illustrate
how readily the Turkish government employs its legal mechanisms to silence individual human rights advocates. But Birdal is
not unique. Other human rights advocates in Turkey have also
suffered from multiple and prolonged prosecutions, many for
their shared association with the Human Rights Association. 6 3
Birdal's case is particularly apt, however, in that it illustrates the
connection between state-sponsored vilification of human rights
advocates and their vulnerability to violence from hostile, nonstate factions. In May 1998, just days before the delegation arrived in Turkey, Birdal was in his office in central Ankara when
two men with whom he had been meeting suddenly pulled out
guns and fired fourteen shots, hitting him six times. 6 4 He was
hospitalized in critical condition and nearly died. Although he
has substantially recovered from the shooting, Birdal continues
to suffer threats of future violence.
The violent targeting of Birdal provided no reprieve from
and Solidarity Party ("ODP"), Yavuz Onen, President of the Turkish Hunian Rights Federation, and Ahmet Tfirk, Deputy Chair of the People's Democracy Party ("HADEP").
363. For example, on September 8, 1997, Birdal and ten other members of the
HRA's national executive board (Nazmi Gur, Kamil Atesogullari, Selahattin Esmer,
Meral Bekar, Sedat Aslantas, Lufti Demirkapi, Mahmut Sakar, Eren Keskin, Ercan
Demir, and Gurseli Kaya) appeared before Ankara Heavy Penal Court No. 4 to face
charges of "disseminating separatist propaganda" and "inciting enmity between people
through racial and religious propaganda" under Article 2908 of the Law on Associations. The charges stemmed from an event called "Human Rights Week" that the HRA
organized in December 1996, during which leading HRA members and other intellectuals decried Turkish human rights violations and criticized government policies in
southeastern Anatolia. On February 28, 1998, the heavy penal court in Ankara acquitted the defendants on all charges. Although welcoming the acquittals, the delegation
remains concerned that had the prosecutions been successful, domestic human rights
advocacy in Turkey-already severely tested by harassment, intimidation, and outright
violence-would have been seriously undermined. Moreover, the delegation is concerned that nothing prevents the government from initiating similar prosecutions
against the defendants or other human rights advocates at any time.
364. Interview with Nazmi Gur, Secretary General, HRA of Turkey, in Ankara,
Turk. (June 4, 1998).
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further prosecution by the State. Only one week after the shooting, while he was recovering from his wounds in an Ankara hospital, the government initiated yet another prosecution against
Birdal, this time accusing him of undermining the State by giving a speech in Ankara. Approximately two months later, the
Ankara SSC sentenced Birdal to one year in prison for "inciting
hatred" in remarks again calling for a peaceful end to the Kurdish conflict. Birdal, still suffering from the shooting, was forced
to attend the session in a wheelchair.3 6 5
3. Problems Faced by Human Rights Organizations
This pattern of prosecution of individuals is only a part of
the Turkish government's attack on human rights advocacy.
Turkish law also enables the government to pursue human
rights organizations. Relying principally upon Article 54 of the
Law on Associations, local executives may shut down such
groups indefinitely, citing security grounds. Closures of this sort
remain an ongoing and pressing problem, especially in
Diyarbakir and other cities in the southeast. Indeed, no example better illustrates the authorities ability to subvert human
rights organizations than the closing of the HRA's Diyarbakir
branch.
On May 22, 1997, members of the Diyarbakir branch found
the doors to their office tied shut with an official wax lock accompanied by .a threatening note warning against attempting to
reopen. The same day several leaders of the organization were
arrested and detained for thirty-six hours. During that time they
were asked whether they were planning a protest against Turkish
army operations in northern Iraq, which they denied.3 6 6 On
May 23, the governor of the state of emergency zone for the region ordered the indefinite closure of the Diyarbakir branch of365. Turk Rights CampaignerSentenced to One Year in Jail, supra note 360.
366. For their part, the leaders of the Diyarbakir branch of the HRA have steadfastly denied the charges. In an earlier interview with the Lawyers Committee, Sinan
Tanrikulu, one of the members initially detained, stated, "We are not against the integrity of the State. We are not against the rights and freedoms of others and, far from
obstructing justice, we are always working for the rule of law." Towards this end, the
Diyarbakir branch in particular had achieved a reputation for collecting evidence and
otherwise facilitating complaints to the European Commission and the European
Court. These applications, many of which have been successful, have proven to be especially embarrassing to the Turkish government, which is bound by the provisions of the
European Convention.
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fice on the ground that it had violated Article 54 of the Law on
Associations. The order specified that the group's activities undermined the integrity of the state, threatened the rights of
others, and obstructed the course of justice.
Lawyers acting on behalf of the branch challenged the closure in the Diyarbakir Administrative Court, seeking both a reversal of the closure as well as a stay pending a final decision.
The Administrative Court upheld the closure, and the lawyers
for the Diyarbakir branch have since appealed to the Court of
Cassation, where the matter is pending. The office has been
closed for two years.
The ongoing closure of the Diyarbarkir branch not only undermines the speech and association rights of its members, but
also compromises legitimate human rights advocacy in the region, including providing assistance to individuals filing applications with the European Commission. Yet two years after the closure, no court has determined that the branch violated any law,
nor have any criminal charges been filed.
In a meeting with the delegation, Dr. Hikmet Sami Turk,
Turkey's then-Minister of Human Rights, drew a distinction between administrative closure on suspicion of illegal activity and
the initiation of criminal prosecution for that activity. He stated
that a local executive could order an administrative closure
notwithstanding the state's failure to mount a criminal prosecution.36 7 Yet this formal distinction proves too much. Closing an
organization on the ground that it either harbored illegal publications or planned illegal activity without pursuing prosecutions
for these activities permits the curtailment of speech and free
association based on a much lower standard of proof than would
be required in a criminal prosecution. Vague, unproved suspicions of illegal activity cannotjustify the indefinite suspension of
the rights of free speech and association guaranteed by Articles
10 and 11 of the Convention.
The closure of the Diyarbarkir branch is not an isolated example. On the contrary, the government has not hesitated to
employ its closure powers broadly, as it did in 1997 when as
many as seven branches of the HRA were shut down in the space
367. Meeting with Dr. Hikmet Sami Turk, then-State Minister for Human Rights,
in Ankara, Turk. (June 5, 1998).
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of four months.3 68 Though these closures proved temporary,
they raise significant concerns nonetheless. Even a limited shutdown materially disrupts-and chills-the human rights work
undertaken by the HRA and similar groups.
The sheer number and scope of the closings underscores
just how vulnerable human rights advocacy in Turkey remains.3 6 9
Besides that HRA, a number of other organizations have been
targeted for harassment or closure, among them some of the
most highly-regarded human rights organizations in Turkey.
For example, the government has taken a number of steps
against Mazlum Der, a leading Turkish human rights group emphasizing religious freedom. It has repeatedly searched the
group's offices in Istanbul and Ankara,37 ° seized its property,3 7 1
and otherwise interfered with its work.3 72
368. The closing of the Diyarbakir branch of the HRA marked the beginning of a
series of similar closures that lasted from two weeks to eighteen months. These included branches in Malatya (closed June 4, 1997, reopened July 23, 1997), Izmir
(closed June 27, 1997, reopened July 4, 1997), Konya (closed June 24, 1997, reopened
July 18, 1997), Urfa (closed June 27, 1997, reopened Dec. 22, 1998), Balikesir (closed
July 9, 1997, reopened 30 days later), and Mardin (closed August 6, 1997, reopened six
months later).
369. Such concerns were hardly diminished when, during this wave of HRA closings, Ankara prosecutor Nihat Ogan threatened to shut all fifty of the HRA's branch
offices, along with its Ankara headquarters, on the ground that the group violated the
Law on Associations.
370. On October 22, 1998, security forces, including members of the Anti-Terror
branch, raided the headquarters, searched documents, computer files, and archives,
and retained several of the items that they found. The officers conducting the raid did
not produce any search warrants, but instead stated that they were merely performing a
routine inspection according to Article 45 of the Law on Associations. One day later,
the Istanbul Governor's office issued an order to stop all transactions in Mazlum Der
bank accounts in light of a call from the press to contribute to the work of human rights
non-governmental organizations, including Mazlum Der.
371. During March 1998, for example, inspectors from the Ministry of Finance
seized all the account books for the last five years from both the Ankara headquarters
and the Istanbul branch. The inspectors filed a complaint accusing the organization of
lax record-keeping and claiming that the headquarters was coordinating illegal activities committed by the branches. Although the state prosecutor dropped all charges,
the investigation still continues and the books have yet to be returned.
372. In addition, the government has taken steps against Mazlum Der and its
members outside the major cities. In Sanliurfa, no fewer than eight prosecutions and
one investigation are proceeding against Sehmuz Ulek, a lawyer who is a director of the
local branch. Six of the proceedings involve alleged violations of the Law of Associations, while the other allege violations of Article 312 (inciting religious enmity) and
Article 158 (causing disrespect for security forces) of the Turkish Penal Code. On October 11, 1998, Ulek was also briefly detained after the nationwide "headscarf' demonstration. Police officers told Ulek that he had been detained "for his own safety." In
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On June 17, 1998, shortly after the delegation concluded its
mission, government authorities closed the Diyarbakir branch
office of the HRFT after less than a week of operation. This
branch would not be allowed to reopen for more than a month.
As grounds for that closure, the government cited the HRFT's
alleged failure to submit a notice of permission to establish a
branch office from the General Directorate of Foundations in its
application to the Diyarbakir Regional Directorate of Foundations. Yavuz Onen, the President of the HRFT maintains, however, that the HRFT adhered to all relevant requirements and
took every precaution in applying to open the Diyarbakir office
precisely because the group anticipated possible obstruction by
the authorities. The HRFT has earned widespread respect inside
and outside of Turkey for providing medical and psychological
aid to torture survivors and their relatives and documenting the
incidence of torture and other human rights violations. 3 The
similar fashion, police asked Prof. Nihat Bengisu, the director of the Kayseri branch, to
go to the police station after a press conference that he organized. Elsewhere, two
investigations are also proceeding against the director of the Mazlum Der branch in
Konya. See Letter via electronic mail from Yilmaz Ensaroglu, Mazlum Der, to the Lawyers Committee (Nov. 11, 1998).
373. While the delegation was still in Turkey, the Council of Europe awarded the
HRFT with one of the two human rights awards that it presents annually. Other honors
presented to the HRFT include the 1994 Roger Baldwin Medal of Liberty Award.
The work of the HRFT, including independent human rights monitoring as well as
rehabilitation for torture victims, is especially needed in southeastern Anatolia, where
Turkish armed forces have been fighting Kurdish guerrillas for fourteen years, and
where human rights violations have been most widespread. Amnesty International confirmed this ongoing need just days after the Diyarbakir closing in a report stating that
"torture continue[s] to be widespread and systematic in police stations and gendarmeries." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TuRKE. HuMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AT RISK (1994).
Onen, who characterized the HRFT as a de facto "Ministry of Human Rights," 'told the
mission that official intimidation has been a fact of life for his organization throughout
its existence. Among other examples, HRFT officials pointed to the prosecution of a
doctor who had helped identify torture in Adana, as well as anonymous phone threats
made to other doctors who aid the organization. The same officials further stated that
the government recently banned an exhibition on torture that was to have been held at
Izmir University.
More serious still, the HRFT claims to have evidence that the group was targeted at
a Ministry of Foreign Affairs human rights training session, during which an ambassador told the police in attendance that "the judiciary can't cope with the HRFT, so it's
up to you." Onen attributes this hostility to the HRFT's success before the European
Court and European Commission as well as the organization's ability to disseminate its
findings in English. As he put it, "it is not easy to issue the types of reports we do
without being subject to intimidation ....
If you are a human rights activist, you are
treated like a collaborator." Interview with Yavuz Onen, President of the HRFT, in Ankara, Turk. (June 4, 1998).
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circumstances of the closure suggest that it may have been an
attempt by the government to avoid-or at the least postponeany embarrassment from the dissemination of HRFT's work.3 74
D. Conclusion
Turkish human rights lawyers and advocates continue to
face harassment and intimidation as a result of their work. Some
of the threats, such as detention, prosecution, and administrative closures of organizations, come directly from the Turkish
government. Others, including death threats and physical assaults from hostile groups, are a result of the failure of the Turkish government to create a secure environment in which human
rights advocacy can take place. Many of these problems constitute violations of the human rights of lawyers and advocates
themselves. More broadly, the harassment and intimidation of
the human rights community undermines the pace of progress
towards the goal of eliminating all forms of human rights violations within Turkey.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the forgoing, the delegation offers the following recommendations for improvements within the areas examined
above.
A. Ensuring the Right to a Fair Trial
Turkey has a well-developed system of criminal justice
staffed by able lawyers, judges, and prosecutors that is nevertheless severely compromised by the existence of the SSC system.
The right to fair trial, and the rule of law generally, would be
better served by the abolition of the SSCs and by the integration
of their functions into the regular penal court system. Few, if
any, changes to existing courts and penal procedure would be
necessary in order to carry out this reform. Therefore, the dele374. Moreover, the Diyarbakir closing is not the first time that the authorities have
sought to hinder the HRFT's work in this manner. According to Onen, it took over a
year to get the HRIF established in the first place because government authorities objected to the term "torture treatment center" in its bill of establishment. Since its 1990
opening, the HRFT has facilitated treatment for over 3000 torture victims. Interview
with Yavuz Onen, President of the HRIFT, in Ankara, Turk. (June 4, 1998).

2240

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:2129

gation recommends the following measures to ensure the right
to a fair trial.
(i) The State Security Courts should be abolished and their
functions transferred to the existing penal courts, operating
under the existing Criminal Procedure Code.
Recognizing that this root and branch reform may be unrealistic in the present uncertain political circumstances, the delegation offers the following recommendations addressing different aspects of the work of the SSCs.
(ii) No one should be prosecuted for the nonviolent expression of political beliefs. The delegation endorses the recommendation of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly report
that the language of the Turkish Constitution should be reviewed by the European Commission for Democracy Through
Law ("Venice Commission") and that domestic reform of the
Constitution aimed at purging it of anti-democratic, authoritarian language should be undertaken, with a view to removing
the SSCs from the political arena.
(iii) Military judges should be removed from the judicial
panel in all cases in which civilians are defendants. As the European Court has noted, the presence of a military officer among
the judges violates the European Convention's guarantee of an
independent, impartial tribunal.
(iv) Executive influence over the Supreme Council of
Judges and Prosecutors should be eliminated in order to ensure
the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary,
as required in the Constitution. The role of the Minister of Justice as a member of the Supreme Council should be reviewed
with a view to decreasing his influence over the process of appointing, promoting, transferring, and disciplining judges and
prosecutors.
(v) Prosecutors should be empowered to take independent
action to carry out their full function as envisaged in Turkish
law, including fulfilling their obligation to safeguard the wellbeing of suspects during pre-arraignment detention. Additional
resources should be provided to prosecutors to enable them to
carry out their duties in full.
(vi) The security forces' power of detention should be
strictly controlled. They should have no power to detain on
their own authority except where the detainee presents an im-
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mediate danger to others or where a detainee is discovered in
the act of committing a crime.
(vii) All detainees, regardless of the gravity of the offense of
which they are accused, should be granted access to legal counsel within a maximum limit of fourty-eight hours. Defendants
must be given adequate access to legal advice during the vital
statement phase of the prosecution process, which often occurs
within the first few days of detention.
(viii) Lawyers representing defendants in SSC cases should
be permitted unfettered access to their clients and should not be
subjected to any form of intimidation or harassment because of
their work as defense lawyers.
(ix) In all cases, relatives should be informed within twentyfour hours that an immediate family member has been taken
into detention.
(x) Enhanced measures to safeguard detainees against torture during pre-trial detention must be enacted. Evidence
shown to be extracted by coercive, illegal measures must be excluded from the file. Records of all members of the security
forces coming into contact with detainees should be scrupulously maintained and be available to detainees and their legal
representatives.
B. PromotingAccountabilityfor Torture and Police Misconduct
The delegation recommends the following measures to promote the accountability of police, gendarme, and security for
members responsible for torture and other forms of misconduct.
(i) Amend Decree 285 such that public prosecutors rather
than provincial administrative boards in the State of Emergency
regions have the sole authority to initiate prosecution of security
forces alleged to have violated the law.
(ii) Amend the Temporary Law on the Procedure for Investigation of Civil Servants ("Civil Servamts Law") such that public
prosecutors rather than provincial administrative boards have direct authority and responsibility to investigate and prosecute
crimes by security force members, whether they are acting in
their administrative or their judicial capacities.
(iii) Initiate efforts to educate prosecutors regarding the
prevalence of torture and Turkey's obligations under international law to provide effective redress of such claims.
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(iv) Create independent procedures for recording every torture claim that is made to a prosecutor and the eventual disposition of the claim.
(v) Increase prosecutorial resources either through the creation of a judicial police force directly under the control of prosecutors or by other appropriate means designed to ensure effective, timely, and independent investigation and prosecution of
torture claims.
(vi) Where credible evidence exists implicating members of
the security forces in human rights violations, those officers
should be immediately removed from duty pending trial. Care
should be taken to avoid conflicts of interest in the investigation
of fellow officers by members of the security forces.
(vii) Require that physicians involved in the examination of
detainees receive adequate forensic training to identify the
sometimes subtle signs of torture; strengthen measures to protect physicians who report torture from harassment and intimidation; permit detainees to obtain medical examinations from
independent physicians and require that such reports be admissible as evidence of torture or coercion.
(viii) Require systematic record-keeping in places of detention, indicating the name of the detainee, location and duration
of detention, and identity of all examining officers. Adoption of
the recommendations concerning access to counsel can be expected to improve the accuracy of such record-keeping.
(ix) Implement all recommendations in the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture's "Public Statement on Turkey" of December 6, 1996, including reviewing past
sentences of officers convicted under Articles 243 and 245 of the
Penal Code to determine whether these articles should be
amended and strengthened.
C. Protecting and PromotingRespect for the Work of Lawyers and
Human Rights Advocates
The delegation recommends the following measures to ensure a safe working environment for defense lawyers and human
rights advocates and to promote respect for their work.
(i) Expeditiously resolve pending prosecutions against attorneys and human rights advocates and immediately dismiss those
cases in which no illegal activity has been proven.
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(ii) Curtail prosecution of attorneys and human rights advocates for their legitimate professional and political activities as
protected under Article 10 of the European Convention and
elaborated by the Defenders Declaration and the U.N. Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers.
(iii) Curtail the practice of administrative closure of organizations based on their legitimate political and professional activities as protected under Article 11 of the European Convention
and elaborated by the Defenders Declaration; reopen those organizations that have been closed based on such activities.
(iv) Promote a climate of respect and cooperation among
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys by educating all three
groups concerning their respective roles and responsibilities
within the criminal justice system. Particular attention must be
paid to eliminating the widespread identification of defense lawyers with the causes of their clients.
(v) Take all necessary steps to protect the safety of lawyers
both inside and outside the courtroom from those who threaten
them based on their representation of unpopular clients,
whether or not such threats are directly state-sponsored.
(vi) Take all necessary steps to protect the safety of human
rights advocates from those who would threaten them based on
their work, whether or not such threats are directly state-sponsored.
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APPENDIX TWO
TRIAL OBSERVATION REPORTS:
THE DIYARBAKIR PRISON KILLINGS
INTRODUCTION
From May 22 to June 5, 1998, the Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights ("Crowley Program") and
the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights ("Lawyers Committee") conducted a fact-finding mission in Turkey that focused,
inter alia, on the prosecution of security officers for alleged violations of human rights. One of the most important prosecutions
is the trial of sixty-five police officers and gendarmes for the
deaths of ten inmates of Diyarbakir E-Type Prison ("Diyarbakir
Prison Case").' Although the killings took place on September
24, 1996, the case was still pending as of May 17, 1999. On June
5, 1998, a member of the delegation observed a hearing in the
case. A second Lawyers Committee delegation observed a hearing on January 29, 1999. Below are the trial observation reports
of each delegation, followed by a brief assessment of the significance of their observations to the broader issue of police impunity. The reports are intended to provide the reader with a
sense of how the procedural obstacles to effective redress of police abuse in Turkey, analyzed in the main report, are manifested in an important impunity case.
I. TRIAL OBSERVATION AND INTERVIEWS
Each of the two following accounts includes interviews with
lawyers litigating the case, as well as observations of the hearings
themselves.
2
A. June 5, 1998 Hearing

On June 5, 1998, we arrived at the court building at approximately 9:30 a.m. There was no unusual commotion outside the
courthouse, although we later learned that several members of
the victims' families had been denied entrance to the building.
1. For a complete summary of the facts of the case, see notes 225-39 and accompanying text in the main report.
2. Marko Maglich of Fordham University School of Law with a translator
represented the Crowley Program/Lawyers Committee delegation at the June 5, 1998
hearing.
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We saw no journalists. The hearing was scheduled to begin at
10:00 a.m., but was delayed. We entered the offices of the
Diyarbakir Bar Association, located inside the judiciary building,
and spoke with victims' lawyers while we waited for the case to be
called.
1. Interviews with the Victims' Lawyers
We met with Sezgin Tanrikulu, Tahir El~i, and Fethi Gfinfis,
who represent the victims and their families. They briefly reported on what had happened in the previous hearing and
since, and on what they expected in this hearing.
The lawyers told us that at the last hearing autopsy photographs had been shown to forensic doctors. The victims' lawyers
at the time had requested a copy of a videotape of autopsies that
had been performed on the bodies of the victims. The videotape is an important piece of evidence because when the bodies
of the victims were brought to the morgue, the forensic specialist
refused to work overtime to perform the autopsies. As a result,
non-forensic medical staff performed the autopsies and the procedures were videotaped. Mr. Tanrikulu told us that the tape is
fifteen minutes and fifteen seconds long. The victims' lawyers
requested a copy of the tape to enable them to have an independent forensic expert review it. Although the court denied
the request, it granted an alternative request to have the court
send the tape to forensic experts for review.
The lawyers expected one topic of the hearing to be the
report of the forensic experts, although they had not yet seen
the report. They were informed that as of June 4, the day before
the hearing, the report had not yet reached the court. According to the lawyers, the court told them that it had taken a long
time to get the video to the forensic doctors, delaying the report.
As it happened, the court faxed the report to the Diyarbakir Bar
Association office during our meeting with the lawyers. The report arrived one-half hour before the scheduled starting time of
the hearing. Although the hearing was delayed an hour, the lawyers still had only one and one half hours to review and consider
the report. The report had been requested on April 24, 1998,
one and one half months earlier. Moreover, the report was only
one page in length. It stated no cause of death for any of the
victims. Mr. Tanrikulu commented that a professional autopsy

2252

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol.22:2129

was not necessary to see from the pictures that brain trauma was
the cause of all the deaths. He noted that the doctors stitched
up the dead victims' heads to stop their bleeding. The report
gave no reason for the failure to determine and include an official cause of death. We retained a copy of the one-page report.
The lawyers expected a second topic in the hearing would
be the ongoing effort to locate defendants in order to obtain
their testimony. The court had not been able to locate five of
the defendants and therefore had been unable to obtain testimony from them. The court had written to four or five other
defendants to invite them to testify at courts in the cities in
which they were now posted. Seven prison guards had been invited to testify at the day's hearing.3 The victims' lawyers said
that these seven guards were "the last important witnesses to be
heard" because the court had denied a request to bring transferred prisoners from Gaziantep to testify. The court had also
denied a request to compel the defendants to appear in court
during the hearings.
The third topic for the hearing to consider was a reply from
prison management to a court request for an explanation of
prison visitation procedures. The victims' lawyers argue that, following standard prison practice on the day of the killings, prison
officials did not inform the prisoners generally that they were to
receive visitors until an hour before the visit and did not specifically identify the individual prisoners that actually had visitors
until ten minutes before the prisoners were called to meet them.
The victims' lawyers contend that this standard practice belies
the defense's theory that a pre-planned prisoner riot precipitated the violence.
We noted that the prosecutor's indictments against the defendants do not allege murder. The indictments charge that the
police and gendarmes "abused their duty" in "causing death by
injury in a way that the perpetrators cannot be determined and
in a manner exceeding the limits of necessity and without intention to kill."4 Given the nature of the charge, we asked Mr.
3. Under the laws protecting civil servants, criminal defendants who are civil servants are not required to appear in court. Moreover, under the Law to Fight Terrorism,
security forces accused of crimes while on duty may remain on active duty pending
determination of the charges.
4. Note that there is a separate case against the prison guards where the indict-

ment alleges "injury," a different crime. The victims' lawyers stressed in an earlier meet-
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Tanrikulu what was the prosecution's theory of the case and
whether the prosecution accepted the defense's theory that the
violence had been precipitated by a pre-planned prisoner riot
and resulting fight between inmates and security forces. In response, Mr. Tanrikulu first noted that the question of whether
any initial disturbance had occurred is irrelevant to the question
of whether excessive force was intentionally used on prisoners
after any disturbance had been quelled. Mr. Tanrikulu then explained that the prosecutor's office, despite being legally responsible for the investigation, did not conduct an independent inquiry and had relied entirely upon police and gendarme reports,
5
which, not surprisingly, minimized the officers' responsibility.
2. Trial Observation
We met with the lawyers for about an hour and one half.
The case was called around 11 a.m. It took some time to climb
the stairs and pass through a hallway into the courtroom because
the police were searching those entering. Police officers
searched us twice. A group of German nationals was not allowed
to enter with their bags "by order of the head of the court."
They had no translator, so our interpreter translated the police
officers' instructions to them.
While waiting to enter the courtroom we spoke with two
young lawyers interning with the Diyarbakir Bar Association.
They told us that the police normally try to prevent people from
observing such trials and that they are especially resistant to the
interns attending. The interns told us that they can usually maneuver their way in. We entered the courtroom and seated ourselves in the gallery, with a direct and unobstructed view of the
proceedings.
The court was the Diyarbakir Third Heavy Penal Court.
ing with the delegation that the procedural maneuvers that allowed the various cases to
be severed also allowed inconsistent charges against the different defendants in an incident in which it appeared that the guards, police, and gendarmes acted together.
5. The delegation previously obtained copies of the gendarmes' reports. These
consisted of virtually identical statements by different defendant-gendarmes, taken by
two gendarme investigators and one police investigator. The reports are short, lack
detail, and contain clear misstatements of fact. For example, the reports refer to the
imprisoned victims as the "arrested and convicted," while the victims were in fact pretrial detainees. The reports also assert that the victims had not been beaten on the
head, while the autopsy pictures clearly show gaping wounds in the backs of the victims'
heads.
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The gallery where we sat was raised up from the floor of the
court. It raked up at a sharp angle, so that when we took our
seats we looked downward on the proceedings. The gallery had
about twelve rows of finished white stone benches. It was quite
full when we entered, but two people moved back to give us seats
in the center of one of the forward rows.
Below and facing us sat the three judges behind a judicial
bench raised from the courtroom floor. The chief judge sat in
the center. One of the other two judges was a woman. To the
left of the judges on the same level sat the public prosecutor.6 A
relief bust of Mustafa Kemal Atatfirk, the father of modern Turkey, surveyed the scene from the center of the high marble wall,
above the chief judge.
Below and before the public prosecutor, Fethi Gfinfis sat in
the lead victims' lawyer chair. In front of him were twelve other
victims' lawyers. Directly opposite the victims' lawyers sat the two
defense lawyers, Ziya Ozmen and Selim Karakoyun. No defendants were present in court. The bailiff called the names of four
or five prison guards who were witnesses, but none were present.
The bailiff then called as a witness, Serafettin Cammur, who entered the courtroom and took his place facing the judge.
At first, the judge conducted his own questioning. Responding, Cammur testified that he knew some of the accused
because of their popularity and high rank. He told the court
that he had worked the night shift and slept in the prison guest
house, near the prison on the night of September 23, 1996. He
left the prison in the morning of September 24, but returned in
the afternoon between 2:30 and 3:00 in the afternoon, even
though it was his day off. He stayed in the prison for one hour.
Cammur testified there were crowds around the prison, as
well as gendarmes. He had heard that gendarmes had entered
the prison, but did not see them himself. Cammur told the
court that he himself saw ambulances going in and out of the
prison and that he saw people carrying out the injured. Cammur testified that later that night he had learned that there had
been fatalities. The judge asked if Cammur knew whether prisoners had been transferred from the prison and when any trans6. Our other trial observations in Turkey had, by this time, made us familiar with
this arrangement. In Turkey, the prosecutor-considered part of the court-sits on an
equal level with the judges, while the defense or victims' lawyers sit below.
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fer had occurred. Cammur responded that he had been told
that there had been a prisoner transfer, but that he did not
know what time it had occurred. When asked by the judge if he
had "heard anything," Cammur testified that he heard an argument between prisoners and police. He further testified that he
did not see the argument.
The chief judge then turned to the victims' lawyers to submit questions.7 Mr. Tanrikulu stated to the court that Cammur
had previously told investigating gendarmes that he had not only
heard, but also seen the events surrounding the alleged confrontation between prisoners and police. Mr. Tanrikulu asked the
court to explore the apparent discrepancy between the witness'
testimony and his prior statement. 8 The judge then asked the
witness what he had seen, to which Cammur responded that he
had seen "a few things ... people coming in and out." He testified that he had not seen any bodies close up. Victims' lawyers
pressed by confronting Cammur with a photo of the split head
of a victim and asking how he could "hear" dead bodies.
Victims' lawyer Tahir Elgi questioned why Cammur was at
the prison on his day off. Cammur responded that he was there
because he had been staying in the prison guest house. Cammur
insisted that he had not been called to report to the prison. He
added that even in an emergency, he would not have been called
to the prison on his day off.
At this point, defense lawyer Ziya Ozmen leapt to his feet
and asserted that the deaths resulted from an argument or altercation. The judge asked whether the witness knew of police hitting the victims. The witness replied that he only knew of deaths
and injuries and not who had inflicted them.
7. The normal procedure in Turkey is for lawyers to question witnesses through
the judge; they would propose a question and the judge would ask it. Sometimes the
lawyers would propose a question and the judge would pursue a line of questioning in
that area. Occasionally, however, lawyers would address the witness directly. The witness faced the bench throughout, his back to us.
8. Police reports and statements from defendants argue that the victims died from
injuries sustained during a fight with prison officers. The victims' lawyers contend that
the fatal beatings took place in a separate room, outside the corridor where the original
confrontation took place, and after the victims were bound and subdued. This contention is consistent with statements made by guards and other prisoners to the victims'
lawyers outside the courtroom. However, because of obstacles to producing witnesses
and to using witness testimony in civil servants' trials, the victims' lawyers have not been
able to introduce any direct testimony supporting their version of events.
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The chief judge and the lawyers probed further inconsistencies between Cammur's prior statement and his testimony. They
confronted him with his earlier statement that he had actually
seen some of the events. He responded that he had seen the
injured being taken out from far away. Fethi Ginfis asserted the
area was not large enough for the witness to have seen from far
away. "It's not an airport!" said Gfiniis-a statement the chief
judge put into the record.
Gfinils criticized the court and prosecutor for the delays
and lack of resolution in the case and for reports that victims'
families and the public had been denied access to the current
hearing. Gfinfis stated that some victims' family members had
been detained trying to attend. He complained that only foreigners and lawyers had been allowed in the courtroom even
though the court had not declared the hearing closed to the
public. (Observers in the gallery that we spoke with told us that
they were lawyers, legal interns, or policemen, along with the
German nationals). In response, the chief judge said witnesses'
and families' protection were the prosecutor's responsibility.
The prosecutor, who had been silent to this point in the hearing,
said nothing.9 Mr. Gfinils also asked why only one of the seven
called witnesses had come. The chief judge replied that the
court had written to all seven, and to the defendants, but had
received no reply.
The chief judge read out the prison authorities' letter on
visitation procedures and the forensic report on the videotaped
autopsy. Mr. Gfinfis argued that these, along with the fact that
the prisoners took no hostages indicated that, contrary to the
defense's contention, there was no organized rebellion. He
pointed out that even the one-page report revealed gaping head
wounds. He emphasized that the wounds were in the same spot
on each victim. He argued that the killers had all hit at the same
target and that this was not consistent with the kind of wounds
that they would have sustained in a fight with the security forces.
He asserted that the victims had been taken out of the corridor
9. The delegation noted the apparent lack of participation by the prosecutor in
the hearing. The prosecutor sat silently throughout. He did not question the witness.
When the chiefjudge told the victims' lawyers that the safe passage of the families and
the public into the courthouse was the prosecutor's responsibility, the prosecutor sat
quietly, covering his mouth and looking down-a posture that he had adopted for
much of the hearing.
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and beaten. Mr. Tanrikulu made three requests. He asked that
the video of the autopsy be shown in court, that the court provide enough security so that the public and victims' families
could get from the street to the courtroom, and that the court
order the arrest of the defendants.
Defense counsel' countered that the Turkish Penal Code
prohibited detention of the accused during the trial, on the
grounds that if they were found not guilty, the state would not
compensate them."° Defense counsel further asserted that the
victims had no grounds for claiming that a prisoner riot leading
to the incident was "impossible." Defense counsel also objected
to the German nationals taking notes because they had no translators and could obviously not understand the proceedings. To
this, the chief judge replied that they were permitted to take
notes. The court then took a recess to consider the lawyers'
other requests.
Outside the courtroom during the recess, lawyers told us
that hundreds of people, including members of the public and
victims' relatives, had been waiting across the street from the judiciary building because they had been denied admission to the
hearing. The police had reportedly detained some of them, but
subsequently released them when lawyers intervened. The lawyers speaking to us said that two or three relatives of the victims
had been able to enter the courtroom.
When the hearing resumed, two more victims' lawyers were
present on the left. The chiefjudge reported that the court was
unable to locate one of the defendants to invite him formally to
appear in court. Although the chief judge then noted that
under Turkish Penal Procedure Code section 223, defendants
normally are required to appear, the court did not order their
appearance.
The chief judge stated into the record that the court had
determined that it needed autopsy reports for each victim and
that it needed to know what had happened to the clothes that
the defendants had been wearing at the time. He also rejected
the victims' request to have the defendants arrested. The chief

10. While most or all of the victims had been in long-term pre-trial detention when
they were killed, their arrests were for crimes within State Security Court jurisdiction
and this Turkish Penal Code protection therefore did not apply to them.
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judge then announced the date of the next hearing and adjourned the court.
As the court adjourned, the mother of one of the victims
who had been seated with the victims' lawyers stood up and-speaking in Kurdish-began asking the court for her rights.
Someone near us in the gallery who spoke Kurdish translated
her words to us. According to that person, she said to the court,
"If we don't get results in this court, we will go to the European
Court," meaning the European Court of Human Rights.
As we gathered our belongings to leave the courtroom, a
man in sunglasses approached us and asked who we were and
what we were doing. Upon our asking him the same, he told us
that he was from the police. We asked whether he was on duty.
He told us he happened to be on duty, but had only come to the
hearing out of curiosity. We asked him about the reports that
victims' relatives had been denied access to the hearing. He
said, 'You got in, didn't you?" When we pressed him, he told us
no one had prevented the families from getting into court. The
officer visibly chafed under our questions, and we ended the interview. After the hearing, we went to the airport in Diyarbakir
for our return flight to Ankara.
3. Interview with Defense Lawyers
On the afternoon of June 5, 1998, on the return flight from
Diyarbakir to Ankara, we saw two of the defense lawyers from the
hearing, Ziya Ozmen and Selim Karakoyun. We formulated
some questions in the hope of interviewing them. Upon landing, we approached them. They offered us a car ride from the
airport into the city, which we accepted. This ride gave us the
opportunity to interview them briefly regarding the case and to
record observations that they wanted to make regarding the
human rights issues that the delegation was investigating.
The defense lawyers spoke of the facts of the case as they
saw them, as well as the roles of the lawyers involved. They first
said that the intervention of the special police unit at the prison
was warranted because the governor's permission was granted.
The lawyers were referring to a special anti-terror police unit
that had been ordered into the prison and, according to the victims' families and lawyers, had participated in the violence
against prisoners. In the. case.of a riot, they said, the police may
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enter the prison with the governor's permission. They said that
the police had entered to "split communication between parts of
the prison."
Regarding the prosecution, the defense lawyers said that the
job of the judiciary was to find those guilty of a charged crime. If
a perpetrator could not be found, there should be no conviction.1 1
Implying that other prisoners killed the victims, the defense
lawyers said that those who died were all informants who after
their arrest had provided information to the police about alleged "illegal organizations." The lawyers buttressed this assertion by claiming that every subsequent search of the prison had
turned up makeshift weapons-such as knives made from forks,
spoons, iron bars, and radiators-illegal documents, and evidence of communications in and out of the prison. The defense
lawyers said that they did not have this evidence, but that it was
documented by the court and the prosecutor should have it.
We asked them about the reliability of the police's internal
investigation in this case. They said that the investigations were
reliable because the police were obligated to follow specific procedures in such investigations.
The defense lawyers had a number of criticisms of the victims' lawyers. The defense lawyers stressed that only the victims'
lawyers saw inconsistencies between the testimony and prior
statement of the day's one witness. The defense lawyer's seemed
to imply that the victims' lawyers were improperly basing their
position on matters outside of the court record. The defense
lawyers also criticized the victims' lawyers for seeking the death
penalty in a case where the individual perpetrators are not identifiable. Finally, the defense lawyers criticized the victims' lawyers for requesting that the defendants be detained.
Explaining why they traveled from Ankara for the case, the
defense lawyers explained that they had to come in from Ankara
because no Diyarbakir lawyer would defend members of the security forces. They also said that a large number of lawyers were
listed as victims' lawyers in this case, while the two of them toiled
alone for the defendants. 12 When questioned about any dangers
11. We note here that facts as presented in the trial have not yet identified the

specific officers alleged to have done the killings.
12. There are 83 lawyers of record for the victims.
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to lawyers representing members of the security forces, the defense lawyers said that they did not themselves feel intimidated.
They knew of one lawyer, Sadik Tokucoglu, however, who was
shot on his way to Izmir to participate in such a case. The defense lawyers also noted that their clients felt much pressurefor the defendants Diyarbakir is a hostile environment where no
lawyers would defend them and everyone assumed their guilt.
The defense lawyers expressed an underlying distrust of
human rights activists in general. Mr. Karakoyun told us that in
police trials, human rights activists tend to sabotage the proceedings. Both Karakoyun and Ozmen said that the activists' tactics
were to appeal to conscience in order that judicial principles
would be undermined. They felt that terrorist and political defendants "held all the power in their hands." They asserted that
Turkish human rights organizations are tools for illegal organizations such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party ("PKK"). They felt
that the Human Rights Association does "politically motivated
work." The defense lawyers also felt that foreign criticism of
Turkey's human rights record was unfair. They reminded us, in
a pointed comparison to the United States, that there had been
no judicial executions in Turkey since 1980.1'
With respect to the independence of the judiciary, the lawyers emphasized the immunity of judges and prosecutors from
both criminal and civil actions for acts undertaken in a judicial
capacity. They felt that decisions on transferring judges and
prosecutors, however, are made on a political basis.
We told the defense lawyers that our delegation had spoken
with several prosecutors. We then asked the defense lawyers
about the role of the prosecutor in cases involving alleged police
abuses. They told us that the prosecutor represents the victims,
in the name of the government. They spoke of the prosecutor's
investigative role and noted that defendants in this case had
been interviewed in the prosecutor's office. With respect to the
prosecutor's apparent passivity at the day's hearing, the lawyers
told us that only the victims' lawyers were probing the witness's
purportedly inconsistent prior statements because only the vic13. As this report goes to press, Turkish authorities must decide whether to end
this defacto moratorium and allow a June 29, 1999 sentence of execution to be carried
out on Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the outlawed Kuridstan Worker's Party ("PKK"). See
Turkey: Will Ocalan Die?; ECONOMIST, July 3, 1999, at 41.
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tims' lawyers saw these inconsistencies. They asked why the prosecutor would probe an inconsistency that he did not see.
The interview was brief-about an hour-but we were able
to ask some of the questions that we had formulated on the
flight to Ankara. Karakoyun and Ozmen seemed pleased to have
a chance to report their opinions on the Diyarbakir proceedings.
B. January 29, 1999 Hearing"4
1. Interviews with Victims' Lawyers
The evening before the hearing, January 29, 1999, we interviewed three of the lawyers representing the victims' and their
families, Sezgin Tanrikulu, Mustafa Ozer, and Emin Oktar.
These lawyers believe that this case, which has now gone on for
two and one-half years, is being deliberately delayed. They report that there have been seven or eight different judges assigned to the case and that the prosecutor has been less than
diligent in pursuing the testimony of witnesses. Often a hearing
will last less than a quarter of an hour because the witnesses do
not attend, a file is lost, a report has not arrived, etc., and then
another month goes by before another hearing is scheduled.
In this case, because of the poor job done by the prosecutor
in the initial investigation as well as the bureaucratic confusion
of the administrative council process, the witnesses have never
officially been interviewed in any detail. This means that their
testimony is being taken for the first time two and one half years
after the killings occurred. Many of the witnesses are no longer
working in the region and must be interviewed in remote areas
by judges and prosecutors unfamiliar with the case. This does
not seem to be a process well-calculated to disclose the truth of
what happened. With a reluctant judge and prosecutor and two
and one half years of delay, ascertaining what happened in this
case will be very difficult.
The victims' lawyers were very pessimistic about any prospects for improvement in the climate of impunity enjoyed by
members of the security forces. They were not surprised that a
court in Manisa had recently reinstated its decision to acquit police accused of torture there. They noted that the chief prosecu14. The members of the second Lawyers Committee delegation were Prof. Tracy
Higgins of Fordham University School of Law, Sam Scott Miller, of the law firm of
Orrick, Herrington and Sutcliffe, and a translator.
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tor in Manisa had previously been in Diyarbakir. According to
the victims' lawyers, it is no accident that those judges and prosecutors who can be relied upon to protect the interests of the
state end up in the controversial cases.
2. Trial Observation
This hearing was one in a series of evidentiary hearings in
the trial of the police and gendarmes accused of beating ten
prisoners to death.
On the morning of the hearing, we met victims' lawyer
Sezgin Tanrikulu at his office and went to the court house with
him. At 9:30 a.m., the security at the court was somewhat higher
than we have seen outside the southeast region but did not seem
particularly heavy. We spoke with journalists and explained our
interest in the case. The press attention in Diyarbakir was substantially less than that in both Manisa and in Afyon, where a
hearing in the trial of police accused of killing Metin Goktepe
had taken place two days before.'" We made a point of connecting this case with the Afyon and Manisa cases regarding the impunity question. The cases do not seem to be so linked in the
minds of those monitoring the impunity issue outside this region.
Around 10:00 a.m., the case was called. As we entered the
courtroom, we were searched and filmed by police and by journalists. The judge took care of some administrative details and
then began to report on witness testimony that had been taken
at a different location by anotherjudge. Two witnesses had been
interviewed in this manner. Five testified in court this day.
The witnesses all reported similar variations on the same
story, depending on where they had been located in the prison
during the incident. They reported that it was visitation day and
that this cell block was to be the third to meet visitors. On the
way to the visitation center, the prisoners began talking with
other prisoners in other cell blocks, apparently in violation of
prison rules. Although the guards warned them not to do this,
15. This delegation also observed a trial in Manisa, as well as the one in Diyarbakir,
in a five-day trial observation mission to Turkey in January 1999. The full report on the
Manisa trial is available from the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and from the
Joseph R. Crowley Program in International Human Rights at Fordham University
School of Law.
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one witness acknowledged that this was not particularly unusual
behavior. The prisoners were confrontational, and one of them
hit the chief guard. After that, a fight erupted. At this point, the
guards closed the gates to block off the corridor. The trapped
prisoners forced the fifth gate open and asked their friends in
other cell blocks to give them extra clothes. Sezgin Tanrikulu
later explained that this suggested that the prisoners expected
that they might be beaten and wanted the extra layers of clothes
to protect themselves from truncheon blows. The fight among
the prisoners and guards continued until the guards were ordered to leave the area. The director of the prison and the chief
prosecutor called for reinforcements and the police and gendarmes were sent in.
The next involvement of the guards was to carry the
wounded from the detention center. Those who testified had
either carried prisoners themselves or seen others doing so.
They admitted that most of the wounded had to be carried. The
judge asked about the location of the wounds, and they said they
were all over their bodies, especially on their heads. One of the
witnesses said that he fainted because of the sight of all the
blood. The wounded were carried to the visitation room. This
room is where the victims' lawyers allege that nine of the victims
were killed, though none of the witnesses mentioned this fact
today. One of the witnesses paused before answering critical
questions such as "Did you see what happened after the security
forces were let in?" A Turkish observer later expressed the opinion that the witness had paused to convey to observers that he
was being compelled to lie under the circumstances.
This story was repeated by all of the witnesses with some variations depending on their individual situations. The judge appeared to the delegates to be reasonably even-handed and conscientious in his questioning. This observation was later confirmed by the lawyers for the victims. They felt that he accurately
recorded the testimony when he summarized it for the court reporter. Nevertheless, the judge did not pursue certain obvious
questions such as whether the "injured" detainees were still alive
at the time that they were removed. There was no mention of
anyone who had been killed, only injured. Also, the judge did
not show any of the photographs of the victims to the witnesses.
It seems that this action would have been relevant and useful as
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they testified about the appearance of the victims and the extent
of their injuries.
Following the testimony, the victims' lawyers made several
requests. They asked that the defendants be arrested-none are
currently-and they asked that the witnesses be shown pictures
of the victims when they are questioned. The evidentiary status
of the photographs is still in question. They also asked that the
doctor responsible for sending the prisoners to the hospital be
indicted. They requested an investigation of the crime scene
and to be provided a copy of the Ministry ofJustice investigator's
report on the testimony of one of the witnesses. Finally, during
the course of his argument, one of the victims' lawyers compared
this case to Goktepe and Manisa as a test of Turkey's resolve to
prosecute human rights violators.
The defendants' lawyers responded, arguing that the doctor
should not be charged, that the defendants should not be arrested, and that the photographs should not be used in evidence. We were not able to speak with the defense lawyers as
they are based out of Ankara and left immediately following the
hearing. According to the victims' lawyers, the theory of the defense seems to be that there was a riot in the prison and that this
force was necessary, though perhaps unfortunate. The victims'
lawyers also believe that the defense lawyers mean to imply that
the prisoners may have attacked one another. This is consistent
with the comments of these lawyers to other delegation members observing an earlier hearing.
Interestingly, the defendants' lawyers also specifically objected to the comparison of this case to Goktepe and Manisa.
They said that, unlike those cases in which the victims were presumably innocent, this case involved a prison riot. Hence, the
actions of the police were justified here. Note, however, that the
prisoners here had not been convicted of any crime. They were
imprisoned pending their trial. The only distinction between
their status and that of the accused police and gendarmes in this
case is that the police and gendarmes are free and remain on
duty.
The hearing lasted approximately two hours. After the testimony and the lawyers' arguments, the court recessed briefly, and
we left the courtroom. As we left, we were again filmed by press
and police. After about ten minutes, the court reconvened. The
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judge announced that the motions to arrest the defendants and
to charge the doctor were denied at least for now. A ruling on
the photographs and the other motions was postponed.
By the time we left the court, security had increased considerably. Outside the courtroom, there were police overseeing
and filming our exit. Outside the building, there were many
more police and police vehicles, and they seemed to be restricting foot traffic around that courthouse. The police continued to
videotape us as we proceeded out of the courtroom, through the
courthouse, outside and across a parking lot, where we entered
our car and drove away.
II. ASSESSMENT
The Diyarbakir Prison Case involves the prosecution of police officers accused of gross violations of human rights. It has
garnered local and international attention as a test case for the
Turkish government's commitment to hold members of the security forces accountable for their actions. To date, the Turkish
government has a poor record in this regard, though it notes
that more police are facing trial than in the past.
The case is a stark example of how the judicial system can
fail victims of official abuse. Public prosecutors, under a legal
duty to investigate and prosecute crimes fully, look no further
than the version of events supplied by the police's internal interviews. Defendants fail to appear in court. Witnesses from the
security forces cannot be compelled to appear. Inmates who witnessed the incident have been transferred to prisons in other
towns, and the court continues to deny them permission to
travel to Diyarbakir to testify. Some testimony from these ostensibly unavailable witnesses is taken in the remote locations in
which they are now imprisoned. Judges and prosecutors unfamiliar with the case take that testimony without even the benefit
of the case file. Victims' lawyers are not present because the expense and danger are prohibitive.
The trial has been subject to numerous debilitating delays
and postponements. For example, after nearly two years of hearings, the court does not yet have autopsy reports. It was not until
the June 5, 1998 hearing that the court acknowledged the need
for autopsy reports on each victim. Delays continue while the
court and lawyers await forensic evidence of obvious materiality.
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The witnesses' and defendants' unavailability has also caused numerous delays. In each of the two hearings that we observed, the
court denied motions to arrest the defendants. Only one of
seven "invited" guard-witnesses appeared at the June hearing.
The testimony of the others was postponed. Seven months later,
five more appeared. During the period in which they failed to
appear, the absent guards were living and working in Diyarbakir,
where the court is located.
We saw examples of two other problems that seem to undermine attempts to prosecute alleged police impunity in Turkey:
the victims' lawyers' lack of access to potential evidence, and
prosecutors' and judges' failure to investigate and prosecute the
alleged crimes fully. As to evidence, the lack of important witness testimony created a number of problems in the two hearings. At the June hearing, when lawyers questioned the six
guards' failure to appear, the court could only respond that they
had sent the guards "invitations" and that the latter had simply
failed to respond. Even the witnesses that the court does schedule fail to appear. More postponements result. Eventually, the
witnesses appear and contribute their pieces of the story, and a
meager factual picture emerges piecemeal as months of litigation turn into years.
Other witnesses-the transferred prisoners-never appear
in Diyarbakir to give their eyewitness accounts. The court has
denied them permission to come. Earlier in the mission, delegates had reviewed the court's denials. The court gave no 'explanation except that the law permitted them to deny the motions.
The defendants were conspicuously absent from both hearings, as they have been throughout the trial. This absence protects the defendants from being identified by witnesses. Moreover, in both hearings, the court denied motions to arrest the
defendants. The defendants remain on active duty and in a position to influence the testimony of others.
In the June hearing, the defense argument against arresting
the defendants was that the Turkish Penal Code prohibited
arrest on the ground that the defendants' loss of freedom would
be uncompensable should the court find them not guilty. The
transferred prisoners, meanwhile, are still detained nearly three
years later, many of them still awaiting trial on the charges
against them in State Security Courts. The fact that the law pro-
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vides such a double standard seems to be complemented by a
sense that the victims here deserve the inferior treatment that
they received. The defense lawyers' objection to arresting the
defendants, and the court's yielding to it, revealed an easy acceptance of this double-standard. In the second hearing, the defense lawyers distinguished the Manisa and Goktepe cases on the
very ground that the Diyarbakir victims were prisoners, implying
that they deserved such treatment.
The observed hearings also underscored the importance of
in-court testimony as opposed to testimony collected at remote
locations. The victims' lawyers, denied much of the evidence to
support their version of events, were nevertheless able to discredit the guards' version by impeaching the one witness who
did appear in June. The fact that one witness presented this opportunity highlights the potentially debilitating effect of the continued absence of other witnesses. Not only do missing witnesses
represent missing pieces of the story, but also they protect the
official story by precluding opportunities to challenge it.
Unequal access to evidence is an additional handicap for
the victims' lawyers. For example, the defendants' lawyers reported that weapons and documents were discovered in searches
of the prison. To date, none of this evidence has been made
available to the victims' lawyers. Moreover, the defendants and
their colleagues have direct access to the prison, calling into
question the integrity of evidence turned up in those searches.
The victims' lawyers, by contrast, are afraid to enter the prison to
interview witnesses or search for evidence. They say that the opportunities are rife for the security forces to find some pretext to
detain the lawyers if they venture into the prison. Cases such as
that pending against twenty-four Diyarbakir lawyers (some of
whom represent the victims in this case) would seem to support
these fears.
Put to such disadvantage, the victims' lawyers are reduced to
implying by circumstantial proof that some story other than that
presented by the defense exists. In the first hearing, these lawyers tried to use the prisons' visitation policy to cast doubt on the
defense and prosecution theory that the deaths resulted from a
riot. The victims referred to the one-page autopsy indicating
identical head wounds to question the defendants' assertion the
blows were random. Meanwhile, witnesses who might have provided positive proof of a different scenario remain absent from
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the courtroom because, as the court said, the law permits their
absence.
The prosecutor has refused to make an independent inquiry beyond the story as presented by the police in their internal investigation. Defense lawyers note that investigating officers
are bound by certain procedures in questioning their colleagues
and that guards were interviewed in the prosecutor's office. The
security forces' statements in the record, however, are short and
lacking in detail. Moreover, we observed no willingness on the
prosecutor's part to probe in-court witnesses beyond their own
previous statements. This responsibility is left to the victims' lawyers.
In both hearings, the chief judge appeared fair in his questioning. He allowed the victims' lawyers to probe the witnesses
and recorded the proceedings faithfully. As the delegation at
the January hearing observed, however, he omitted some obvious questions. Moreover, he denied the victims' evidentiary motions without explanation, again and again.
In Turkey, the standard of proof for criminal conviction is
guilt to a moral certainty. The victims' lawyers have been denied
the use of evidence to support affirmatively their version of
events and are limited to challenging the occasional witnesses'
inconsistent statements and employing circumstantial proof
such as the visitation policy to cast some doubt on the official
story. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the
victims' lawyers can meet the burden of proof for conviction. No
one denies that the additional witnesses exist. It is only the lawful refusal to allow them to testify at trial and, in the case of
security officers, the lawful refusal to compel their appearance,
that impose these fetters on the victims. These, in combination
with the prosecutor's lack of diligence, may prove fatal to the
victims' case.
If the prosecution fails for these reasons, the victims may be
denied the effective remedy required by international law. As
the European Court of Human Rights said in Aksoy v. Turkey, the
right to an effective remedy includes a "thorough and effective
investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and including effective access for the
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complainant to the investigatory procedure."1 6 Nearly three
years after ten prisoners' skulls were caved in, such a remedy
continues to elude those prisoners' families.

16. Aksoy v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.. judgment of Dec. 18, 1996, 26 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2260, 2287, 98 (1996-VI).

